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This study is an analysis of the United States policy in
counterinsurgency as it was implemented in the country of
Colombia in the physical and military defeat of an insurgent
guerrilla movement within that country. It was the objective
of the policy of counterinsurgency to achieve this task by
aiding in the upgrading and professional development of Co
lombia's military and policy forces. In accomplishing this
objective, the Colombian government was able to wage a suc
cessful military campaign against the insurgent guerrillas.
This counterinsurgency policy allowed the United States to
limit its role to that of a supportive ally. The primary
responsibility of the United States was to provide support in
the form of economic and military (equipment and training)
assistance.
In analyzing this subject, the study elaborates on three
programs which constitute the main aspects of the counterin-
surgency policy in Colombia. These programs are military
action, civic action and policy assistance.
The discussion of the military action program focuses
on the joint effort of the United States and Colombia as
they work together to eliminate the insurgent movement.
Particular attention is given to the United States role in
providing assistance in the coordination of military opera
tions, training and the supplying of military aid and equip
ment.
The discussion of the second program, civic action,
centers on the socio-economic dimension of the counterinsur
gency policy. The study discusses the use of civic action
projects as a way of facilitating military objectives. Thus,
under this program various socio-economic development pro
jects are implemented as a means of lessening the popular
support of the civilian population for guerrilla forces.
The philosophy underlying this concept of civic action as
well as the actual projects implemented are discussed.
The third program, policy assistance, is examined to
show how this type of aid was also utilized to fulfill a mil
itary function within the context of the counterinsurgency
policy. It discusses the United States use of policy train
ing assistance through the agencies of the Office of Public
Safety and the International Policy Academy in upgrading the
police forces in Colombia. The rationale behind this train
ing was the view that in an insurgency type environment it
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is necessary for the police to expand their traditional du
ties and to function in an additional military capacity. The
study details the means by which the United States police
assistance program helped to transform the structure and
character of the Colombian police enabling them to assume and
fulfill a military role within the counterinsurgency policy.
These three programs constitute the main focus of the
study. Prior to discussing them, however, the study provides
a broad background perspective on the history of the United
States counterinsurgency activities throughout the Latin
American region. In addition, the particular insurgent con
ditions in Colombia which led to the implementation of the
United States policy are discussed.
The study concludes with a discussion on the background
history of the doctrine of counterinsurgency. It examines
the emergence of the doctrine and outlines its basic tenets
prior to its implementation in Colombia. Finally, the study
closes with a discussion of the current United States counter
insurgency effort in El Salvador. It focuses on the merits
of the national debate in respect to the meaning and implica
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Statement of Problem and Methodology
It is the purpose of this study to examine the United
States policy of counterinsurgency as it was utilized to as
sist the government of Colombia in putting down a revolu
tionary insurgency. The United States chose to implement
this policy in Colombia because it considered that government
to be a vital ally and deemed the armed insurgency inside the
country to be a threat to its own interest in the region. It
was the objective of the counterinsurgency policy to achieve
the task of defeating the insurgency by aiding in the up
grading and development of Colombia's military and police
forces. In accomplishing this objective, the Colombian gov
ernment was able to wage a successful military campaign
against the insurgent guerrilla forces. The effect of the
counterinsurgency policy is that it allowed the United States
to assist in the defeat of the defeat of the insurgency
through its role as a supportive ally without American troops
becoming directly involved in the conflict.
In examining this subject, the initial research problem
was a need to operationally define the term counterinsurgency
1
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in order to establish the main contents of the study. This is
done by citing the definition of counterinsurgency according
to United States military policy. According to United States
military policy, counterinsurgency is defined as:
All military, political, economic, psychological
activities directed toward preventing and supres-
sing resistance groups whose actions range from
subversive political activity to violent actions
by large guerrilla elements to overthrow a duly
established government.!
While this definition is quite comprehensive, for the purposes
of this study it is too broad. This definition is thus more
narrowly defined by specifying the scope of concerns that the
study examines in the counterinsurgency policy in Colombia.
This is accomplished by utilizing a framework suggested
in another study on counterinsurgency entitled Challenge and
Response in Internal Conflict! The Experience in Africa and
Latin America. Based on its framework, the scope of this
study is clarified by focusing on three issues. First, the
study specifies what constitutes an insurgency. Secondly, it
selects the specific programs which are focused on as opposed
to trying to examine "all" activities as defined in the of
ficial United States military definition. Finally, this study
Willard Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal Security
and Military Power; Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in
Latin America, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press,
1966), p. 180.
2F. M. Condit and Bert Cooper, eds., Challenge and Re
sponse in Internal Conflict: The Experience in Africa and
Latin America, Vol. Ill (Washington, D. C.: The American
University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1968).
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spells out exactly what actors are involved in the implemen
tation of the counterinsurgency policy.
On the first point, insurgency is generally defined as
any threat from internal sources to an existing government.
The Challenge and Response Study discounts political motiva
tions and defines insurgency as a threat "to the viability
of the government—i.e., its credibility, its legitimacy,
its ability to influence." For the purposes of this study,
however, political motivations are crucial. Thus, on a po
litical level, this study is concerned with challenges to
the viability of the Colombian government from groups with a
left-of-center orientation. Such groups challenged the cur
rent status quo governments and favor the reorganization of
the society into a socialist or communist political system.
As the same time, it is the contention of this study
that the counterinsurgency doctrine is also a politically
motivated program. In implementing the policy in Colombia,
the United States was supporting a friendly government and
sought to prevent any socialist or communist movements from
gaining power. Commenting on the political character of
this kind of policy, former Senator William J. Fullbright in
remarks on a particular global counterinsurgency project
noted:
Implicit in Camelot, as in the concept of counter
insurgency, is an assumption that revolutionary
movements are dangerous to the interest of the
Ibid., p. xx.
United States and that the United States must be
prepared to assist, if not actually participate in,
measures to repress them.4
In specifying the programs or activities which are fo
cused on, the scope of this study is limited to military and
military-related aspects of counterinsurgency. Three such
programs are discussed as they constitute the main aspects of
the United States counterinsurgency policy in Colombia. These
programs are military action, civic action and police assis
tance. Each of these programs is explained in greater de
tail later in the chapter.
The justification for this limited scope is based on the
view of the study that the counterinsurgency policy implement
ed in Colombia was aimed at the physical and military defeat
of the insurgent movement. Other kinds of activities out
lined in the official military definition such as political
or psychological programs were not present in the Colombian
policy. Therefore their inclusion in this study is not war
ranted.
The third concern of this study centers on what actors
are involved. The focus is on the bilateral relationship
between the governments of the United States and Colombia.
The study discusses the United States policy as it was imple
mented with the agreement and cooperation of the government
4
See Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Life and Death of Proj
ect Camelot" in Robert Perrucci and Mark Polisuk, The Triple
Revolution; Social Problems in Depth (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1968), p. 153.
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of Colombia. Moreover, in view of the military orientation
of this policy, the study highlights the relationship between
the respective Armed Forces of the two countries.
Colombia's selection as the focus of the study is because
of the United States concern and interest about the level of
insurgency in that country in the early 1960's. Two separate
American intelligency reports spelled out a specific concern
on these matters. One report sponsored by the Central Intel
ligency Agency (CIA) in 1962 was conducted by what were called
Strategic Analysis Targeting Teams (SATT). Former CIA agent
Phillip Agee explained the purpose of the SATT report:
Recently I read the report by a special interdepart
mental team of experts from Washington called the
Strategic Analysis Targeting Team (SATT), which in
month's past secretly visited all the Latin American
countries. Their purpose was to review all U. S.
government programs in each country and to determine
the gravity of the threat or urban terrorism and
guerrilla warfare.5
In another report Columbia was also cited as a country
to be studied for possible major insurgency developments.
This was done in a global counterinsurgency study project
known as Camelot sponsored by the United States Army in
1962. Irving Horowitz describes the project as a:
method of measuring, forecasting and finding ways
to both eliminate the causes and discover abilities
to cope with revolutions and insurgencies.6
Phillip Agee, Inside the Company; CIA Diary (New York:
Bantam Books, 1975), pp. 246-247.
6Horowitz, "The Life and Death," p. 153.
Horowitz cites a recruitment letter from the Special Opera
tions Research Organization which carried out the study that
explains its purpose and goals. The letter defined the fol
lowing aims of the project:
(1) Make it possible to predict and influence politi
cal significant aspects of social change in the
developing nations of the world;
(2) Assessing the potential for internal war within
national societies;
(3) Identify with increased degrees of confidence,
those actions which a government might take to
relieve conditions which are assessed as giving
rise to potential for internal war.7
It should be pointed out that this report recommend actual
survey research and field studies to assess the insurgency
problem in Colombia.
In analyzing the substance of the United States counter-
insurgency policy in Colombia, there are six additional chap
ters to this study. A brief description of the contents of
those six chapters follow.
In Chapter two the study discusses the broad implica
tions and meaning of the counterinsurgency policy for Colom
bia. This chapter, thus, concentrates on the larger nature
of the United States military policy in Latin America. It
seeks to provide a broader perspective on the specific coun
terinsurgency program in Colombia. The chapter begins with
a discussion of the widespread guerrilla activities in Latin
America as well as the long history of the United States
7Ibid., p. 155.
involvement in the region. In particular, United States
political and strategic concerns during World War II are
examined as they led to the creation of the Military Assis
tance Program and Mutual Security Act of 1951.
While these programs are concerned with external de
fense, developments in Latin America led to the transforma
tion of their purpose to those of an internal security na
ture. This transformation is examined as these new inter
nal security concerns became the basis for the development
of a counterinsurgency policy for the area in response to an
increased level of guerrilla activity throughout the con
tinent.
Of particular concern are the programs and institutions
established to facilitate a counterinsurgency policy for the
Latin American region. The chapter discusses four institu
tions which include United States military schools in the
Panama Canal Zone and in the United States, mobile training
teams, and joint United States military-multinational cor
poration training programs. In closing, the chapter examines
the economic and military expenditures needed in developing
and establishing the broad counterinsurgency policy for Latin
America.
Before moving to the specific counterinsurgency program
in Colombia, Chapter three's purpose is to provide a back
ground analysis of the insurgency problem in that country
which prompted the United States' decision to implement its
policy there. Colombia was of particular concern due to the
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endemic and pervasive social violence which had gripped the
country for a number of years. The specific problem result
ing from the ten year war known as "La Violencia" which lasted
from 1948 to 1958. This event is discussed in regard to its
causes and dimensions. In addition the chapter focuses on
how this war contributed to the insurgency problem, leading
up to the formation of anti-government guerrilla movements
and independent communist republics. The republics being
geographic regions of the country in which the Colombia gov
ernment no longer retained political control.
The guerrilla movements discussed are those which con
stituted a definite military or political threat as well as
having a defined ideological character whose goals were the
violent overthrow of the elected Colombian government. Five
such groups fit this category. They are the Students and
Peasants Movement (MOEC), United Front Revolutionary Action
(FUAR), Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), Army of
National Liberation (ELN), and the Popular Liberation Army
(EPL). The chapter examines their origins, ideological and
military character, and the manner in which they constituted
a threat to the existence of the colonial government.
From here the chapter moves to a discussion of the vari
ous regions outside of the government's control known as the
independent communist republics. The groups operating in
these regions had a specific communist orientation or had been
under the influence of the Colombia Communist Party and its
ideas. For many years groups in the regions operated with
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impunity and were deemed a threat to the sovereingnty of the
Colombian government. Being outside the government's con
trol, the regions served as a base for guerrilla activities
and attacks on government troops and facilities. Eight such
independent communist republics which can be identified and
sufficiently documented are discussed in regard to the politi
cal and military structure. They are Viota, Sumapaa, Tolima,
Marquetalia, Rio Chiquiota, Meddelin de Ariari, El Pato and
Guayabero.
Finally, the chapter discusses the third and most recent
component of the internal security threat, that of urban guer
rilla warfare. These urban guerrilla organizations have simi
lar objectives to the rural groups in seeking the destabliza-
tion or overthrow of the government. Four movements are dis
cussed. They are MOGUR, H-15, MARC and M-19. The greatest
attention is given to the most well known and active of the
groups, M-19.
Chapter four examines the actual development and imple
mentation of the United States counterinsurgency police in
Colombia. It begins, however, with an analysis of past his
tory of United States-Colombian relations. It is against
this background that the counterinsurgency program was im
plemented. The particular focus of this discussion is on
diplomatic, strategic, geographic, political and internal
security concerns. In addition, United States economic in
terest, especially trade, investments and foreign aid are
examined. Especially important is the selection of Colombia
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by the United States to become the "showcase" of the Al
liance for Progress.
Next, the chapter moves to a discussion of the actual
counterinsurgency program. There are three broad aspects or
phases of the counterinsurgency program. They are military
action, civic action and police assistance—public safety.
This chapter discusses the first phase of military action.
The overall counterinsurgency program, which begins with the
military action phase, was known as Plan Lazo. This initial
effort made Colombia the first country in Latin America
where the policy of counterinsurgency would be implemented
in a specific detailed program.
In looking at the military action phase, the chapter
examines the joint effort of Colombia and the United States
to physically eliminate insurgent guerrilla forces and the
independent communist republics. The discussion gives
particular attention to the United States assistance in helping
plan, coordinate and carry out various military operations.
An assessment is also made of the impact or success of these
military operations.
Additional information in the chapter looks at how the
United States trained the Colombian military personnel who
were responsible for carrying out internal security opera
tions. This include United States sponsored training at
the Panama Canal bases and by mobile training teams. The
total number of personnel trained is accounted for. In ad
dition military aid purchases are examined in regard to the
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actual fiscal amounts and equipment assistance which the United
States provided to Colombia. Also discussed are recently de
classified military missions which were designed to build up
the Colombian armed forces. Finally, evidence is examined
which indicates a possible direct United States combat role
in military operations against guerrilla forces. The chapter
concludes with an overall assessment of the impact of the
military phase of the counterinsurgency policy in Colombia.
Chapter five moves to an examination of the socio-
economic dimension of the United States counterinsurgency
policy in Colombia which functioned as a complement to the
military action phase. It was based on the realization that
a purely military approach to the problem would be both in
complete and insufficient in a counterinsurgency policy.
Hence, the policy of civic action is utilized.
The policy of civic action is thus examined in regards
to its philosophical principles and background history. The
key emphasis here is that civic action would function as a
means of lessening popular support for the guerrillas and
aiding in the socio-economic development of the country. The
discussion also focuses on the process by which civic action
became a part of official United States military policy and
was also integrated into the course of instruction at mili
tary institutions and facilities. Based on these develop
ments, the chapter also explores the rationale by which civic
action came to function as a specific tactic within the broad
counterinsurgency doctrine.
12
Next the chapter moves to a brief examination of the role
of civic action in Latin America. Then the discussion shifts
to the United States sponsored civic action program in Colom
bia where it functioned as the second aspect of the Plan Lazo
program. It will focus on the United States involvement in
the development of the program as well as the Colombian's
military attitude and role in implementing the concept. A
look is then taken at the actual civic action projects which
were implemented. Starting with the initial programs of the
early sixties, the chapter discusses the major projects im
plemented and the various intermittent decisions that affected
the support and emphasis of the program. In particular, the
focus is on fourteen United States sponsored projects during
the years 1962 and 1965. Using declassified documents, these
documents are examined in regard to their purpose, cost and
United States role. Also post-1965 civic action efforts and
projects are discussed. Finally, an examination is made of
the overall effectiveness of civic action as a part of the
counterinsurgency policy in Colombia.
Chapter six discusses the police assistance-public safe
ty program in Colombia as a part of the United States spon
sored counterinsurgency policy. The program was thus the
third aspect of the Plan Lazo scheme. The chapter begins by
focusing on the background history of the United States po
lice assistance efforts which began during World War Two. The
election of President John Kennedy and the subsequent selec
tion of his brother Robert as Attorney General, witnessed the
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transformation of those small efforts at police assistance to
a larger purpose in the context of the cold war. Two key in
stitutions, the Office of Public Safety and the International
Police Academy, are discussed as they played a central role
in the development of police assistance as a policy to be em
ployed on an international basis. The Office of Public Safety
was responsible for developing and implementing police assis
tance-public safety programs in foreign countries. The inter
national Police Academy on the other hand, functioned primari
ly as a training institution for foreign police forces. Final
ly, this section of the chapter examines the use of the police
assistance program and its rationale as a component of a
counterinsurgency policy.
The second half of the chapter moves to a discussion of
the actual role of the United States program in transforming
the structure and character of the Colombian police. Criti
cal to that transformation was the ability of the Colombian
police to confront and stifle the internal security insur
gency problem. In bringing about this change the chapter de
tails the wide-ranging variety of assistance provided includ
ing economic, material and equipment, training and personnel.
The combination of these efforts are assessed in regards to
the impact of the police assistance-public safety program on
the Colombian police force and the internal security problem
in Colombia.
The final chapter of the paper provides an overall sum
mary and conclusion on the United States counterinsurgency
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program in Colombia. At the same time, the chapter offers
comments on the doctrine's origins prior to its implementa
tion in Colombia. The focus here is on the Vietnam conflict
out of which the concept emerged. The discussion looks at
the factors and events which led to the development of the
concept and its purpose. Importantly, it also illustrates
how the doctrine, despite its emergence out of the conflict
in Vietnam, was actually abandoned and never fully imple
mented there. Hence, it was in Colombia and other areas that
saw the actual implementation of counterinsurgency programs.
Finally, the chapter concludes with remarks on the most re
cent counterinsurgency oriented program by the United States.
Namely, the decision to offer military and economic assistance
to the government of El Salvador to help put down guerrilla
forces. The discussion comments on the similarities and dif
ferences between this action and those in Vietnam and Colombia,
In collecting the data on the counterinsurgency policy
in Colombia, this study is a library research project. It
has required a thorough examination of related existing lit
erature. Included among this literature are the traditional
academic sources and journals concerned with foreign policy
and military affairs. Also, in view of the governmental na
ture of the policy, the acquisition of certain government
documents and materials is of prime importance. Government
libraries such as the Library of Congress have been utilized.
In addition major universities which act as government depo
sitory libraries are also used. This includes Vanderbilt
15
University and Georgia State University. The Air University
Library at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama is
also utilized in view of its extensive collection of both
government and military materials.
At these institutions, I have utilized specific types of
governments documents along with key Congressional hearings
of various committees. For example, this includes documents
such as the Department of Defense's Annual Report (Defense
Budget and Programs), the Agency for International Develop
ment1 s Annual Fiscal Year Projects (by country and by field
of activity), Military Assistance Facts, and the United States
Army Area Handbooks. Annual Congressional hearings include
those of the Department of Defense appropriations before the
Committees on Appropriations and Military Procurement
Authorizations before the Armed Services Committee.
Additional government materials have been obtained from
various government agencies and those specialized research
institutes which engage in extensive foreign study projects
for the government. Government agencies include the Depart
ment of Defense, State Department and the Agency for Inter
national Development. Major research institutes include the
Institute for Defense Analysis, Stanford Research Institute,
Brookings Institution, Rand Corporation, Clearinghouse for
Federal Scientific and Technical Information and the Defense
Documentation Center. Materials acquired from lesser known
institutes include the American University Center for Research
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on Social Systems; Abt Associates, Atlantic Research Corpora
tion and the Research Analysis Corporation.
Finally, I have used the Freedom of Information Act to
declassify and acquire a number of previously classified gov
ernment documents pertaining to the counterinsurgency policy
in Colombia.
CHAPTER II
COLOMBIA AND LATIN AMERICA: THE CONTEXT OF
THE UNITED STATES COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY
In examining the counterinsurgency policy in Colombia,
one can see that it was not designed for application to a
single country. To the contrary, it represented one aspect
of a larger continental policy. To that extent the counter-
insurgency policy reflected American planners1 real and
legitimate concerns for a continent that has a long confirmed
history of revolutionary activity. Throughout the Latin
American continent social unrest was an endemic aspect of
political life. Legendary figures such as Jose Marti, Ceasar
Augusto Sandino, Ernest Che Guevara and Priest Camilo Torres
became continental heroes honoring the wide-ranging seal of
revolutionary activity that engulfed all of Latin America.
Practically no country had been spared the emergence of
armed guerrilla movements which sought the revolutionary
overthrow of established regimes and consequent transforma
tion of those social systems.
On the other hand, American military activity is no
stranger to politics on the Latin American continent. A
consistent pattern of military intervention has been evident
for the last two hundred years. To be precise, in many in
stances those interventions had a specific counterrevolutionary
17
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purpose. So in a very real sense the counterinsurgency doc
trine merely represents an ideological and technical trans
formation of the historical pattern of counterrevolutionary
intervention. From 1800 up to today, over eighty instances
of interventions onto the Latin American continent have been
recorded.1 Colombia, itself, has been the victim of seven
such interventions, three of which had a specific and de
fined counterrevolutionary objective.
The net effect of these two sets of activities has been
to create on a continental level a dialectical interplay be
tween revolutionary actions on one hand, juxtaposed by a
counterrevolutionary response on the other. Throughout La
tin America armed guerrilla movements have arisen seeking to
overthrow established governments as well as challenge what
many see as an ever present external American exploitation
and domination. American military planners thus developed
and established an extensive program of counterrevolution
based on the doctrine of counterinsurgency to support se
lected governments by assisting in the defeat and elimina
tion of these guerrilla movements.
Looking to Colombia specifically, it is clear that in
no other country has the dialectical interplay between revo
lutionary activity and counterrevolution or counterinsur
gency been more dramatic and intense. Colombia is a country
U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Dirksen speaking on
the Use of U. S. Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1945. 23 June
1969. Congressional Record, pp. 16840-16843.
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where violent upheaval and unrest were so endemic to the
everyday social fabric of life that an entire era of the
nation's history has been termed "La Violencia." Yet in
the relatively brief period of ten years, American military
policies of assistance and training transformed the once
inept Colombia Army into what a United States Army document
characterized as "the world's premier counterinsurgency
force."
In examining the American policy makers application of
the counterinsurgency doctrine in Colombia then, this aspect
of the study must approach the problem from a dual perspec
tive. At one level an examination of the concept will be
made from a continental perspective. Here the study shows
how the counterinsurgency program in Colombia is a single
aspect for a larger policy. At the second level, a specific
detailed focus will be undertaken on the counterinsurgency
policy, its application, development and usage in Colombia.
As we noted earlier, the American counterinsurgency pro
gram for Colombia does not emerge as an isolated phenomenon.
To the contrary it presents itself as an integral part of
a large Latin American scheme concerned with the containment
of internal security problems in the region. Accordingly,
the study now moves to an examination of the larger conti
nental question in order to develop a more concise perspec
tive of the Colombian policy.
2U. S., Department of the Army, Area Handbook for Colom
bia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977, p.
426.
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Although American military concerns have led to persis
tent and frequent involvement with the Latin American coun
tries, formal entangling alliances and ties were not the
primary source of relations. Major developments of that kind
did not emerge until the immediate post World War II era.
As a matter of fact it was the World War II concerns that
generated American initiatives which eventually culminated in
a number of formal bilateral treaty arrangements. Importantly,
however, those concerns originally grew out of problems per
taining to the Axis conflict as opposed to any serious con
cerns of interal security within the Latin American countries.
The major development of these initial concerns was the
creation of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) under which
the United States established a number of military missions
in Latin America. Designed to counter German aggression in
the area, the Latin American nations were supplied with Amer
ican arms and equipment. This program began in the late
1930's and its stated purpose was:
To enable the area to defend itself against external
aggression...and to gain military cooperation in the
event the Western Hemisphere become involved in World
War II.4
These military missions functioned on a very small scale and
the actual operations were in reality inconsequential. In
"U. S. Military Operations in Latin America." U. S.
Military and Police Operations in the Third World. (New
York! North American Congress on Latin America, 1970), p.7.
4
U. S., Congress, Senate, Commxttee on Foreign Rela
tions, Survey of the Alliance for Progress, "The Latin Amer
ican Military," by Edwin Lieuwin. Washington, D.C.: Govern
ment Printing Office, 1969, p. 113.
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many cases during the war they actually ceased to function.
They did however lay the initial groundwork for the imple
mentation of larger and more functional programs.
One such program grew out of the Mutual Security Act
of 1951. It continued to build on the earlier MAP program,
but allowed the United States to develop a much more in
volved and complex relationship with its Latin American
neighbors. Accordingly, all Latin American countries who
signed the agreement made the following concessions:
One, agreed to restrict their trade with any com
munist nation; two, grant the United States exclu
sive access to their strategic raw materials; and
three, allow a United States advisory team to
evaluate the military assistance requirements of
each country.5
Aside from these provisions the Mutual Security Act like
the initial MAP program, also had a decidedly external orien
tation in respect to United States military concerns. Its
basic purpose being the increased support and development of
Latin American militaries for external hemisphere defense.
Thus the then Assistant Secretary of State Edward Miller
would define the primary objectives of the Act as being:
(1) To secure sources of strategic materials;
(2) To keep open the lines of access to those ma
terials;
(3) To have the armed forces of those countries in
readiness to keep the strategic areas defensible
from small air and submarine attacks from abroad;
and
Major Robert Russell, "Reduced Military Assistance to
Latin America: The Impact on U. S.-Colombian Relations,"
Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air
Force Base, Alabama, May 1970, p. 24.
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(4) To reduce the commitments of our own armed forces
for the defense of those areas.6
By the early fifties later events began to force a re
shaping of the dominant military views and refocus attention
away from the emphasis on external hemispheric defense. In
creasingly concerns as to the viability and sustenance of the
Latin American governments now centered on what came to be
known as internal subversion. The first major development
in this realm was the national democratic revolution taking
place in Guatemala. Initiated by Juan Jose Arevalo in 1945
the revolution culminated with the election of more leftist
leaning Jacobo Guzman Arbenz. Although neither was an avowed
socialist or communist, their leftist liberalism and anti-
American and imperialist positions began to raise serious
concerns in the minds of United States policy makers about
internal security in Latin America. The clinching factor
was the coming to power of Fiedel Castro in Cuba in 1959.
That national democratic revolution's gradual evolution into
a Marxist communist state now began to trigger initial
American actions to cope with this newly perceived problem.
Thus the fifties saw the development of American chal
lenges to what were perceived as a growing communist menace
Williard Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal Security
and Military Power; Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in
Latin America (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966),
p. 30.
Susanne Jonas and David Tobis, eds. Guatemala (New
York: North American Congress on Latin America, 1974), pp.
44-55.
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in the form of internal subversion. Early actions utilized
a series of politically mild but symbolic resolutions aimed
at making known American concerns and awareness of those
developments.8 The first was at the Tenth Inter-American
Conference in 1954 at Caracus, Venzuela where the United
States was able to successfully sponsor a resolution that
stated:
The domination or control of the political insti
tutions of any American State by the international
communist movement would constitute a threat to the
sovereignty and political independence of the Amer
ican States, endangering the people of America and
would call for a meeting of consultation.
A later resolution in reference to Castro's take-over like
wise condemned any external intervention into Latin American
affairs and particularly advised against adverse Sino-Soviet
manipulation of internal events.
By 1960 however, the realities and potential conse
quences of the Cuban revolution had hit home and formal
policy alternatives began to be implemented to counter these
developments. The sixties soon witnessed a total shift from
the previous emphasis on external defense to that of inter
nal security. The election of President Kennedy signaled
the formal shift on this new policy. As Edwin Leiuwen ex
plains:
The basis for military aid Latin America abruptly
shifted from hemispheric defense to internal se
curity, from the protection of coastlines and from
8
Barber and Ronning, Internal Security, p. 15.
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anti-submarine warfare to internal defense against
Castro-Communist guerrilla warfare.9
Kennedy's fetish for counterinsurgency developments
in Vietnam was soon being transformed into United States
Latin American policy. The counterinsurgency era for the
region had now begun. Throughout the continent as a whole
and for the purposes of this study, in Colombia in particu
lar, this new Kennedy doctrine would be utilized to counter
those perceived threats to internal security and stability.
Accordingly, it was in 196 3 that for the first time funds
specifically earmarked for counterinsurgency purposes were
now made available under the MAP program. A year later
General Robert J. Wood announced that in the coming years
MAP programs in Latin America would be designed
To counter the threat to the entire region by
providing equipment and training which will
bolster the internal security capabilities of
the recipient countries.10
Some three years after Wood's announcement former Secretary
of Defense MacNamara confirmed this policy shift emphasizing
counterinsurgency measures when he noted that:
The primary objective [of the MAP program] in
Latin America is to aid, where necessary, in
the continued development of indigenous mili
tary and paramilitary forces capable of pro
viding in conjunction with police and other
g
Lieuwin, "Latin America," p. 115. See also John Saxe-
Fernandez, "The Central American Defense Council and Pax
Americana" in Irving Louis Horowitz, Joseda Castro and John
Gerassi, eds. Latin American Radicalism (New York: Random
House, 1966), p. 82.
Michael Klare, "Arming the Generals" in The U. S.
Military Apparatus (New York: North American Congress on
Latin America, 1972), p. 47 (my emphasis.)
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security forces, the needed domestic securi
ty. 11
Towards that end the United States has established a
network of training programs and facilities which were used
to bolster the internal security capabilities of the Latin
American countries.12 More specifically, United States
military installations in Latin America underwent a concur
rent change in objectives and functions as overall foreign
policy goals shifted in concern from hemispheric to internal
security.
The most crucial aspect of this new aid policy centered
on military and police training that the United States would
now provide under the MAP program. Aware of the obvious
liabilities and constraints in respect to cost (men and
equipment), logistics and political opinion, United States
policy planners opted for massive training programs to bol
ster internal security rather than rely on the time worn
historic tradition of overt military intervention. Ironi-
ally, this approach to Latin American security problems was
initiated in the early 1960's just as the Asian theater was
witnessing an ever-increasing and massive military inter
vention.
"U.S. Military Operations," p. 5. For a detailed
discussion of this matter see U. S., Congress, House, Com
mittee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1967,
Hearings. 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 117.
12Except where otherwise indicated this information on
training facilities in Latin America is taken from Klare,
"Generals," pp. 46-52 and "U.S. Military Operations," pp. 5-8.
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Explaining the rationale and major emphasis placed on
the training assistance programs, former Secretary of De
fense Robert McNamara speaking before a House Committee on
Appropriations in 1962 noted:
Probably the greatest return on our military assis
tance investment comes from the training of selec
ted officers and key specialists at our military
schools and training centers in the United States
and overseas. These students are handpicked by
their countries to become instructors when they
return home. They are the coming leaders...I need
not dwell upon the value of having men in positions
of leadership—men who have first-hand knowledge of
how Americans do things and how they think. It is
beyond price for us to make such friends of such
men.13
McNamara's frank statement is most informative as it precisely
indicates the additional ideological orientation and indoctri
nation that necessarily accompanies the more material aspects
of assistance.
Later events in Vietnam confirmed the wisdom of this
Latin American policy which eventually became the basis of
United States military policy worldwide in the form of the so-
called Nixon Doctrine. Another former Secretary of Defense,
Melvin Laird noted that the MAP program covering military
training was the "essential ingredient" of the Nixon strategy.
He added that the emphasis and objective of the policy is on
Low-cost, low-visibility assistance and training
programs designed to upgrade the capacity of.lo
cal forces to overcome guerrilla movements.
13Klare, "Generals," p. 49.
14Nancy Stein, "U.S. Army School for Scoundrels," Latin
America and Empire Report Vol. 8, No. 3 (March 1974), p. 25.
27
The training programs instituted for the Latin American
nations were of a fourfold nature. The first and major fea
ture of this training assistance involves U.S. military schools
through which key officials and personnel of the Latin American
militaries receive specialized training as well as ideological
indoctrination. The second aspect of the training program
utilizes additional facilities located inside the United
States. There are four main installations for such purposes.
A third feature calls for the visitation of United States mil
itary units to selected countries. These units, designated
as mobile training teams (MTT's), are utilized to provide
temporary training of various military skills according to
the specialized needs of a country. The fourth and concluding
feature of the training assistance program involves a unique
and joint effort on the part of United States military of-
ficals working in cooperation with various transnational cor
porations .
Looking at United States military assistance in greater
detail, it is clear that the major training programs are cen
tered at the United States Forces Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)
loacted at Quarry Heights in the Panama Canal Zone. SOUTHCOM
has responsibility for the coordination of all United States
military activity in Latin America. It is an all encompassing
"unified command" (Army, Navy, Air Force) under which all
United States military missions and the MAP program are con
ducted. In regards to the main purpose of this study,
"U.S. Military Operations." p. 6 and Klare, "Generals,"
p. 49.
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SOUTHCOM1s role in the counterinsurgency effort cannot be
overstated. It is the central hub of the entire United
States counterinsurgency policy for Latin America. Such a
key function is both an indication of its significance to
and of the overall counterinsurgency effort in Latin America.
Another point to be considered is that SOUTHCOM was estab
lished with no counterinsurgency objectives in mind. Its
original purpose as a military facility was to provide United
States forces with a strategic location for the defense of
the Panama Canal. Its role as the Latin American counterin
surgency center is one into which it has evolved concurrent
with the overall policy shift on the question of internal
security since the late 1950's.
To no small degree this transformation has been a direct
result of the Vietnam experience in Asia accompanied by a
growing concern over the impact of the Cuban revolution.
SOUTHCOM1s subsequent transformation, then, is consistent
with the basic theme of the study that the United States has
an international military policy of counterinsurgency to pre
vent the emergence and successful fruition of radical libera
tion movements. Explaining the rationale and evelopment of
United States policy analysis on this concept, Noam Chomsky
and Edward S. Hermon write in The Washington Connection and
Third World Fascism;
Ideally, the proper role of the military junta in
post-Vietnam U. S. thinking is to prevent Cubas
and Vietnams by anticipatory counter-subversion,
which nips any radical or seriously reformist
29
tendencies in their earliest stages before they
become problems.16
They add a quote from retired General Maxwell Taylor, one the
men most responsible for the whole grand counterinsurgency
policy, wherein he spells out developments behind such
thinking. Taylor wrote:
The outstanding lesson (of the Vietnam War) is that
we should never let another Vietnam-type situation
arise again. We were too late in recognizing the
extent of the subversive threat. We appreciate now
that every young (sic) emerging country must be
constantly on the alert watching for those symptoms
which if allowed to develop unrestrained, may even
tually grow into a disastrous situation such as that
of South Vietnam.17
Accordingly, SOUTHCOM in a very real sense became a de-
facto training ground for possible Vietnam-type conflicts in
Latin America. As one study on SOUTHCOM and Canal Zone op
erations points out, the Vietnam experience had a profound
impact and influence on the policy analysis and actual opera-
18
tions taking place at the installation. A number of mili
tary officials there have made known their feelings that
many Vietnams may arise in Latin America at any possible
moment. Moreover, during the Vietnam war, the Canal Zone was
used as a training and testing ground for both military equip
ment and personnel. This was undertaken on the premise that
Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Washington




Nathan A. Haverstock and Richard C. Schroder, Dateline
Latin America (Washington, D.C.: The Latin American News
Service, 1971), p. 86.
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environmental and climatic conditions were a vivid reminder
of Vietnam. After the failure in Vietnam, the Asian exper
ience became even more imprinted in SOUTHCOM and Canal Zone
operations. As Nathan A. Haverstock and Richard C. Schroder
note,
In military assistance and training activities
throughout Latin America carried out by Zone
personnel, Vietnam is the prime influence, the
psychological conditioner.
Returing to SOUTHCOM1s relevance to the study, author
Nancy Stein points out that
The entire U. S. counterinsurgency force for Latin
America, including more than 12,000 Army, Air Force
and Navy personnel, military training centers and
a jungle warfare school, is located in the Zone.19
A significant number of these forces are comprised of the
United States main counterinsurgency unit, more popularly
known as the Special Forces (Green Berets). In having the
entire counterinsurgency force located there, the United
States hopes to fulfill the "preventive security" objec
tives as spelled out by General Maxwell Taylor. Thus Miles
D. Wolpin in Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third
World quotes a U. S. Congressman who notes:
...SOUTHCOM is responsible for contingency plan
ning for crisis situations in countries of Latin
America which might require a military response
from the United States. According to SOUTHCOM1s
general staff, the U. S. military presence in
the Canal Zone serves as a credible deterrent to
adventurism by radical elements who would be more 20
active in the hemisphere if SOUTHCOM did not exist.
19Stein, "Army School," p. 24.
20
See Miles D. Wolpin, Military Aid and Counter-Revolu
tion in the Third World (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co.,
1972), p. 65.
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The overall training assistance functions at SOUTHCOM
involve the supervision of United States military missions
in Latin America. These missions formally called Military
Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) vary in size from coun
try to country. The missions in addition to providing
training in various military and technical skills, also
assist in the development of counterinsurgency and internal
security programs.
As a central aspect of MAAG operations in the overall
counterinsurgency effort, the United States utilizes those
special units designated as MTT's. These teams are composed
of up to a half-dozen Special Forces (Green Beret) troops
who travel throughout the Latin American hemisphere pro
viding intensive training in counterinsurgency techniques.
Since 1962, the initial year for the implementation of the
counterinsurgency policy for Latin America, these MTT's have
traveled to every country in the hemisphere except Cuba,
Mexico and Haiti. It should be added that in special emer
gencies the MTT's have gone beyond their designed role of
simply a training force and has actually participated in
limited military operations along side the Latin American
21
militaries. The widespread travel and use of such teams
is a clear indication of the emphasis and thrust assigned
21
Stein, "Army School," p. 24 and Haverstock and Schroder,
Dateline, p. 81. It is known that a Mobile Training Team
trained and assisted the Bolivian Ranger Forces in the cap
ture and assassination of the famed Latin America guerrilla
leader Ernesto "Che" Guevara.
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to the counterinsurgency program in this region.22
Without question, then, SOUTHCOM is the central compo
nent of United States military policy in Latin America. In
the early 1970's however, the rumors began to circulate that
SOUTHCOM would be shut down. The implication being a shift
in the policy of internal security. The New York Times re
ported that SOUTHCOM was one of seven military installations
to be closed by 1975. SOUTHCOM operations costing over
136 million dollars a year were reportedly a major factor in
the decision. This fact in addition to previous Congres
sional actions which placed restrictions and cutbacks on a
22
Some authors have argued that U. S. military programs
outside of Vietnam were a minimal nature and relatively sig
nificance or emphasis. See Douglas Blaufaub, The Counter-
insurgency Era; U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to Pre
sent (New York: The Free Press, 1977), pp. 279-280). In
one comment illustrative of this view he writes, "the threat
developed there (Vietnam) were assessed to have a degree of
seriousness not found elsewhere, and particularly, not in
Latin America, which is where almost all other such activity
was concentrated." But Blaufaub"s comments reveal a basic
misunderstanding of the United States international counter-
insurgency policy. As this study argues, the goal of that
policy (and its success) would be to prevent an incident
from reaching the magnitude of the Vietnam crisis. All po
tential revolutionary situations must be nipped in the bud.
For Latin America, this was the heart of the counterinsur
gency effort. If monetary, material and manpower resources
comparable to the level of Vietnam had to be committed to
Latin America, it clearly would not be a positive indication
of an American commitment for that region. To the contrary,
the necessity of such a commitment would have represented an
inability to learn from mistakes in Vietnam and more so a
blatant failure of the United States counterinsurgency policy
for Latin American.
The New York Times, 7 February, 1974.
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number of other military bases in the region seemed to lend
credence to the rumors.
To the contrary, later reports claried the rumors in
pointing out that only a partial withdrawal of certain Army
0 A
units would take place. Under the Nixon administration as
a matter of fact, SOUTHCOM actually witnessed an increase in
military activity. Thus no major programs at SOUTHCOM during
the seventies were affected. Moreover, the thousand or more
Special Forces (Green Beret) units comprising various MTT's
would definitely remain at the installation.
An important assessment and bolster of support to SOUTH
COM1 s operations had come in 1969 when the former Governor
Rockefeller reported his findings on Latin America in re
sponse to an earlier regurest by President Nixon. Rockefeller
strongly attacked the internal security problems facing the
Latin American countries and likewise added that the United
States should respond in a much more vigorous and positive
manner to those concerns. He called for increased aid in
cluding more varied as well as awesome types of military
equipment. Particular assistance, he added, should also be
continued and increased in dealing with internal security
matters.
On these points Rockefeller was explicitly backing
SOUTHCOM1s operations. For on the internal security issue,
SOUTHCOM takes responsibility for assisting a number of Latin
24
Stein, "Army School," p. 24.
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American governments in putting down guerrilla insurgencies.
Those countries include Bolobia, Colombia/ Guatemala, Peru
25 ■
and Venezuela. According, Rockefeller pointed the necessity
of continuing such assistance. He commented:
In view of the growing subversion against
hemisphere governments...It is essential that
the training program which brings military and
police personnel from the other hemisphere na
tions to the United States and to training 26
centers in Panama be continued and strengthened.
Another recommendation in the Rockefeller report also illu
strates the magnitude and implications of SOUTHCOM1s role in
Latin American affairs. As a means of insuring internal do
mestic security, Rockefeller suggested the United States
create a "Western Hemisphere Security Council." Such an or
ganization would most assuredly guarantee direct United States
military involvement in this region. Although the proposal
was for the most part attacked and disregarded, it is not
totally unrealistic and to some extent reflects an already
existing situation at SOUTHCOM.
On that point, it should be noted that for years SOUTHCOM
has been promoting and participating in regional activities.
It already works thorugh sub-regional organizations such as
27
the Central American Defense Council (CONDECA). In addi
tion it is also involved in the planning execution of joint
25
Haverstock and Schroder, Dateline, p. 82.
Stein, "Army School," p. 24.
27
See Saxe-Fernandez, "Central American," p. 75.
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military maneuvers in the region. For example, United States
Naval Forces regularly participate in annual training exer
cises with Latin American navies. Also, in an even more di
rect action, in 1969 United States troops from the SOUTHCOM
installation comprised most of the units of a peace-keeping
force sponsored by the Organization of American States fol
lowing a brief armed conflict between El Salvador and Hon-
28
duras.
Aside from these actual developments, there are also
other suggestions which tend to back Rockefeller's original
proposal. One study by the influential Rand Corporation also
explores the possibilities of such regional cooperation. It
reads:
Despite the limitation on regionalism as a guide
line for U.S. security assistance in the Third
World, regional cooperation is not uniform in
vain hope . . . Furthermore, there is the possi
bility that where indigenous regional cooperation
exists, efforts by the United States to promote
its own concept of regionalism may be counter
productive. The safest guidelines would seem to
be to allow local forces to take the lead in ex
ploring the possibilities for regional coopera
tion in security matters.29
The calls, then, for such a regional council are thus by no
means farfetched. Nancy Stein argues that such a process
which institutionalizes the counterinsurgency effort on a
28
Haverstock and Schroder, Dateline, p. 80.
29
Guy Paulker, et al., In Search of Self-Reliance; U.S.
Security Assistance to the Third World Under the Nixon Doc
trine (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1973), p. 8.
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regional basis, is already underway. United States military
aid and assistance are already leading toward the development
of such an apparatus. Stein comments,
The U.S. military is beefing up national armies
into a special repressive forces that would be
able to unite under a single command to combat
liberation movements anywhere in the continent.-30
She also adds that one Latin American military leader, General
Gustavo Leigh, like Rockefeller, has also called for military
regimes in Latin America to form a league of self-help and
consultation, to respond to guerrilla movements. SOUTHCOM
without question seems to be facilitating these developments.
As the coordinating unit of United States military policy for
Latin America, it has been described as a "miniature pentagon."
The only difference being that there are no regular observa
tions and checks placed on its activities by civilian per
sonnel like the Pentagon in Washington.
In addition to the SOUTHCOM operation the other military
programs in the Panama Canal Zone which facilitate the coun-
terinsurgency effort include the U.S. Army School of the
Americas, the Inter-American Air Force Academy, and the Eighth
U.S. Special Forces. Each of these programs has specialized
training objectives which accent particular aspects of the
overall counterinsurgency policy.
The first of these programs, the U.S. Army School of
the Americas, is considered to be the most important training
30Stein, "Army School," p. 25.
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center for counterinsurgency operations in Latin America.
It was specifically established to conduct training for
designated Latin American personnel which will increase
their capability to contribute to the maintenance of in
ternal security and the development of their countries.31
The school is the only United States military institution
designed specifically for the training of Latin American
personnel and likewise is the single installation which
provides instruction in a foreign language. Since its es
tablishment the school has trained over 30,000 Latin Ameri
can military personnel in courses of instruction that pri
marily emphasize counterinsurgency and internal security capa
bilities. An army journal points out that School's Irregular
Warfare Committee "teaches various measures required to defeat
an insurgent on the battlefield, as well as military civic
action functions in an insurgent environment."32 In addition
Nancy Stein notes that recent documents indicate:
There is a heavy emphasis on intelligence opera
tions, interrogation techniques, civic action,
jungle warfare and the inculcation of U.S. Army
doctrine and ideology."33
Examining a course catalog from the school, a partial
listing of its classes include the following: Course 0-4,
31Ibid., p. 24.
32
See "U.S. Military Operations," p. 5.
Stein, "Army School," p. 25.
34
"USARSA Catalog," Latin America and Empire Report Vol.
8, No. 3 (March 1974), p. 26-27.
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Internal Development/Civic Action; Course 0-6, Counterinsur
gency Operations; Course 0-7, Urban Counterinsurgency; Course
0-11, Military Intelligence Officer; Course OE-8, Jungle
Operations; Course C-4, Counterinsurgency Operations for Ca
dets and Course C-6, Internal Security Operations. As one
can see new courses have been added on urban guerrilla war
fare in response to a growing wave of urban revolutionary
activity.
The influence and impact on Latin American affairs that
the United States receives from training these military per
sonnel cannot be overstated. It speaks to the earlier quote
by McNamara that such training develops important friendships
with men who come to value friendship. An Army Digest journal
further emphasizes this fact in pointing out that:
Training Latin Americans in U.S. military skills,
leadership techniques and doctrine also paves the
way for cooperation and support of U.S. Army mis
sions, attaches, military assistance advisory 35
groups and commissions operating in Latin America.
Moreover, many of the officers trained at the school eventually
become high ranking government officials. For example grad
uates include the former Minister of War and Chief of Staff
in Colombia, and six members of the Chilean military junta
which overthrew the socialist government of Salvador Allende.
35Klare, "Generals," p. 50.
The Children example succinctly illustrates a basic
point on this matter of training assistance. Here we see the
direct impact of the overall counterinsurgency program for
Latin America. Without the direct use of American military
arms and personnel, United States political objectives were
nonetheless accomplished. In a very real sense, an American
39
The second of the additional programs in the Canal Zone
is the Inter-American Air Force Academy located at Albrook
Air Force Base. Similar to the Army school training it is
primarily geared toward counterinsurgency and civic action
programs. Beginning in 1963, when the counterinsurgency
policy for Latin America began to evolve, a Special Air Oper
ation (i.e., counterinsurgency) course was implemented to
train these units in air-type counterguerrilla operations.
The third counterinsurgency program is the Eighth U.S.
Special Forces (Green Beret) unit stationed at Fort Gulick.
Comprised of over 1000 men, it is from this group that the
Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) are drawn. As specialists in
guerrilla warfare:
The principal mission of the Special Forces is to
advise, train and aid the Latin American military
and para-military forces to conduct counterinsur
gency activities, and to do so in support of the
objectives of the United States of American within
the framework of the Cold War.37
True to their counterinsurgency purpose, the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Center for International Studies notes
"the MTT's of this unit increase their training activities
whenever a pro-U.S. government is threatened by guerrilla up-
,,38
risings.
trained proxy counterinsurgency unit succeeded in preventing the
establishment of a radical, revolutionary government which
could have been a challenge to American interest in Latin Amer
ica.
37"U.S. Military Operations," p. 7.
38
Klare, "Generals," p. 50.
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In addition to these installations and facilities lo
cated in the Canal Zone, there are similar programs func
tioning inside the United States which are an integral as-
spect of the total Latin American counterinsurgency effort.
Like the situation in Latin America, there are four such
programs and facilities. The first of these is the Inter
national Police Academy (IPA) located in Washington, D. C.
At the time of its creation it was known as the Inter-
American Police Academy and was situated in the Panama Canal
Zone along with the other military facilities. The Inter
national Police Academy's role in the overall counterinsur
gency strategy has been both immense and controversial. A
more complete discussion of its role and function in this
process will be undertaken in the chapter examining the
specifics of the counterinsurgency program in Colombia.
The second of the training programs situated in the United
States is the Inter-American Defense College. Established in
1962, the school is designed as an advanced level institution
for high-ranking Latin American military officers. Interest
ingly, the school is administered by what is called the Inter-
American Defense Board (IADB). This Board is comprised of
military representatives of the member nations of the Organi-
39
zation of American States. In respect to its role in the
counterinsurgency process, the course of study here emphasizes
Cold War ideological objectives while concurrently encouraging
39
"U.S. Military Operations," p. 8.
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the idea and need of joint (i.e., regional) action against
40
radical revolutionary guerrilla movements. In addition
specific courses deal with counterinsurgency strategy and
tactics as well as the theory and practice of military civic
action.
Aside from these major programs, additional service
schools catering to Latin American concerns have been estab-
lisehd at two United States Army bases. These are the Special
Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the Civic
41
Affairs and Military Government School at Fort Gordon, Georgia.
The Special Warfare School trains both United States and Latin
American personnel in counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare
type operations. Many of the personnel trained there go on to
make-up part of the Eighth Special Forces (Green Beret) unit
and MTT's located in Latin America. The Civil Affairs School
offers training in both counterinsurgency and civil action op
erations. Graduates are then assigned to many of the military
missions and advisory groups in Latin America and other parts
of the Third World.
The third and concluding feature of the major training
assistance effort for Latin America is a relatively new pro
gram involving the use of international corporate firms. These
Such an administrative set-up as this school has lends
credence to Nancy Stein's earlier implication that Rockefeller's
call for a regional defense force already exists.
41Klare, "Generals," p. 51.
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firms have begun to handle an increasing share of the overall
training assistance programs. This little known operation
came to light in 1975 when the Department of Defense revealed:
The programs were not new but were part of a pat
tern set in the nineteen-fifties, and were in
creasingly being conducted by commercial organi
zations rather than by United States military
advisers.42
At the time of this annoucement there were 132 such technical
43
assistance teams operating in thirty-four countries. In
Latin America this included the countries of Ecuador, Peru,
Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.
Significantly, this corporate training program is a re
flection of political developments in respect to United States
military relations with many third world and Latin American
countries in particular. On the one hand, the Pentagon has
increased the programs:
to stop a drain on skilled military personnel who
are needed by the United States military service
to maintain modern equipment of the same type as
is being provided to the foreign countries.44
A second perhaps more important reason, of a political nature,
is that the post Vietnam image of the United States military
operating in many third world countries has often become a
political liability leading to potential domestic unrest.
Accordingly, the surrogate use of international corporate
firms fulfilling essential military tasks helps lessen any
42
The New York Times, 20 February 1975.
43Ibid.
44
The New York Times, 20 February 1975.
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critical public reactions. In Latin America, then, United
States policy goals are accomplished in a disguised fash
ion without generating a hostile public outcry and possible
causing political embarrassment to client regimes.
In concluding this chapter on the continental counter
insurgency program, it is clear that it constitutes both a
critical and essential aspect of the broad American policy
for Latin America. As has been illustrated in the chapter,
the counterinsurgency policy eventually consumed and contin
ues to consume vast resources and operations. A few final
statistics substantiate this point. As of 1977 (MAP) expendi
tures for the Latin American operations totalled 2,215.9 mil
lion dollars. Moreover, the United States has established
a total of thirty-three military bases in the region as well
as 448 military missions within various countries on the con
tinent.46 Since the implementation of the counterinsurgency
policy, the United States has also provided close to 700
47
million dollars worth of military sales to the region.
U.S.., Agency for International Development, U.S.
Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance From International
Organizations; Obligations and Loan Authorizations/ July 1,
1945-September 30, 1977 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1978), p. 35.
46"The Mercenarization of the Third World," in The
U.S. Military Apparatus (New York: North American Congress
on Latin America, 1972), p. 42.
7Michael Klare, "U.S. Arms Sales to the Third World:
Arm Now Pay Later," in Ibid., See Chart, p. 68.
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Finally, in respect to training assistance, the United States
has trained over 60,000 Latin American personnel in developing
48
the continental policy of counterinsurgency.
48This figure of 60,000 represents only the Latin America
total out of a worldwide number estimated at 420,000. It
should also be noted that the figure only applies to military
personnel. Figures which also include police personnel and
assistance programs are discussed in a later chapter. For
more details on this figure of 60,000 see chart in "Mercenari-
zation," p. 44.
CHAPTER III
REVOLUTION AND INSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA
Any analysis of the internal security problems in Colom
bia must begin with the era of massive violence and chaos in
that country which covered the years from 1948 to 1958. It
was in April 1948 that a popular leader, Jorge Elicar Gaitan,
was assassinated. Gaitan was the popular leader of the Lib
eral party whose views on social reform were spelled out in
an influential work, Las Ideas Socialists. His assassina
tion sparked a massive uprising of riots and destruction in
the capital city of Bogota. The three-day uprising known as
2
the "Bogotazo of 1948," spread to other major cities as well.
The end result was a ten-year war of terror and mayhem so de
structive that it has most appropriately been called "La
Violencia" (i.e., The Violence).
In order to understand this era and the Giatan assassina
tion, these events must be placed in their proper context.
Both grew out of a long-standing rivalry between the country's
D. M. Condit and Bert Cooper, eds., Challenge and Re
sponse in Internal Conflict; The Experience in Africa and
Latin America, Vol. Ill (Washington, D. C.: The American
University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1968), p.
414.
^Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America




two major politcal parties. Those being the Conservative and
the Liberals, whose names were' consistent with their ideologi
cal orientation. Their political rivalry was an on-going
struggle reaching varying levels of intense conflict. The
Liberal party in particular, was at the forefront of a nas
cent social reform movement bordering on a revolution with
definite idelogical undertones that had begun in the 1950's.
The rivalry took a bitter turn in 1946 with the election of a
Conservative party member as president. This man, Ospinia
Perez, initiated a brutal reactionary campaign negating prac
tically all efforts at social reform. These actions led to
inter-party clashes throughout the country during the 1946
and 1947 years. The Liberals, having felt that the Conserva
tives were using the government to destroy not only their
social programs, but their party as well. The assassination
of Gaitan, a charismatic party leader and popular champion of
social reform, was the final action that precipitated the
nationwide reign of terror.
In examining the La Violencia period, one is struck by
the awesome levels of violence and destruction. Interestingly,
depending on political circumstances a pattern of reoccurring
waves of violence developed. A. Pazmany has identified this
pattern as follows: wave, 1948-1953; recess, 1953-54; wave,
John L. Sorenson, The Relationship of Rural to Urban
Insurgency in Venezuela and Colombia (Santa Barbara: Defense
Research Group, 1964), p. 13.
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1954-1958; recess, 1958-1959; and wave, 1959-1962.4 The
initial wave, of course, began with Gaitan's assassination,
yet it was sustained as a result of the presidential campaign
in 1949 and the election of another Conservative president.
President Laureano Gomez's attemtp to suppress the violence
through repressive measures only served to deepen and make
the conflict more pervasive throughout the country.5 Accord
ingly, it has been suggested that it was during the Gomez
reign from 1950 to 1953 that the country witnessed the most
widespread and destructive phase of La Violencia.
The result of Gomez's actions were that by 1953 the vio
lence had spread to as many as nine regional departments in
the country. These included Tolima, Boyaca, Santander del
Sur, Cundinamarca, Norther Huila, Eastern Causa, Valle, Choco
and the territory of Meta.6
More striking than its pervasiveness, however, was the
brutal and grotesque character of the violence itself. Raymond
Estep comments:
Before the war 'officially' ended . . . both sides
were resorting to the employment of the worst as
pects of guerrilla warfare—they burned homes, and
whole villages, wiped out families, raped women,
4
Z. Pazmany, Background for Counterinsurqency Studies
in Latin America - III, Notes on Violence in Venezuela and
Colombia; (Santa Barbara: Defense Research Group, 1964),
p. 13.




stole, or 'expropriated1 property and assassi
nated government officials and other leaders.7
The point is made clear in examining the level of destruction
in the department of Tolima alone. In that department, from
1949 to 1958, the estimates of material destruction read:
48,046 houses, barns and corrals burned; 93,822
abandoned houses and small crop producing proper
ties; 34,730 abandoned ranches; 192 million pesos
in killed livestock; 170 million pesos in lost
production.8
As one author notes, "economic destruction, fear and poverty
became general."9
The number of persons actually killed is also consistent
with the level of material destruction. Estimates of the
total deaths range from 200,000 to 300,000. Included in
this number were 6,200 army personnel, as well as police and
government officials. Even more startling than the staggering
total, however, is the nature of the violence itself. A.
Pazmany notes that a special vocabulary was developed re
flecting the particular styles or murder, assault and torture.
A few terms are presented herein:H
Raymond Estep, "Guerrilla Warfare in Latin American,
1963-1975," Air University Institute for Professional Develop
ment, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 1974, p. 2.
g
Pazmany, Background for, p. 13.
Q
Sorenson, The Relationship of, p. 14.
10
Condit and Cooper, Challenge and Response, p. 419. It
should be added that the deaths ranged from 200 to 300 per
sons per month during this era.
Pazmany, Background for, p. 14.
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picar par tamal, in which the victims were literally
chopped into minute pieces.
bocachiquear, in which the victims received long,
superficial cuts that would bleed slowly, an
act usually carried out by children in their
training for violence.
no dejar ni la semilla, meaning "don't leave even the
seed," in which the defeated family or the popu
lation of a hacienda, or a whole town, had all
pregnant women and children killed and all males
castrated.
corte de franela, a guerrilla invention consisting of
gruesome throat cut simulating the contour of
the flannel undershirt.
corte de corbata, a "parajo" invention (government
backed anti-guerrilla gansters) in reply to
the above, in which the victim had his throat
cut and the jaw and his tongue pushed through
the cut to simulate a necktie.
corte de mica, a decapitation leaving the head on
top of the chest.
corte de franees, equivalent to a scalping.
corte de ereja, in which the victim's ears were cut
as proof to be shown to superiors.
descuartizamiento, in which the victim was tied up
and his feet and hands severed with the machete
finally his heart was carved out.
emplamiento, where the victim was literally skinned
from the back towards the chest and the skin
extended by stakes to simulate a bat.
La Violencia was finally brought under control in 1958
as the country's two political parties compromised to form a
National Front government. While the level and pervasive
character of the violence subsided, it did not signal an end
to the problem. To the contrary, it is in the context of La
Violencia that the more organized ideologically oriented in
ternal security threat from guerrilla warfare organizations
50
has its emergence.
This view of the La Violencia period, however, is not
shared by all. Some authors have concluded that the violence
was merely chaotic banditry spurred by the rivalry of the
political parties. Hence, with the formation of the National
Front government, the political motivation of the violence
is said to have ceased and any later actions were only those
of bandit gangs with no idelogical organization character.
The suggestion is put forth by John L. Sorenson who argues:
Since 1958 the major elements of the two main
parties have concentrated in government under the
National Front agreement. In the interval, acts
of violence with political overtones have de
creased sharply. Murder and mayhem are still pre
valent in many sections of the country, but most
of it cannot be called insurgent. As a matter of
fact even during the mid 1950"s there was a progessive
tendency for political motivations to become subor
dinated to mere savagery. Today's official term
for the rural bandits, "antisociales," is certainly
more nearly correct than "insurgents."I2
Sorenson's argument, however, misjudged the reality of
the situation at the time and clearly failed to make an ac
curate assessment of future developments in Colombia. While
the early violence may have been primarily the work of un
organized bandit party gangs, later developments witnessed
the emergence of political organizations with a variety of
distinct ideological identifications. A number of authors
offer arguments counter to those of Sorenson. The Condit
and Cooper study comments;
12
Sorenson, The Relationship of, p. 14.
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By the end of 1952, a broad organizational pat
tern could be detected in the insurgency. At
no time was it unified or centrally divided
movement/ but a dozen or so regional groups or
commands became fairly well organized. These
"revolutionary commands" were active in the
eastern llanos where some 19 guerrilla forces
were in organizational contact; in the depart
ments of Santander and Norte de Santander; in
Northern Cundinamarca and Western Goyaca; in
eastern, southern and central Tolima; and in
western and eastern Antioquia. Communist led
commands were active in Viota; Sumapaz (southern
Cundinamarca), Gaitania (southern Tolima), Rio
Chiquito and Simbola-Paez (a mountain area on
the Cauca-Huila border).13
Likewise the United States Army Area Handbook for Colombia
adds:
These years (La Violencia) also saw the ap
pearance of some nine so-called independent
republics . . . receiving considerable support
from the PCC (Colombian Communist Party), the
independent republics administered their own
systems of justice and law enforcement.14
As further evidence of the continuation of the violence
beyond the formation of the National Front government, Pazmany
noted that the final wave of La Violencia did not begin until
1959, lasting until 1962. He adds that by 1958, the year of
the National Front, various bands had organized throuqhtout
the country. The locations and numbers included: Tolima-33
bands, Huila - 5 bands, Cundinamarca - 4 bands, Boyaca - 2
bands, Santander - 2 bands, Arauca - 3 bands, Casarne - 13
Condit and Cooper, Challenge arid Response, p. 416,
(author's emphasis).
U.S. Department of the Army, Area Handbook for Colom
bia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing. Office, 1977),
p. 401.
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bands, El Meta - 7 bands, Caldas - 3 bands, Valle - 3 bands,
Antioquia - 14 bands, and Choco - 2 bands.
In this context it seems quite clear that while the ini
tial mayhem of La Viplencia may have been the work of rival
party banditry, this pattern soon changed as organized guer
rilla units developed. Particularly, significant was the
role of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC). The PCC was not
directly responsible for the formation of all revolutionary
guerrilla groups, but rather its greater role was the inter
jection of a definite ideological orientation into the vio
lence expanding the meaning of the conflict beyond that of
the limited party rivalry of the past. Thus, despite Soren-
son's argument, it seems quite clear that the La Violencia
era produced not only bandits, but also ideologically oriented
guerrilla insurgents. Hence, Raymond Estep's conclusion
saying, "the heritage left by La Violencia continues to mani
fest itselt even to the present in the operations of small
bands of guerrillas in the Colombian mountains." Finally,
this view is explicitly expressed in the United States Army
Area Handbook for Colombia which reads:
The National Front government had been in power
barely six months . . . A new threat to the na
tion' s internal security appeared in the form of
ideologically based guerrilla groups dedicated ^
to the overthrow of the National Front government.
Pazmany, Background for, pp. 15-16.
16Estep, "Guerrilla Warfare," p. 2.
Area Handbook, p. 402, (author's emphasis).
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Insofar as the United States was concerned, it never
discounted the ideological (i.e., communist) influence in
the La Violencia period. At the time of the Gaitan assassi
nation, United States officials who were attending the Ninth
International Conference of American States, began to express
their concern as to a possible communist role. In part,
this concern was based on the coincidence of Fidel Castro's
18
presence in Colombia when the Bogotazo began. Because
Castro was a delegate to an Anti-Imperialist Student Congress,
United States officials later saw a direct connection. Sec
retary of State at that time, George Marshall, accused inter
national communism for the violence saying it was the "first
19
major Communist attempt in the Western Hemisphere." Mar
shall added:
In the action we take here in regard to the present
situation we must have clearly in mind that this is
a world affair, and not merely Colombia or Latin
America.
Eleven years later, after the formation of the National Front
government and subsequent developments which included a new
threat from organized leftist guerrillas, regions of the
country outside government control, the success of Fidel Castro
in Cuba, the United States was absolutely convinced that a
18
Condit and Cooper, Challenge and Response, p. 418.
19
Gott, Guerrilla Movements, p. 228. The Colombian gov
ernment also believed that some communist plot was involved
and immediately broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union.
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forceful and vigorous policy of. anti-guerrilla counterin-
surgency was sbsolutely necessary. Three years later, the
United States implemented just such a policy.
At this point then, the chapter turns to an examination
of these guerrilla movements which emerged in the post-1958
era. Those covered will be the major groups with a specific
ideological orientation dedicated to the overthrow of the
National Front government. This distinction will thus elimi
nate the various other groups or bands which retained their
basic character as criminal bandits or a continued identifi
cation with either the Liberal or Conservative parties. It
was these groups which emerged as a serious political and
military threat to the continued existence of the Colombian
government. This threat was in the form of specific military
and political actions on their part and the ideological char
acter they brought to the struggle. On this point the re
cently declassifed Defense Intelligence document entitled
"Cold War (Counterinsurgency) Analysis - Colombia," remarked:
. . . they hope to develop sufficient military or
para-military forces to establish additional and
enlarge existing safehavens; extend their area of
influence; defeat government forces in guerrilla
warfare type operations; undermine public confi
dence in the government; and to eventually dic
tate peace terms that would provide for or favor
their eventual control of the country.20
20
U.S., Defense Intelligence Agency, Cold War (Counter-
insurgency) Analysis-Colombia, n.p., (December 1963), p. 50.
This document was declassified by the author under the Free
dom of Information Act on December 6, 1979. It should be
noted that despite the seventeen years since the document
was written major portions remain classified.
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In addition, comments which are remarkable for the clarity
of different interests between the guerrillas and the United
States noted:
The objectives and interests of the political
group are contrary to those of the United States.
Primary differences exist in methods of achieving
reform; Violent revolution instead Of peaceful
revolution or evolution; in the ultimate philosophy
of the society, communism or socialism instead of
capitalism; political orientation of the society,
dictatorship versus democracy; and international
orientation, Bloc (Soviet) instead of the West . . .
it is believed that their long association with
leftism provides so strong a psychological orientation
that it would be impossible for the United States
to secure effective and reliable cooperation and
support from any of these groups.21
First, looking at the specific guerrilla movements, five
such organizations emerged in the post 1958 with a definite
ideological character and military posture such that they
warranted the attention of the cunterinsurgency policy. These
groups were the following: Workers, Students and Peasants
Movements - MOEC; United Front of Revolutionary Action - FUAR;
Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces - FARC; Army of National
Liberation - ELN; and the Popular Liberation Army - EPL. All
groups had a leftist ideological position and sought to over
throw the government by means of a social revolution.
The first two of these groups, MOEC and FUAR, were for
mally organized shortly after the formation of the National
Front government. MOEC was the first of the two to be formed
in 1959 after a student strike and protest over an increase
21
Ibid., p. 5., (author's emphasis).
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in bus fares in the capital city of Bogota. The person most
responsible for its formation was one Antonio Larotta. Al
though neither he nor his movement was avowedly communist,
Larotta actively sought to develop ties wtih Cuba, seeking
financial assistance from this country. It was for this rea
son that MDEC has been characterized as being both Marxist and
22
the country's first cuban-oriented or Fidelista movement.
Despite the efforts of Larotta, MOEC never developed as
a major guerrilla organization. The group's attraction was
mainly limited to students and intellectuals. In the politi
cal realm, its actions were limited to organizing attempts
in the department of Valle de Cauca. Militarily, MOEC is
believed to have been responsible for a number of bombings
in Bogota in 1961 and 1962. Larotta's own demise by assas
sination in 1961 signalled a decline for the entire movement.
Other student leaders attempted to fill his leadership role,
but none had any real success. By the end of 1964 MOEC's
existence as a serious guerrilla organization with a threat
ening potential had all but disappeared.
FUAR, like MOEC, was also a group comprised mainly of
students and intellectuals. Attempting to revive the name
and ideas of Jorge Elicar Gaitan, the organization was led by
24
his daughter and her husband, Glorida and Luis Emiro Valencia.
22Gott, Guerrilla Movements, p. 211 and Pazmany, Background
for, p. 197.
23
Pazmany, Background for, p. 197.
Gott, Guerrilla Movements, p. 241.
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Again like MOEC, FUAR never developed into a major guerrilla
movement. Its limited actions were confined to the depart
ment of Vichada. The only military action associated with
FUAR was a single guerrilla unit which captured a Colombian
army patrol. FUAR's inability to expand its base of opera
tions or its number of recruits soon led to the fading of
the group after only a few years of operations. Both groups,
FUAR and MOEC, thus never developed whatever potential they
seemed to possess. Their distinctive contribution to the
guerrilla movement in Colombia, however, was in their leftist
ideological input and direction. In this sense they were the
first groups to crystallize leftist ideological views into
organized revolutionary guerrilla movements. Accordingly,
the United States Army Area Handbook for Colombia comments:
Although they were short-lived, their ideologies
and many of their members were picked up by other
guerrilla bands, three of which survived a decade
of intense government efforts to suppress them.25
Those three groups were the Army of National Liberation
(ELN), the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and
the Popular Liberation Army (EPL). They were formed a few
years after MOEC and FUAR and emerged as much more formidable
threats to the Colombian government. Additionally, although
all three emerged in the 1960's, they too have their origins
in the La Violencia period.
25Area Handbook, p. 402,
Estep, p. 32.
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The first to be formed was organized in 1964 and was
the ELN. Led by Fabio Vasquez Castano, the ELN was based on
an alliance of students and peasants. It initiated its guer
rilla activities in the department of Santander in January
1965 issuing a statement of its goals and purposes known as
27
the Simacota Manifesto. Interestingly, the date of its
initial actions were timed to coincide with the anniversary
of the now defunct MOEC. This act was a clear indication
of the ideological sympathy between the two groups. Like
MOEC, ELN's basic ideological orientation was also pro-Castro
and it is suspected to have received some assistance from
Cuba.
As one of the three major guerrilla organizations, the
ELN has been characterized as the most effective. Its major
military actions took place in the immediate years after for
mation when it expanded its base of operations and mounted a
series of attacks on small towns and banks. Its most pub
licized achievement was the attack and defeat of an armed
28
forces military patrol on a train in March 1967. At this
point its guerrilla activities and organizing efforts had
helped the organization grow from an original size of eighteen
to several hundred guerrillas.
ELN also received a great deal of publicity when a pop
ular Colombian Catholic priest joint the organization. Father
27
Ibid., p. 32 and Gott, Guerrilla Movements, p. 258.
28
Area Handbook, p. 402.
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Camilo Torres joined the ELN in hopes of establishing a
United Front Movement by uniting all opposition to the Na
tional Front government. Although Torres was killed by the
Columbian Army only months after he joined the ELN, his sta
ture and reputation as a priest made him something of a Colom
bian-Latin American hero as well as enhancing the national
status of the ELN.
The second group to be formed was the FARC. It was or
ganized in May 1966 and was supported by the Moscow backed
Colombian Communist Party. For the record it was after the
Tenth Congress of the PCC that a decision was made to assist
in the formation of a guerrilla organization. Manuel Marulanda
who was a former member of the PCC's Central Committee emerged
29
as the head of FARC. The group's ideological orientation
was thus toward the Soviet Union rather than Fidel Castro.
FARC's greatest military successes as a guerrilla organi
zation came in the immediate years after its formation. Dur
ing that period FARC succeeded in waging a number of attacks
on the Colombian armed forces capturing both weapons and sup
plies. At this time the group membership totalled about 500
guerrillas along with active support of several thousand pea
sants. A major blow to FARC's effectiveness and long-term
potential developed when the Soviet Union established diplo
matic relations with the government of Colombia in 1968. This
29
Gott, Guerrilla Movements, p. 256.
Area Handbook, p. 402.
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action severely undercut the PCC's economic and political
support of FARC.
The third of the three guerrilla groups to be organized
was the EPL. It was headed by Gonzalo Gonzales and was com
prised primarily of dissatisfied members of the ELN and FARC
as well as students and peasants. EPL was formed in 1968 and
was always of a relatively small size with its peak number of
guerrillas totaling no more than one hundred and fifty to two
hundred members. Its most significant feature seems to have
been its ideological orientation towards Peking. Character
izing itself as a "people's war" movement, the EPL is said to
have had at least the official recognition, if not any actual
support from the People's Republic of China. Its primary
bases of operation were in the departments of Antioquio and
Cordoba from which it launched sporadic attacks on armed
forces patrols.
Aside from the threat of the guerrilla organizations,
the greatest concern of the Colombia government emanated from
the areas of the country known as the "independent communist
republics." These areas, whose reported numbers ranged from
a low of five to as many as nine, were called independent
because they existed outside of any effective government con
trol. In addition, over the years the regions had proved to
31Estep, "Guerrilla Warfare," p. 33 and Gott, Guerrilla
Movements, p. 301.
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be impenetrable in the face of repeated government attempts to
gain control over them. The republics were ruled by various
guerrilla chiefs or caudillos who administered their own sys
tems of justice and political authority. The government's
concern also centered around the fact that these areas were
32
used as safe havens and bases for anti-government operations.
Their total size covered roughly 1,800 square miles.
Just as the term "independent" indicates the lack of gov
ernment control, the reference to these areas as "communist"
is an indication of the PCC's influence and ties with repub
lics. This association had its beginnings in the 1930's soon
after the PCC was formed. At that time the party helped to or
ganize peasants in the Viota region. Over the years the party
continued to expand its ties and influence into other areas.
The ties in general, however, never developed into any
concrete organizational links and the relationship remained
at best something little more than a supportive role. This
support has primarily been in the form of political propaganda
as opposed to any substantial military or other material as
sistance.33 The PCC's most ambitious effort to develop linkages
with these areas took place in 1952 when the party organized a
meeting of various enclaves in what was called the "Confercia
32Cold War, p. 4.
33James M. Daniel, Rural Violence in Colombia Since 1946
(Washington, D.C.: The American University Special Operations
Research Office, 1965), p. 175.
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Nacional de Guerrillos" or the "Conference of Boyaco."
Here the PCC attempted to unite the various republics and
provide a more definitive revolutionary perspective as well
as establish more formal ties with the party. Former Secre
tary General of the PCC Gilberto Vieira commented on the
conference saying it was an:
attempt to coordinate and orient the dispersed and
unequal guerrilla movement, composed of detachments
isolated by distances of thousands of kilometers of
jungles and mountains and separated even more by
diverse concepts concerning the characters of the
fight which they were heroically unleaching.35
And on the results of the conference,
the national conference of guerriallas declared
itself in favor of the struggle for power through
the formation of popular governing councils the
area dominated by the guerrillas, and it sketched
out an anti-imperalist and anti-latifundist pro
gram. 36
Besides the conference itself the party's only other
significant contact with the republics was through a number
of guerrilla leaders who were members of PCC's Control Com
mittee. This included Fermin Charry of Marguetalia, Victor
Mechan of Viota, Juan de la cruz Varela of Sumapaz and Robert
Gonzales Prieto (dubbed the "ideologist of the "communists" by the
34
Ibid., p. 176 and Gott, Guerrilla Movements, p. 234.
35Ibid., p. 176.
36
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Colombia government)37 of Tolima. Despite these direct con
tacts the guerrilla leaders and the republics as a whole, re-
38
mained totally independent of the PCC and its policies.
Turning to the republics, as I noted earlier, the number
of such areas range from five to nine. Of these eight can be
identified revealing pertinent information. It is those eight
which will be discussed. Except where otherwise noted the pri
mary information on the "independent communist republics" is
taken from Daniel's Rural Violence in Colombia Since 1946.
Perhaps the two most significant of the republics were
Viota and Sumapaz. It was both these areas that the PCC had
its most extensive ties and influence. According to the De
fense Intelligence Agency student both areas were "safe havens
39
and bases for paramilitary training and arms caches." Viota
in particular had been a training center for indoctrination
and guerrilla warfare training. Established here was a Na
tional Personnel School which offered instruction in politics,
economics, international problems and socialism. Graduates
from the school used this in organizing other republics. In
sofar as Viota's origins are concerned, it was established in
the 1920's. Revolutionary socialists entered the area at this
time and organized peasant revolts to sieze land from large
landholders. Following up on these efforts the PCC in the
37Condit and Cooper, Challenge and Response, p. 419.
op
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1930's helped form cooperative Peasant Leagues. These leagues
were comprised of political bodies and military units which
were able to repulse police and army attempts to enter the
region.
Sumapaz, the second of the communist-influenced repub
lics was founded in the 1930's. The man responsible for its
foundation was former PCC Central Committee member Juan de la
Cruz Varela. Varela's communist views seemed confirmed in
1960 when he visited Fidel Castro in Cuba. Varela's guer
rilla activities in Sumapaz have their beginning in the late
1940's. These activities spurred a major government army
campaign into the region in 1954 in an attempt to eliminate
the communist presence. The government's campaign failed as
the guerrillas counter-attacked and also strategically re
treated into the rough mountain terrain of the republic. In
view of these developments the guerrillas in Sumapaz were
considered to be the most belligerent and destructive of all
the republics.40 This was based in part on early 1960 esti
mates of the guerrilla's size numbering five to six thousand
strong.
The third of the identifiable republics was that of
Tolima. Established in the early 1950's, the PCC also had a
role in organizaing the peasants of this region. The party
also helped to set-up both a political and military organi
zation. The republic was led by Robert Gonzales Prieto who
40Condit and Cooper, Challenge and Response, p. 417.
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was also a member of the PCC. Like Varela, Gonzales spent
some time in Cuba. Upon his return he is credited with
sponsoring guerrilla warfare training and having printed liter
ature on the subject. According to the PCC the republic of
Tolima was "the first major center of guerrilla struggle in
42
Latin American led by the part of the proletariat.
Perhaps the largest of the republics was that of Mar
quetalia which was established in 1949 and covered an area of
about 2000 square miles. The republic was established and
headed initially by Fermin Charry. Joining the PCC in 1952,
Charry later became a member of the Central Committee nick
named "Charro Negro," Fermin also published various politi
cal articles under the name Jacobo Frias Alape. Marquetalia,
like the other republics, existed with virtual autonomy out
side of the government's authority. After resisting periodic
government incursions into the area, Charry was killed in
1960 due to an internal conflict in the republic. Before
this happened, Charry had expanded his organizing activities
beyond Marquetalia and played a major role in the establish
ment of the adjoining republic of Rio Chiquito. Once Charry
was killed he was succeeded by another well-known and destruc
tive guerrilla leader named Manuel Marulanda Velez. Marulanda
was also a Central Committee member of the PCC.
41Ibid., p. 417.
42Gott, Guerrilla Movements, p. 233.
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The fifth republic, Rio Chiquito is an area of very
rough terrain and inhabited mainly by Indian aborigines.
These people had experienced a history of intense exploitation.
Fermin Charry who initiated political organizing efforts among
the Indians, was later followed by the guerrilla chief who
came to head the republic, Ciro Trujillo Castano. Castano
was a communist who initiated a campaign of land distribution
using the land expropriated from expelled landowners.
The sixth of the republics was that of Medellin de Ariari.
It was established in the 1950's by Juan de La Cruz Varela as
communist organizers moved into the area. Although the party
succeeded in setting up agricultural unions, its influence was
not as great as in other republics.
The last two republics were those of El Pato and Guaya-
bero. Both were of a smaller size and were never accorded the
notoriety of the other republics. Like Medellin de Ariari, the
influence of the PCC was limited. The leader of El Pato was
Jose Antonio Castaneda who may have had some contacts with
other PCC members, but does not seem to have been a communist
himself. In Guayabero, which is described as a dependency of
El Pato, the guerrilla leader Jose Eno Leal was a lieutenant
of Castaneda. In both these areas the degree of the govern
ment's authority was much greater than in ther other republics.
In regard to the internal structure of the republics, the
pattern varies from region to region. In general, most have
both political and military divisions. The influence of the
67
PCC is evident in the various titles of officials including
political commisar, political secretary and secretary-general.
In a military sense each republic is also different. Most
have regular military troops, special defense forces and pea
sant units who can also serve as armed combatants. Most mili
tary action of the republics were primarily of a defensive na
ture while others were more offensive minded. The most active
offensively were the guerrillas of Manuel Marulanda Velez. As
a final note, despite the common communist influence on prac
tically all of the republics, there was never any serious co
operation or coordination among the regions. This was the goal
of PCCs National Conference of the Gurrillas.
In assessing the overall significance of the independent
communist republics it is clear that their presence consti
tuted a serious obstacle to the sovereignty of the Colombian
government. While they were not a military threat, their
intermitten attacks on army, policy patrols and civilians as
well as the government's inability to penetrate these areas
placed Colombia officials in a precarious position. Finally,
the influence of the PCC and the republics' long existence
made them a potentially troublesome situation. As author James
Daniel noted, "So long as they exist they will be a threat to
43
peace, providing as they do bases of operations ..." It
was this combination of concerns that prompted the Colombian
43
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and United States governments to develop a policy for the
elimination of the independent communist republics.
In addition to the revolutionary movements in the rural
countryside, and the independent communist republics, the
third dimension of Colombia's insurgency problem emanated from
an urban guerrilla warfare movement. This movement emerged in
the mid-1960's operating in the capital city of Bogota and
other major urban areas. Collectively these groups had the
potential to rival the threat of the guerrilla organization
operating in the countryside. Hence the United States Army
Area Handbook for Columbia argues that it constituted a major
~ 44
problem and a more substantial threat than the rural guerrillas.
This view is based on the realization that the periodic campaign
of urban attacks of these small, close-knit, clandestine groups
have the potential to upset the political stablity and security
of the Colombian government.
In the 1970's the most prominent and successful group
was the Urban Guerrilla Movement (MOGUR). Later about half a
dozen groups followed MOGUR with the most notable being M-19,
H-1.5. and MARC.45 Of these three, M-19, taking its name from
the April 19, 1970, elections which the group says was a fraud,
is clearly the most well-known and most active organization.
M-19's actual and associated membership is comprised of over one
Area Handbook, p. 404.
45Ibid., p. 404.
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thousand people and the group has contacts throughout the
country and with other movements throughout Latin America.
46Huntsville (Alabama) Times, 28, February 1980,
CHAPTER IV
THE UNITED STATES MILITARY COUNTERINSURGENCY
PROGRAM IN COLOMBIA
The information in the last chapter makes it quite clear
that the guerrilla insurgency problem in Colombia has a long
persistent history. Moreover, it has also been illustrated
that past Colombian governments attempts to quell and destroy
the violence through indigenous counterinsurgency strategies
and tactics have met with little success. Accordingly, this
chapter turns to an examination of the role of the United
States in introducing and applying its international foreign
policy doctrine of counterinsurgency to the Colombian guer
rilla warfare problem.
In spelling out the application of the United States coun
terinsurgency doctrine to Colombia, there are three sections to
this chapter. First, the chapter will offer a brief examina
tion of past United States-Colombian relations. Here the
United States interest and justification for deciding to in
troduce the counterinsurgency policy into Colombia is under
taken. Next, the chapter moves to an examination of the major
features and components of the United States counterinsurgency
policy as it was developed and implemented in Colombia. Fi
nally the chapter concludes with a discussion of the various
70
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kinds of military assistance the United States has provided
Colombia with as a supplement to the overall counterinsur-
gency program.
Looking first at the history of United States-Colombia
relations, it is clear that both nations have enjoyed a long,
friendly and cordial relationship. The United States was the
first nation to recognize Colombia's independence. Later
both nations signed a Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation and
Commerce that dates from 1846. Contemporary relations have
their beginnings since 1939 when the United States established
a military mission in the country. This relationship took
a more substantive and formal turn when relations were up
graded in 1952 as both nations signed a Mutual Security Pact.
Later as concerns shifted away from the problem of external
hemispheric defense, Colombia became a recipent of the United
States Military Assistance Program. One of its specific
purposes being to help developing nations develop their inter
nal security capabilities in order that domestic violence prob
lems would not be allowed to deter national development.
This concern for internal stability coincided with the
American intervention in Vietnam where the United States had
begun to develop its new counterinsurgency doctrine as a de
terrent to internal instablity problems in the developing
countries. By the late 1950"s particular attention was being
paid to this problem in Latin America. The large amount of
1This treaty was discussed in an earlier chapter.
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United States investments and in the region being a key factor
of concern. Colombia was immediately selected as one of a num
ber of countries, and in particular the very first in Latin
America, where a full-scale application of the counterinsur-
gency doctrine along with a major program of military assistance
would be undertaken.
There are a number of significant reasons that accounted
for or justified United States officials selection of Colombia
for such purposes. The reasons comprise a variety of military,
strategic as well as political factors. On the military plane,
Colombia at that time was one of three Latin American countries
2
considered to have a serious and active insurgency problem.
The other two countries being Guatemala and Venezuela. A suc
cinct expression of this concern was spelled out in a newly
declassified State Department paper. Under a section pertaining
to Colombia's political unrest entitled "U.S. National Interests,"
it commented:
Major U.S. Interests in Colombia reflect overall
U.S. interest in Latin America. With the countries
of this area we have achieved a special generally
friendly and close relationship which is important
to guard and preserve. Should extremist governments
in this area, hostile to the U.S. come to power they
would threaten this present association and create
major foreign policy problems.3
Major Robert Russell, "Reduced Military Assistance to
Latin America: The Impact on U.S.-Colombian Relations," Air
Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama, May 1970, p. 55.
3U.S., Information Agency, Country Plan Program Memoran
dum for Colombia, Part I, n.p., n.d., p. 15. This was a pre
viously classfied document which was declassfied by the author
under the Freedom of Information Act of June 11, 1979.
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Equally as important, strategic factors in respect to
Colombia's size and geographic location were critical con
cerns of the United States. Spelling out this case, an United
States Army document notes:
Colombia's position, straddling the isthmus of
Panama, with coastlines on both the Pacific Sea
and the Caribbean Sea, is a strategic one with
respect to the approaches to the vital Panama
Canal.4
Moreover, the recently declassified State Department document
further emphasizes this point in noting that Colombia's geo
graphic position relative to Caribbean shipping routes as
well as "the possiblity that it might be the route for a new
canal gives it a special strategic importance." In respect
to size, Colombia is important in that it is the third largest
country in Latin America in terms of population and ranks
fourth in regards to geographic area. A final strategic
concern centers on the fact the Colombia's borders are in
close proximity to Venezuelan oil fields.
On a political level, as noted earlier, Colombia and the
United States have enjoyed a long and friendly relationship.
At the beginning of World War II Colombia co-sponsored a reso
lution at the Rio Conference of the Inter American Nations
that would have required the Latin American states to break
4
U.S., Department of the Army, Colombia Background Notes
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), P. w-3,
Country Plan, p. 15, (author's emphasis).
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diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. Even though the
resolution was passed only as a recommendation, Colombia
showed its willingness to cooperate with the United States by
not only unilaterally breaking diplomatic relations with the
Axis nations, but by also expropriating the property of German
nationals and declaring war in 1939. Thus Colombia
became one of the two Latin American nations that contributed
troops to the Allied cause and later was the sole contributor
of troops to the United Nations force during the Korean con
flict.7
Aside from these specific considerations, the United States
pursued and developed concerte relations with Colombia for two
other general reasons. One, the realization that in future
years Colombia had the potential to become a political leader
among the Andean countries. Secondly, the United States is
grateful and pleased with the support Colombia has offered on
critical political issues at international forums such as the
United Nations and Organization of American States. Viewed
as a whole, the broad range of political factors, notes the
above mentioned State Department Country Plan, has placed the
United States in a position where "the desirability of con
tinued close and friendly relations is therefore particularly
Q
significant."
U.S. Department of the Army, Area Handbook, for Colombia
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 310.
Russell, "Reduced Military Assistance," p. 53.
o
Country Plan, p. 16.
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While the above reasons constitute the political aspect
of United States Colombian relations, additional economic fac
tors should also be taken into account as an important part
of that relationship. In this arena it is also clear that the
two nations have a long and extensive relationship. Since the
turn of the century the United States has been Colombia's main
trading partner. In particular, the United States has been
the main customer for Colombian coffee which has always been
the country's leading export and main source of revenue.
In the early 1960"s the period when the counterinsurgency
doctrine was introduced, Colombia was the largest market for
the country's goods, purchasing over half the nation's ex
ports. This trade relationship, along with the fact that
the United States provided most of the private investment in
Colombia, continued past the mid-1970's with the United States
retaining its role as Colombia's single main trading partner.
These trade agreements and private investments that totalled
over $800 million clearly reflect the United States interest
in Colombia. Accordingly, the Country Plan document advises
that "it is in the United States' interest that these com
mercial relationships be protected and expanded."
Area Handbook, p. 321,
Country Plan, p. 16.
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Supplementing these trade relations has been an economic
aid program wherein the United States provided Colombia over
$1.5 billion in loans and grants (excluding military aid)
from 1960 to 1975. Most of the funds were administered through
the Agency for Internationl Development under the much revered
and highly publicized Alliance for Progress. Importantly, it
should be noted that the implementation of counterinsurgency
doctrine coincided with the initiation of the Alliance for
Progress. More significant, however, is the fact that American
officials selected Columbia to be the "showcase" of the Alli
ance for Progress. This point is made clear in the United
States Army Area Handbook for Colombia which notes:
Colombia was selected as the major recipient of
assistance under the alliance because, in the
words of the United States Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations report, it "combined in a high
degree the opportunities and challenges both
economic and political—which the Alliance was
designed to meet.H
Information in the declassified Country Plan paper supports
this contention of selecting Colombia as a showcase in comments
that read:
It is important to the United States, in terms of
a successful example and as a demonstration of
consistency in our commitments to help those who
help themselves, that this effort not flag, but
rather, continue in friendly association with the
United States to a point that the country (Colom
bia) is firmly on the path of self-sustaining eco
nomic growth . . .12
-11Area Handbook, p. 321, (author's emphasis).
12
Country Plan, p. 15.
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As noted earlier, the United States counterinsurgency
program for Colombia i coincided with the initiation of the
Alliance for Progress in that country. The general purpose
behind the Alliance being the elimination of poverty and
underdeveloment. At the same time, however, American offi
cials felt that the Alliance could not fucntion effectively
within the context of discontent and internal security prob
lems that many of the Latin America nations faced. Hence,
former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was led to remark,
"the goals of the Alliance can only be achieved within the
framework of the law and order."
This comment was particularly pertinent for Colombia con
sidering the massive level of discontent within that nation.
If "law and order" was a pre-condition for the success of
the Alliance, the situation in Colombia would necessitate a
major effort to bring the country's internal security problem
under control. This was especially true as regards the rural
interior regions of the country where guerrilla movements
controlled the so-called independent communist republics.
Such a major internal security problem was obviously of great
concern to American officials. Accordingly, Richard Gott
in Guerrilla Movements in Latin America reveals that at this
juncture the Colombian government was forced "—doubtless
"U.S. Military Operations in Latin America." U.S.
Military and Police Operations in the Third World. (New York;
North American Congress on Latin America, 1970), p. 6.
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under United States pressure—to consider the task of "clean-
14
ing up1 the independent communist republics." Additional
pressure from the United States was also suggested in a CIA
memorandum reportedly issued at that time which listed these
areas as being a serious problem and "stressed that it was up
to the government (Colombia) to abolish them with utmost
speed."15
It is in this context then that an examination of the
United States counterinsurgency effort in Colombia can be
undertaken. Pursuant to that task United States officials
assisted members of the Colombian government in the develop
ment of a broad counterinsurgency policy to eliminate the
internal security problems of the country. Particular at
tention was initially focused on the "independent communist
republics" and other centers of guerrilla activity in rural
areas of the country. The American sponsored counterinsur
gency policy was known as "Plan Lazo." In brief it was a
broadly conceived plan encompassing military, police as well
as socio-eoonomic remedies. The plan included short and long
term actions as well as being relatively flexible for future
adjustments and changes that might be become necessary.
14
Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America
(New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1971), p. 247.
See Ramon Lopez, "New Stage in the Guerrilla Struggle
in Colombia," World Marxist Review (February, 1967).
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In examining the new policy, Plan Lazo, it was developed
through the assistance of United States military officials
of the SOUTHCOM Command.16 The significance of this action
is noted by Richard Gott who comments:
Colombia (thus became) the first country in Latin
"America where the United States began to put into
action the new anti-guerrilla strategies that had
been evolved during the first years of the Kennedy
administration .~T7 " ~~
Being a comprehensive effort, Plan Lazo involved exten
sive features including "specialized training in anti-guerrilla
operations, training in operational intelligence and psycho
logical warfare."18 In addition the Condit study adds that
the plan provided for guidance in community defense (civil
defense indoctrination) while the Columbian army also em
barked on a program of civil action assistance to help re-
19
construct areas affected by the violence.
Facilitating this effort the United States negotiated a
series of military aid packages to support the new counter-
insurgency policy. This included:
16Nathan A. Haverstock and Richard C. Schroder, Dateline
Latin America (Washington, D.C.: The Latin American News Ser-
vice, 1971), p. 82 and James M. Daniel, Rural Violence in
Colombia Since 1946 (Washington, D.C.: The American Univer
sity Special Operations Research Office, 1965), p. 129.
17Gott, Guerrilla Movements, p. 249, (author's emphasis).
18Daniel, Rural Violence, p. 129.
19D. M. Condit and Bert Cooper, ed., Challenge and Re-
sponse in Internal Conflict: The Experience in Africa and
Latin America, Vol. Ill (Washington, D.C.:The American Uni
versity Center for Research in Social Systems, 1968), p. 425.
Details on the civil action program are discussed in a later
chapter.
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Some $60 million in military assistance between
1961 and 1967 for counterinsurgency and socio-
economic development projects conducted under
the auspices of the Colombian Army. Since that
time United States military assistance has been
concentrated on. supplying credits for the pur
chase of equipment and training personnel in
its use. Between 1962 and 1972 Colombia received
just under $100 million worth of military equip
ment from the United States. This fact has made
the United States the single most important
foreign influence on the Colombian army forces
. . . .20
Insofar as counterinsurgency training is concerned,
United States Army officials provided this to Colombian mili
tary personnel at SOUTHCOM facilities in the Canal Zone as
well as institutions in the mainland. Mobile Training Teams
(MTT's) also visited Colombia providing on the spot training
to personnel who were able to train other armed forces troops.
Many of the Colombian personnel included high-ranking mili
tary officials who received the specialized training for
officers at the U.S. Army School of the Americas. Most
likely this included Major General Alberto Ruiz Novoa who
21
was responsible for the implementation of Plan Lazo.
This extensive emphasis on countersurgency type training
was clearly a reflection of both United States Army officials
and the Colombia government's perception of the severity of
the problem. According to one estimate, by 1962 there were as
many as 3,000 guerrillas organized in 161 bands numbering from
20
Area Handbook,, p. 445, (author's emphasis).
21
I say "most likely" because SOUTHCOM does not release
the names of ranking Latin American military officers who re
ceive training at its facilities.
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4 to 300 members each.22 Considering the fragmented politi
cal culture and socioeconomic conditions in Colombia, it is
clear that the guerrilla movements did indeed represent a
serious threat to the long term viability of the government.
Plan Lazo was thus issued to the Colombian army in mid-
1962. Daniel notes that the plan consisted of and was to be
implemented in five phases. The phases were designed as
follows: preparatory, initiation of counter action, assump
tion of the offensive, destruction of brigands (guerrilla
bases), and reconstruction.23 Richard Gott gives us a Colom
bian guerrilla's more detailed description of the various
24
phases:
Phase one: preparation and organization: Once
the troops have been trained in anti-guerrilla
action, spies are sent into the area and inform
ers recruited. For that purpose, "civil-military
action" is organized, in which the army appears
under the guise of a benefactor, bringing presents
to the peasants (clothes, medical supplies, Ameri-
can food from CARE and CARITAS), medical and den
tal services, bridge-building, roads and schools.
Phase two: A large-scale program of psychological
action is then put into operation, using the fac
tor of surprise. Measures are taken to control the
civilian population. This is the first stage in
setting up a blockade of the area.
Phase three: The next operation is to try and
isolate the armed rebel groups in order to suppress
them.
Phase four: The armed rebel movement is systemati-
cally divided, using psychological techniques. Ad
vantage is taken of internal splits, resulting from
political differences, the ambitions of the leaders
22Raymond Estep, "Guerrilla warfare in Latin America,
1963-1965," Air University Institute for Professional
Development, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 1975.
0 "3
Daniel, Rural Violence, p. 129.
24Gott, Guerilla Movements, p. 249.
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human weaknesses, or mistakes by the guerrilla
command. This is an attempt to win over those
who would be likely to carry on the guerrilla
struggle.
Phase five: The final stage is the economic,
political and social reconstruction of the zone
operations, using the American aid that was
previously used to destroy the area.
In addition to the above phases, Plan Lazo also in
cluded a number of actions that were to be implemented as
supportive measures to the general counterinsurgency effort.
The range of actions were:
a. The extension of the period of required military
service in order to take advantage or a greater length of
time of the training provided recruits.
b. The creation of instruction centers in order to
improve the combat readiness of personnel.
c. The extension of anti-guerrilla training to all
branches of the army and obliging all officers and non
commissioned officers to take training.
d. The improvement of intelligence techniques.
e. The increased emphasis on training in marksman
ship.
f. An improvement in coordination between army and air
force units which resulted in more effective air support.
g. Better cordination of operations and intelligence
among military, civil, police and Department of Security
(DAS). authorities.
25
Daniel, Rural Violence, pp. 130-131.
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h. The substitution of small fixed military post with
mobile patrols consisting of up to a dozen men each.
i. The greater use of helicopters.
Once Plan Lazo was actually put into effect it immediate
ly began to produce gradual and steady gains. Over a two year
period it led not only to a lessening of the number of civilian
and military personnel, but also increased the number of guer






Total deaths 2,802 1,806
Despite this success, the guerrilla movements remained a
persistent and serious problem. Moreover, the independent
communist republics remained relatively intact. The Colombian
government still had not taken any major action against the
regions. The move to eliminate these guerrilla regions repre
sented a new stage in the counterinsurgency effort. Being of
great concern to both Colombian and American officials, the
elimination of guerrilla bands in these regions in many ways
was the primary objective of Plan Lazo and the overall coun











Such a campaign, then, would have to be a major one in
volving the Colombian military and United States assistance
at a level heretofore unseen. One previous attempt to elimi
nate the republics had been tried in 1963 when Plan Lazo was
first developed. In that rather limited operation the Colom
bian army attacked the independent republic of Marquetalia,
one of the oldest and largest of the guerrilla enclaves.
The Colombian army used 5,154 soldiers, 1,514 NCO's and 189
officers, all of whom had received United States training in
anti-guerrilla warfare tactics. That operation proved to be
something of a failure as the guerrillas successfully counter
attacked. The guerrillas actually outgunned the army in some
instances, capturing ammunitions and weapons. These setbacks
soon forced the government to withdraw its troops. As a con
sequence, Marquetalia, as well as the other independent re
publics, remained free from any serious government efforts
to destroy them.
This impasse came to an end two years later in 1964. A
random guerrilla attack on a small commercial aircraft in the
republic of Marquetalia enraged government authorities and
led to a decision to conduct a major military campaign against
the communist enclaves. An explanation of the incident which
precipated that decision is provided by Daniels.
On March 1, 1964 the caudrialla (guerrilla base)
shot down a small commercial plane in southern
Tolima, resulting in the death of the pilot. At
the request of the airline, the Armed Forces agreed
to assist in the recovery of the pilot's body and
on March 2, a helicopter landed; it was ambushed by
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the caudrilla (guerrilla base), and the air force
pilot and one of the passengers, an army captain
were killed while a representative of the airline
and a local landowner, who was acting as a guide,
were taken prisoner. The attack outraged the
government, and the Armed Forces began to plan a
large-scale $30 million military and civic action
operation to eliminate the enclave. President
Valencia gave priority to Operation Marquetalia,
as it was called . . . ,2^
In essence, the operation signaled the long awaited show
down between the government and the independent communist re
publics. With the basic character of the Colombian military
having been totally changed due to United States military
assistance and counterinsurgency training, government author
ities now felt this was the opportunity to illustrate its
new strength. Operation Marquetalia began in June with a mas
sive invasion of the area using 16,000 elite counterinsurgency
troops. The large detachment constituted about one-third of
the Colombian army at that time, and most of the officers were
2 8
trained by the United States in the Panama Canal Zone.
President Valencia revealed the overall objective of the op
eration when he noted that it was the spearhead of a govern
ment decision to destroy not only Marquetalia, but the other
independent communist republics as well.
In regards to strategy, the operation began with the
Colombian army making extensive use of American made heli
copters supplied under MAP. This was considered to be a
27Ibid., p. 130.
28
Gerard Chailand, Revolution in the Third World (New
York: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 62.
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standard technique in a counterinsurgency type. war. The
ability of helicopters to transport large numbers of troops
with mobility and surprise were seen as both a critical and
effective requirement in aiding the Colombian army. Other
tactics included the army's imposition of an economic and
military blockade of the area, the conducting of psychological
29
warfare and a campaign of intensive bombing.
The confidence of the Colombian army and United States
officials was such that it allowed members of the western
press to witness the operation. This was considered to be
somewhat of an oddity insofar as the normal practice of most
Latin American governments is to forbid such coverage until
victory is assured. Colombian officials, however, had few
concerns about the outcome and invited the American publi
cation Life Magazine in to view the operation. The magazine
ran a number of articles with headlines such as "A Defeat for
the Reds in the Andes" and "The Final Occupation of Marquetalia"
that announced the attack on the guerrillas to the American
... . 30
public.
True to the governments most optimistic expectations, the
operation proved to be both relentless and successful. The
Colombian army routed most of the guerrilla forces as well as
capturing a number of popular guerrilla leaders of the region.
29
Ibid., p. 62. See also R. Moullin, The Colombia Army
Against the Guerillas (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1970)
Gott, Guerrilla Movements, p. 25 0.
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Marguetalia's long and legendary existence as an independent
communist republic soon came to an end. Its demise was con
sidered to be a major physical and psychological setback for
the entire guerrilla movement. More significantly, for Colom
bia and United States military officials it was a shining
testimony to the efficiency of the new American counterin-
surgency doctrine being employed. For the guerrillas, the
significance of the United States involvement was also recog
nized. In a 1964 Agarian Reform Statement, they commented on
both the nature of the operation while also highlighting the
United States role:
In fifteen years, four wars have been unleashed
against us ... and this one which we have been
suffering since 18 May 1964, when the military
command officially announced that "Operation
Marguetalia" had begun. . . .This is why, in this
war, we are fighting against troops, planes, senior
officials and American specialists. This is why
16,000 men have been launched against us, equipped
ith the most modern and destructive weapons. This
is why they are using an economic blockade, a seige
to the last, land and air attacks and finally,
bacteriological warfare. This is why the government
and Yankee imperialism are spending hundreds and
thousands of millions of pesos and dollars on arms,
equipment . . . .31
With the Marguetalia enclave eliminated the government
then continued its relentless attack on the other republics.
By the end of 1964 over seventy percent of the Colombia
armed forces were engaged in internal security operations
31Ibid., See Appendix 5, "Agarian Program of the Colom
bia Guerrillas of Marquetalia," July 1964," pp. 515-516.
88
32
against these areas. Success continued to come the govern
ment's way as by 1965 two other guerrilla sanctuaries Rio
Chiquto and Guayobero had been completely destroyed. The de
nouement of the initial Plan Lazo operation came in March
1965 when the last of the independent communist republics,
El Pato was attacked and destroyed. The New York Times re
ported this event saying that government troops had:
smashed the thirteen year old independent communist
republic of El Pato . . . warplanes and helicopters
airlifted several battalions of infantry and na
tional police detachments into the regions to seize
strategic spots and mopping-up operations are now
in progress.33
With this operation complete, Gott notes, "the independent com
munist republics were no more than a memory."
Without a doubt, the destruction of the independent com
munist republics meant that the guerrilla movement had been
dealt a severe but not fatal blow. The immediate effect was
the almost total suppression of armed guerrilla activity in
the rural countryside. This lull in activity, however, by no
means indicated an end to the problem. To the contrary, new
concerns arose almost immediately. On the one hand, the in
ternal security problems witnessed a shift in location from
the rural to urban areas. An urban guerrilla movement be
gan to emerge and gather momentum almost simultaneously as
the crippling blows to the rural areas were being dispensed.
At the same time remnants of the defeated guerrilla forces
32
Area Handbook p. 408.
Gott, Guerrilla Movements, p. 251.
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used this opportunity in desperate attempts to reorganize
and consolidate their tattered units.
After being turned out of the republics, the guerrillas
held a series of conference aimed at recouping their losses
and deciding on new directions for the struggle. The first
conference held in late 1964 after the fall of Marquetalia
simply made a number of political propaganda announcements
called for various agarian reform measures. More substantive
were the developments of a second meeting held later that
same year. Uniting a variety of guerrilla forces, this
conference established what was called the Guerrilla Bloc
of the South under the tutelage of the Colombian Communist
34
Party. It was two years later in 1966 at what was called
the Tenth Congress that the new guerrilla organization FARC
was established. These developments made it perfectly clear
that the guerrilla movement had by no means been totally de
stroyed and the struggle would continue.
From the standpoint of the guerrillas, at the Tenth Con
gress there was a also a recognition of the predominate role
of the United States in opposing their efforts, and the reali
zation that its counterinsurgency doctrine was a major force
to be reckoned with. A report from that meeting illustrating
that concern reads:
This new Colombian guerrilla movement is the patri
otic response to growing military intervention by
Yankee imperialism aginst our people, with the aims
of the Lazo Plan, and the principles of the so-called
34Ibid., p. 254.
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"preventive war." Imperialist Yankee intervention
is also visible in the increasing interference of
the American military mission in the armed forces,
in the direct financing by the United States of
operations against peasant areas and in the "loan
of all sorts of arms for war against the workers—
airplanes and fleets of helicopters. Thus to the
old reasons for terrorist violence for Colombia,
among which the main one was and still is the greed
of the landowners, is now added the intervention of
Yankee imperalism.35
The second and third guerrilla organizations also arose
during this period. As discussed in the earlier chapter, the
first was in 1965 known as the National Liberation Army (ELN).
The third group to emerge was the People Liberation Army (EPL).
Like FARC, the EPL was also aware of the American role it
would have to contend with. In a document attesting to the
presence of the United States counterinsurgency doctrine, EPL
noted:
When the enemies of the people try to carry out
an emergency policy to counteract the people's
war, all they manage are discredited traps like
the "Lazo Plan," the "Andes Plan," "Strategic
Villages," "Integration of the Poeple," Associ
ation of Users," Civil Military Action," etc.,
all of which carry the stench of a trap, the smell
of betrayal of principles, a taste of vinegar
which executioners used to give the crucified;
they are the first acts for the slaughter and
massacre of the people.36
The emergence of the three guerrilla organizations repre
sented a sharpening fo the ideological character of the strug
gle. From obscure peasant ramblings, these new groups presented
Ibid., See Appendix 6, "Chapter from the central report
approved by the Tenth Congress of the Colombian Communist Par
ty, January, 1966," pp. 518-521.
36Ibid., p. 532.
91
clarified and defined ideological positions as well as an
explicit preference for external models of revolutionary
struggle. Thus, despite the relative success of Plan Lazo,
by 1965 it was quite clear that the Colombia Army would once
again be called upon to continue the war against the guer
rillas. The guerrillas were clearly, at this point, no match
for the American trained and assisted Colombia Army, but none
theless, their new ideological clarity and structural reor
ganization made them a force to be concern with.
In particular, the military activities since Plan Lazo
had been relatively minor, but were on the increase. By the
late 1960's and early 1970's the groups had engaged in a vari
ety of activities including the temporary capture of small
towns, bank robberies and a kidnapping campaign. The best
indication of their renewed activity was the fact that for
the first time since Plan Lazo, the number of civilian deaths
38
surpassed the 1,000 mark.
Colombian government and military officials along with
the American military advisers were not unaware of the in
completeness of the initial military actions. By the end of
1964 the government had begun to implement the non-military
aspects of the Plan Lazo policy. In the rural areas paci
fied by the military, the government employed a series of
37Estep, "Guerrilla Warfare," pp. 34-45.
38Russell, "Reduced Military Assistance," p. 58.
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socio-economic projects developed and assisted by the United
State known as "military-civic action." The assumption being
that such activities would get all the root causes of the
violence and eliminate the need for long-term military solu
tions in these areas. Immediate attention was also focused
on the new urban guerrilla warfare problems. Again, Under
States direction and guidance, the Colombian government imple
mented a program of "public safety and police assistance,"
specifically designed to deal with guerrilla problems in ur
ban areas. These two programs, military-civic action and
public safety-police assistance" will be treated separately
and in detail in the next two chapters.
On the more immediate problem of the guerrilla resur
gence and reorganization the government was also aware of
these developments. As early as 1966, former President Dr.
Alberto Ueras Camargo indicated a concern for this problem
when he remarked, "Castro still hopes to make Colombia the
39
Vietnam of South America."
As a response to this problem the government initated
a series of actions beginning in late 1965. The first step
was a deemphasis on the military-civic action program and a
return to the military counterinsurgency tactics employed
under Plan Lazo. For the most part these were specific small-
scale operations designed to eliminate key trouble spots.
The problem had not become quite so serious as to necessitate
39Ibid., p. 58.
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another Operation Marquetalia. Additionally, in 1965 the
government organized a citizen based internal security force.
Known as the Nationwide Civil Defense Organization, this force
"brought together local citizens vigilante groups, which
aided the armed forces and police in the prevention and con-
40
trol of disorders."
The United States also reaffirmed its support in the
continuation of the counterinsurgency doctrine. American
policy officials were also convinced that the initial basis
of Plan Lazo, concern for internal security problems due to
outside supported insurgency, had not fully abated. Just
about the time the EPL emerged, United States officials be
gan to reiterate their basic views on the internal security
situation in Colombia. That position was expressed in July
1968 by Assistant Secretary of State Chales A. Meyers speaking
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. Meyers re
marked :
We believe that there is very little likelihood
of a major threat to the area in the foreseeable
future ... At the present time, active in
surgencies of a sporadic nature continue to ,,
to exist in Venezuela, Colombia and Guatemala.
Area Handbook, p. 427. It has often been suggested
that such groups were used as paralegal terrorist by govern
ment authorities. Their paralegal nature allowing them to
operate outside any pretense of legality and engage in cam
paigns of terror and coercion against suspected guerrillas
as well as those persons opposed to government policy. For
a more detailed treatment of this issue in Latin America see
A. J. Longguth, Hidden Terrors; The Truth about U.S. Police
Operations in Latin America (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978)
and, Nancy Stein, "U.S. Army School for Scroundrels," Latin
American and Empire Report, Vol. 8, No. 3 (March 1974), p. 25.
Russell, "Reduced Military Assistance," p. 66.
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The views of Meyers as well as former President Heras were
reflected in the FY 1970 MAP Justification Program for Latin
American policy which cautioned:
Castro continues to train dissidents for other
Latin American countries to forment trouble
and to take advantage of insurgencies which oc
cur. He can be expected to continue or inten
sify this support for "wars of national libera
tion. "42
Accordingly, MAP goals and for Colombia that year con
firmed the past emphasis of achieving internal stability. As
Richard Russell explains:
The United States feels that there is a very close
relationship between the prospects for achieving
socio-economic progress and acceptable levels of
internal stability.
In a Department of Defense congressional presentation of MAP
goals for Colombia FY 1970, this policy was stated as fol
lows :
U.S. military assistance is provided to improve
the capacity of the Colombian Armed Forces to
cope with insurgency and other threats to in
ternal security. In addition, the military as
sistance program for Colombia seeks to promote the
increased involvement of the armed forces in civic
action activities, while encouraging the develop
ment and maintenance only of those military forces
and equipment essential to the legitimate needs of
the country.43
While these concerns were being expressed publicly, the
previously mentioned classified Country Plan echoed a similar




assistance. Sections of the document entitled "Objectives"
and "Time" spell out these points:
Stimulate awareness for the need for containment
of insurgency, subversion and communist penetra
tion in Colombian society...
Chicom (Chinese Communists), pro-Castro and Soviet-
oriented insurgency forces presently operate in the
Colombian territory with allegiance to foreign
powers . . .
If the present containment of insurgency by the
45,000 man army of Colombia fails through inade
quate programs such as supplying of military
assistance and AID, the result within the next
four years would be disastrous.44
With these concerns in mind United States officials im
mediately implemented a renewed program of military assistance
to forestall any possibility of a serious guerrilla resurgence.
These initial actions consisted of a series of military aid
packages that included financial support as well as selected
equipment and spare parts. This aid package was composed of
45
the following items: (1) an increase in cash military
sales from $100 thousand to cover $2 million in 1971; (2) a
$13.3 million FMS credit program for 1972 to update the mod
ernization of the Colombian Armed Forces; and (3) a total
military assistance and sales package (cash, credit, MAP)
loans, lease) of $16 million for the years 1969 to 1971, with
A A
Country Plan, pp. 22-23.
U.S., Department of Defense. SOUTHCOM. Summary of
Military Assistance and Sales: Colombia, FY 73-77, n.p., n.d.,
pp. 1-4. This was a previously classified document which was
declassfied by the author under the Freedom of Information
Act on November 2, 1979.
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additional funds of $17 million and $15 million scheduled
for years 1972 and 1973 respectively.
More substantive actions were taken by the SOUTHCOM
command located in the Canal Zone. In 1970 the number of
military missions for Colombia were rapidly increased.
What is most significant about this development however, is
that 60 out of the 65 missions had a specific and defined
counterinsurgency, internal security purpose. The missions
to be implemented in the years 1970 and beyond have been
spelled out in a newly declassified Military Assistance
Plan. Despite the ten years which have elapsed since the
document was written, major portions remain classfied. From
what is available it is possible to establish a complete pro
file of the 60 counterinsurgency directed missions (See Ap
pendix 1). While a detailed discussion of each particular
program is beyond the scope of this chapter, a general synop
sis is possible. In this context the document is quite val
uable in providing an insightful view of the wide-ranging
character of the SOUTHCOM facilities role in conducting coun
terinsurgency operation in Colombia and throughout Latin
America.
The missions touch every aspect of the Colombia Armed
Forces operations. This involves all branches including the
United States Southern Command. Military Assistance
Plan: Colombia, Vol. II. n.p., n.d. This was a previously
classfied document which was declassified by the author
under the Freedom of Information Act in December, 1979.
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Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines. The specific kinds of as
sistance (much of the details which remain classified) are
also quite broad. As spelled out in Appendix 1, the range
of programs included training assistance, communications as
sistance, publishing assistance, repair services and troop
transportation. Also included in the missions were an ex
tensive range of equipment and spare parts transfers. A par
tial list includes the following: Artillery Fire Control
Sets, M-16's, Compasses, Sub Caliber Mortar Training Devices,
Rocket Launchers, Cargo and Utility Jacks, Photographic
Supplies, Teletypes and Training Films.
Two missions in particular, which are deserving a greater
discussion help to emphasize the magnitude of the United
States effort in confronting the internal security problem.
The first, a corporate training program was alluded to in an
earlier chapter as a new type program involving the direct
participation of American multinational corporations in Latin
American internal security programs. In Colombia this mis
sion was set up to provide support MAP units of the Air Force
47
(FAC) as a helicopter maintenance program. This was sig
nificant considering the extensive use of helicopters as a
tactical manuever in fighting the guerrillas. Funds for the
years 1970 and 1971 totalled $140,000 for the mission. More
important, it was civilian personnel from the Lycoming divi
sion of the Avco Corporation and the Bell Aircraft Corporation
47Military Assistance Plan, See Map Element Code 3MU0,
p. 1.
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who were assigned to assist the Colombian Air Force. De
scribing the purpose and significance of the mission, the
Military Assistance Plan reads:
The above ... is a continuing requirements to
provide the Colombian Air Force helicopter main
tenance personnel with the training necessary
to maintain the UH-1 helicopter fleet in an ac
ceptable and safe flying condition. The two . . .
personnel will conduct formal and informal
classes for the FAC, and will perform actual
work on helicopters and engines as required.
. . . The remaining funds are programmed for the
in-country visit of technical assistance team to
provide assistance and training in the mainte
nance of the C-ll and M-60 trainer, the jet
engine test cell, and other maintenance repair
shops at the FAC maintenance depot.
. . . This line (mission) is considered one of
the most important ones in the program. Its
depletion would deprive the FAC of the in-country
services and training of U.S. techniques in the
maintenance of MAP provided equipment.4 a
A second mission of major significance documents and
spells out the critical training function that the United
States provides the Colombian military. In part it was a
reaction to the guerrilla resurgence, but also is a con
tinuation of the overall training policy established not
only for Colombia but all of Latin America. A description
of the mission notes:
The purpose of this mission is to consolidate the
minimum training requirements of all MAP supported
units and activities of the Colombian Army. Funds
programmed will improve the training of the army
through courses in the U.S. Army schools in CONUS
(Continental United States) and the Canal Zone,
by (Mobile Training Teams) and through the medium
of orientation tours.49
48Ibid., see MAP Element Code 3MU0, p. 2 (author's
emphasis).
49Ibid., See MAP Element Code, 3 BT0.
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The total number of Colombian personnel trained for this
mission in 1970 and 1971 were 1,319 and 206 for the Army
and Navy respectively. In a broader context the mission
is a reflection of the major emphasis of training as a key
function of the counterinsurgency policy for Colombia.
By 1973 over 2,100 Colombian military personnel had been
trained in the Panama Canal Zone, while total training
figures (including those sent to the continental United
States) surpassed the 5,300 mark. These figures placed
the training program in Colombia among the top five for
all of Latin America. Moreover, during the critical years
of renewed guerrilla activity, United States Military Aid
Missions (Milgroup) increased to a total of 58, the second
52
largest in Latin America.
In examining these missions as a whole, they are sig
nificant in that they clearly document the level of the
United States involvement in the counterinsurgency effort
in Colombia. In view of the extensive character of the
military assistance, a congressional team that visited
Colombia could accurately conclude that the United States
military involvement with the host country's military
structure is "so interwined that they cannot ever be
totally untangled." The best indication of this fact
50Stein, "U.S. Army School," p. 25.
Area Handbook, p. 408.
52
"U.S. Military Operations," see chart p. 13.
53
Haverstock and Schroeder, Dateline, p. 79.
100
is revealed in a House Special Study Mission report on
Latin America. It pointed out that under agreements with
Colombia, the 48 members of the military aid mission (Mil-
group) are "theoretically" considered to be a part of the
54
Colombia Armed Forces.
The final aspect of the United States counterinsur-
gency effort centers on the limited yet direct intervention
of American troops in Colombia. In perhaps the most con
troversial feature of the entire counterinsurgency effort,
it is reported that United States military personnel,
along with the Colombian Armed Forces, were directly engaged
in military actions against the guerrilla movements. Three
sources provide strong supporting evidence of these actions.
One, the Special Study Mission by the House concluded:
During the early 1960's these communist insur
gent groups controlled significant areas of
rural Columbia, but effective action by the
Colombia Armed Forces, and government, added
by U.S. Advisors, have largely broken their
control in the countryside.55
A second view, an article by Tad Szulc in The New York Times
adds,
The 14,000 American troops under SOUTHCOM in
clude a Special Foreign contingent from which
Mobile Training Teams were drawn to assist the
Colombia Army in fighting leftist insurgents.56
54
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Report of the Special Study Mission to Latin America on
Military Assistance Training. 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1970,
p. 15.
The New York Times, 1 November 1970.
The New York Times, 1 November 1970.
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Finally, the third and most substantive evidence was a
State Department official's announcement (stationed in
Colombia) that the U.S. Army's Special Forces in Colombia
57
had participated in Operation Marquetalia.
Assisted by CIA intelligence reports, Richard Gott
identifies the team as being headed by none other than the
infamous American guerrilla warefare expert Major Pappy
CO
Shelton. It was Shelton, one can recall, who was respon
sible for training and assisting the unit of Bolovian Ran
gers that captured the famed Latin American guerrilla,
Ernesto "Che" Guevara. The sending of a man of Shelton's
stature and reputation is a clear indication of the seri
ousness of American officials involvement and concern in
eliminating the insurgency problem in Colombia.
The basic Plan Lazo policy and subsequent adjustments
proved to be quite effective in negating the efforts of
the guerrills to reorganize and develop any momentum.
These efforts were culminated by a final campaign of at
tack on the guerrillas in mid-1973. At this time the
government launched its coup de grace against the remain
ing members of all three guerrilla organizations. Many
Z. Pazmany, Background for Counterinsurgency Stu
dies in Latin American - III, Notes on Violence in Venezuela
and Colombia (Santa Barbara; Defense Research Group, 1969) ,
p. 146.
58
Gott, Guerrilla Movements, p. 304.
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members of the ELN, ELP and FARC were captured and killed.
As a result, Raymond Estep concludes:
It seemed evident at the beginning of 1975 that
the government's 1973 campaign virtually de
stroyed the combat apparatus of all three guer-
rila groups.59
Insofar as this aspect of the United States counterin-
surgency policy in Colombia is concerned, it can only be
evaluated as an unqualified success. On this point the
United States Army Area Handbook for Colombia comments:
The success of counterinsurgency efforts in the
late 1960's and early 1970's was due to the ef
fectiveness of the stepped-up role of the armed
forces and to the weakness of the guerrillas.
Having had almost twenty years of experience in
combating guerrillas before the appearance of
Marxist groups, the military had developed sophis
ticated counterinsurgency training and other pro
grams in the prevention and control of disorders.60
With due respect to the United States role, Haverstock and
Schroeder add quite correctly that:
SOUTHCOM (as well as the entire military com
mand) takes credit for aiding the Colombia
government in putting down communist-inspired
guerrillas.61
Finally in a conclusive statement on the success of the United
States role, the House Special Study Mission notes:
U.S. counterinsurgency instruction was provided
to the Colombia Army largely through mobile
training teams from the Panama Canal Zone.
59Estep, "Guerrilla Warfare," p. 35.
Area Handbook, pp. 408-409.
Haverstock and Schroeder, Dateline, p. 81
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Their success can be measured by the steady
decline of the insurgency threat ....
Thus,
Colombia would seem to epitomize the benefits
which may flow from our MAP training. Through
the program, the United States has assisted
Colombia in diminishing significantly the
threat from organized, anti-democratic com
munist forces.°2
Report of the Special Study, pp. 16-17.
CHAPTER V
THE UNITED STATES MILITARY CIVIC
ACTION PROGRAM IN COLOMBIA
As has been indicated earlier the concept of civic ac
tion developed as one of a number of approaches to confront
insurgent guerrilla forces. The United States program of
assistance in Colombia was a key forerunner in the develop
ment of this approach. The realization that a purely mili
tary approach to the problem would be both incomplete and in
sufficient was recognized at the outset of the implementation
of the United States sponsored counterinsurgency plan in
Colombia. The concept of counterinsurgency was consequently
expanded to include certain socio-economic dimensions.
This chapter will delineate this component of the
broad counterinsurgency policy. Whereas the last chapter
examined the military methods employed to deal with the
guerrillas, this chapter discusses the concept, of civic ac
tion. In discussing this concept, it will be viewed as a
complement to the military solution outlined in the last
chapter. First the chapter will undertake a general dis
cussion of the philosophical principles underlying the
concept. Then an examination of the role of the civic
action in Latin America is presented. Here the chapter
104
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examines the development of the formal civic action program
for Colombia. The focus will be on the United States in
volvement in that development as well as the Colombian mili
tary's attitude and role in using the concept. Next a look
is taken at the actual civic action projects implemented.
Starting with the initial programs of the early 1960's,
the chapter will look at the major accomplishments and the
various intermittent decisions that affected the support and
emphasis of the overall program. Finally, an examination
will be made of the overall affectiveness of the civic ac
tion program in Colombia.
Looking first to the purpose of the civic action pro
gram, it is clear that its development is an outgrowth of
the Vietnam conflict's effort at "winning the hearts and
minds of the people." In general, it reflects an attempt
to approach the problem of guerrilla warfare in a sophis
ticated and varied manner. A new dimension is added to
counterinsurgency through the focus on constructive and
development alternatives as opposed to the traditional
emphasis on purely military solutions. In a very real
sense, civic action ironically attempts to duplicate or
rather supplant certain services and activities which the
guerrilla forces attempt to engage. Thus both groups seek
to provide constructive and beneficial service projects to
the civilian population, that seemingly passive yet active
and critical element in a guerrilla type conflict. Their
support or lack of it is often the decisive factor in deter-
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mining the outcome of a conflict. Accordingly, the offi
cial United States military definition of civic action
reads:
The use of preponderantly indigenous military
forces on projects useful to the local popu
lation at all levels in such fields as educa
tion, training, public works, agriculture,
transportation, communications, health and
sanitation and others contributing to economic
and social development which would serve to
improve the standing of the military forces
with the population.!
This central concern of aiding the civilian population
is continually stressed by authorities on the subject. For
mer Commanding General of SOUTHCOM, Andrew P. O-Meara, noted
that civic action programs are the key in "achieving the
objective of enabling the military to gain the confidence
of the populace, and winning them away from the subversive
2
revolutionaries." Major Dominick R. Gannon in a valuable
short study of the subject entitled "Military-Civic Action
in Colombia: A Panacea for Violence," provides greater de
tail on the subject as it ties in civic action with the
broader concept of counterinsurgency. Gannon argues:
If the military is to be effective in a counter-
insurgency role, it must be trusted by the pea
sant. One way to acquire this trust is through
military civic action. This benefits the pea
sant in his daily life and shows him that the
government cares about him. While many of these
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of United States
Military Terms for Joint Usage (Washington, D.C.: Gov
ernment Printing Office, 1968), p. 134.
^williard Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal Se
curity and Military Power: Counterinsurgency and Civic
Action in Latin America (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1966), pp. 229-230.
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projects are costly, sometimes the most ef
fective are the least expensive and simplest.
This occurs when the military offers a little
muscle, a little manpower, or the form of its
educated officers, a little more brain-power
than is generally available in the average
village. Most important is an unpretentious
willingness to cooperate with the villager.3
These comments attesting to the value of civic action
in gaining the support of the civilian population's help
to establish a connection with the broader concept of
counterinsurgency. On this point, two key questions can
be asked here. One, how did the concept of civic action
evolve? And two, what is its connnection to the overall
doctrine of counterinsurgency?
In regards to the first question, it is clear that the
doctrine developed in response to developments within the
Latin American continent in the post World War II ear. These
developments centering around pervasive internal security
problems, widespread guerrilla warfare and the need for a
solution as to the proper role of military forces in such
situations. In a broader sense, however, the introduction
and application of the civic action doctrine to the Latin
American arena developed as a result of the United States
experiences on the Asian continent. As Ronning and Barber
point out:
Ideas with respect to civic action were evolving
during the late 1950's at a time when the tacti
cal applications of civic action in counterguer-
rilla operations in Southeast Asia were proving
Major Dominick Gannon, "Military Civic Action in
Colombia: A Panacea for Violence," Naval War College, New
port, Rhode Island, April, 1971, p. 21.
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themselves extremely useful. Military officers,
who had seen what civic action could do in an
insurgent environment, were convinced of its
utility . . . The result was a natural alliance
between elements in the military who viewed ci
vic action as a combat tactic and civilians
in both the Defense Department and the State
Department who were convinced with the economics
of political utility of civic action.4
In particular, the initial origins of the concept de
veloped from American activities in Korea and the Philip
pines. There the first major program was known as the
Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK). A study conducted
in March 1959 by Army Chief of Staff concluded that the
AFAK program was applicable to other countries and recom
mended it for such purposes. This recommendation along
with a number of additional stipulations were formally ap
proved on May 9, 1960.
The additional stipulations included the following
points:
First, no more than a total os six training teams
could be dispatched overseas. Second, civic ac
tion must not interfere with the more traditional
military capabilities of the armies involved.
Third, civic action requests and programs must be
sanctioned by the American ambassador to the coun
try concerned. And, fourth, they must be funneled
through the channels of the military assistance
advisory groups and the unified commands.6
4
Barber and Ronning, Internal Security, p. 22. See
Chapter 3 of this work entitled "Development of a Doctrine:
Civic Action" for a detailed discussion of the concept's
development.
Edward B. Glick, Peaceful Conflict: The Non-Military
Use Of the Military (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackfole
Books, 1967), p. 70.
Ibid., p. 70.
109
The recommendation and stipulations thus established the
basis of the Army's civic action program. Within a month
after its approval, the Department of the Army had estab
lished civic action training teams who were ready to be
deployed around the world.
The major initiative for the civic action doctrine
however came with election of John Kennedy into office.
As President, he elevated the program to one of priority
status within his administration in general, and the De
partment of Defense in particular. Accordingly, some ten
months after the civic action recommendation was approved,
President Kennedy began to vigorously support the doctrine,
In a special message to Congress he stated:
To the extent that world security conditions per
mit, military assistance will in the future more
actively emphasize internal security, civil works
and economic growth to the nations thus aided.7
Later Kennedy went on to elaborate this view saying:
Pure military skill is not enough. A full spec-
true of military, paramilitary and civil action
must be blended to produce success. The enemy
uses economic and political warfare, propaganda,
make military aggression in an endless combination
to oppose a free choice of government and suppress
the rights of the individual by terror, by sub
version, and by force of arms. To win this strug
gle, our officers and men must understand and com
bine the political, economic and civic actions
with skilled military efforts in execution of
this mission.8
Hugh Banning, The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 217.
8Ibid., p. 217.
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Congress later confirmed its support of Kennedy's
views when it passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Included in the Act was section 505(b) which states:
To the extent feasible and consistent with the
other purposes of this part, the use of mili
tary forces in less developed countries in the
construction of public works and other activi
ties helpful to economic development shall be
encouraged.^
With this support and backing civic action was now a
key aspect of Kennedy's new foreign policy. Three months
after the Foreign Assistance Act was passed, Kennedy con
tinued his promotion of the program when he directed the
Department of Defense to assist the armed forces of under
developed countries in nation-building programs. He went
further as he issued National Security Memorandum No. 119.
As Edward Glick notes, "it is one of the key civic action
directives because in it President Kennedy related civic
to the stages of subversion." Kennedy enunciated three
points on this subject:
1. In countries fighting active campaigns against
subversion, Civic Action is an indispensable
means of strengthening the economic base and
and establishing a link between the Armed
Forces and the populace.
2. In countries threatened by external aggres
sion, forces should participate in military
civic action projects which do not materially
impair performance of the primary military
mission.
3. In countries where subversion or external at
tack is less imminent, selected indigenous
9
Section 505 was later amended in 1965 elevating the
civic action's role to a stated purpose of MAP.
Ill
military forces can contribute substantively
to economic and social development and such
a contribution can be a major function of the
forces.10
With the administrative and congressional support of
civic action now having a firm foundation, President Kennedy
proceeded with immediate plans to set the new policy into
action. The arena of first concern would be the Latin
American continent. In this contex, it was felt that the
new civic action program would help to facilitate the lar
ger Alliance for Progress policy. Thus, in a speech before
Latin American diplomats in March 1961 Kennedy spoke of the
new program saying". . . the new generation of military lea
ders have shown an increasing awareness that armies cannot
only defend their countries—they can help build them."11
Also, four months later, speaking before representatives of
the Inter-American Army Conference in Panama, Kennedy's
Army Chief of Staff, Gen. George Decker continued to elab
orate on the policy in regards to Latin America. Decker
commented:
I suggest that we examine the ways in which we can
assist directly in the success of this vital pro
gram [Alliance for Progress] upon which so much of
our security depends. This is not a new role for
the soldier. Each of our armies has contributed
to the civic growth and welfare of its respective
nation by exploration, building of communications,
and by humanitarian service in periods of national
disaster ... In the U.S. Army, we term this the
civic action program. You, perhaps, call it by
another title. Whatever the title, such work can
be a valuable adjunct to the Alliance for Progress.
lOGlick, Peaceful Conflict, p. 71.
Harry F. Walterhouse, A Time to Build; Military
Civic Action for Economic Development and Social Reform
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1964),p. 13.
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Army sponsored project to establish field-type
communications, construct trails, roads, bridges,
and to provide simple medical clinics and sani
tation facilities for the population in remote
and virgin areas, are certainly a great military
benefit. At the same time, they also serve as
a direct counter to typical communist campaigns
to convince the population that its army seeks
to oppress, rather than to aid and protect the
people. I*2
As an illustration of the Kennedy administration's commit
ment and enthusiasm for the new policy, it should be noted
that within a year of his election, the first Military Civic
Training Teams (CAMTT) were sent to the countries of Guate
mala and Ecuador.
In regards to the second question as to civic action's
role in a counterinsurgency effort, the connection is deemed
both necessary and vital. The political and military con
ditions in Latin America required sophisticated and unique
approaches that were relevant to serious problems. Hence,
as Kennedy suggested in his National Security Memorandum
No. 119, civic action was seen as offering a possible solu
tion which complemented the traditional military tactics.
At the same time it was seen as being complementary to
Kennedy's military doctrine of counterinsurgency. On that
point, Harry Walterhouse comments:
From the point of view of doctrine, civic action
is being treated in the United States Army as an




This conception of civic action, of course, coincided with
the program's introduction into Guatemala and Ecuador.
The policy connection to counterinsurgency was further
established in September 1962, when a Civic Action Branch
was organized in the Army's Civil Affairs Directorate,
which is situated in the Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Military Operations. Then in March 1963, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff officially defined counterinsurgency
as "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psy
chological and civic actions taken by a government to de
feat subversive insurgency."14 As Glick notes, "civic
action, like counterinsurgency, was now 'in1 doctrinally."
Elaborating on the doctrinal relationship and com
patibility of civic action and counterinsurgency, Ronning
and Barber present a summary of the views of the United
States military personnel in Latin America on this subject.
The benefits of that relationship are listed as follows:
1. It can be a subtle means of having troops in
a strategic location. In an area where there
is a treat of insurgency it might be wiser to
send in a battalion that devotes at least a
part of its time to construction or other use
ful labor. It can secure valuable intelli
gence, and its presence might discourage
potential insurgents without antagonizing
the uncommitted.
2. It can serve to alleviate some of the intol
erable conditions of rural inhabitants and
thus make them less inclined to join or assist
insurgent movements.
14
Glick' Peaceful Conflict, p. 73, (author's emphasis).
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3. It is a means of improving the image of the
military, the central government, or both;
thus enlisting the cooperation of local in
habitants when the army is in pursuit of
rural insurgents.
4. By contributing to the general economic de
velopment of the country, it will reduce
the danger of insurgency.
5. It is a means of educating the armed forces
and civilians by bringing the military into
contact with rural problems, inducing com
munities to work together and by teaching
the officers and enlisted men useful civilian
skills.15
On the same issue, Edward Glick expresses a similar view
saying:
Civic action definitely has a role in counter-
insurgency. It removes some of the grievances
and helps to destroy the cooperation between
civilians and guerrillas, which the latter need
for support and success. How much of a role and
how effective it will be depends on the stage
of the insurgency.16
By April 1963 the revised role of civic action to that
of a major policy was completed with the establishment of
regular courses on the subject at the United States Army
Civil School in Georgia. In addition, courses were added
to the programs of instruction at the Army School of the
Americas, the Inter-American Air Force Academy (both in the
Panama Canal Zone) and the Special Forces Center at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina. These courses were primarily de
signed for officers assigned to military assistance ad
visory groups, military missions, special warfare forces
and foreign military personnel.
Barber and Ronning, Internal Security, p. 182.
l6Glick, Peaceful Conflict, p. 176.
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Critical to the success of these new courses of instruc
tion, as well as the implementation of the policy, would be
the CAMTT's. As it was in Guatemala and Ecuador, it was
these teams that would attend the various schools for in
struction and then provide the overall technical assistance
and guidance for a civic action program is an assigned coun
try. A team would be comprised of specialists in one or
more of the following fields: governmental affairs, civic
action, sanitation, engineering, medical and/or public
health, psychological operation, agriculture, education
and public relations. The task assigned to a team is
fourfold: (1) to keep the country team informed of civic
action operation; (2) to identify areas where civic action
could be useful; (3) to develop a civic action program;
and (4) to provide training guidance for local forces and
specific technical assistance. The training and develop
ment of these teams was undertaken with the utmost speed
by the Kennedy administration. With two years of the
policy's initiation, over seventy-six CAMTTs had been dis-
18
patched to more than twenty countries. In Latin America,
in every country except Cuba and Haiti, these teams com
prised of hundreds of military personnel who were deployed
on a regular on-going basis.
Hanning, A Time To, p. 218.
18Ibia. , p. 219.
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A final feature to be considered in establishing the
civic action program was that of funding. From its incep
tion civic action was envisioned as a low-cost or no-cost
policy. The main financial commitment was to be borne by
the host countries as opposed to the United States. Ex
periences with the initial plot programs in Guatemala and
Ecuador, however, soon made it clear that many, if not most,
countries did not have the necessary funds to sponsor a
civic action program. Accordingly, it was realized that
the success of the new policy would depend on a more sub
stantial financial commitment from the United States.
It is against this background that an agreement on
funding was developed between the Department of Defense and
the Agency for International Development in 1962. Under
that formula, the Department of Defense, through the Mili
tary Assistance Program, would provide funds for the pur
chase and maintenance of equipment (ie..bulldozers, trac
tors) used in civic action projects and for any training
connected with its use. A.I.D., on the other hand, would
provide funds for material cost (i.e. cement for roads)
and consumable products (i.e. lumber, gasoline), which the
military would use either in training or on actual civic
action projects.
This funding agreement provided the foundation for
both a greater financial and operation commitment to the
new civic action program. From 1950 to 1959, prior to the
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new conceptual delineation of civic action, the United
States spent about $5 million on mobile training teams
serving abroad providing non-military service. With the
new funding formula, however, the financial commitment
for civic action increased to almost $100 million for the
19
1961 to 1964 period. Operationally, the number of coun
tries in the civic action program also increased dramat
ically. Beginning with Guatemala and Ecuador, the pro
gram increased its support to a total of nine countries
in 1962, twenty-four in 1963, twenty-five in 1964 and in
20
more than thirty by 1965. Appendix 2 shows the amount
of MAP funds spent on civic action from 1962 through 1966.
Appendix 3 shows the amount spent by A.I.D. for civic
action for the year 1965 and estimated spending for 1966
and 1967. Based on the amount of funds, as well as the
number of contries involved, Edward Glick is quite appro
priate in saying: "It is obvious that America is heavily—
21
and financially—committed to civic action overseas."
At this point it is now possible to examine the United
States civic action program in Colombia. This particular
program was implemented as an integral aspcect of the lar
ger United States counterinsurgency policy for Colombia.
19Ibid, p. 221.
20
Glick, Peaceful Conflict, p. 88.
21Ibid., p. 88.
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That policy, it can be recalled, was formally developed
and implemented in 1962 being known as "Plan Lazo."
Prior to the United States effort, the Colombia gov
ernment had attempted to employ a program somewhat similar
to civic action in the early 1950's. While not having
the same chacter, the use of military forces for social
services, it did have similar goals. These goals were
primarily aimed at quelling the guerrilla insurgency,
while also providing needed services to the civilian popu
lation. The program was instituted by General Gustavo
Rojas Pinalla, a military strongman who seized power in a
coup d'tat and established himself as President. Rojas's
actions were developed as a part of his own counterinsur-
gency policy. Its major actions included the establishment
of a Colonization and Immigration Institute, which was de
signed to provide for land reform, and the National Social
Assistance Secretariat (SENDAS) which was to aid civilian
victims of the guerrilla conflict. One description and
evaluation of Rojas's efforts comments:
Rojas took other measures which, while not so
effective as the general amnesty, indicate
something of the scope of his counterinsurgency
program from the latter half of 1953 to 1954.
Colonization and Immigration Institute, which
was to make idle public lands available to re
fugees and surrendered guerrillas. Capitali
zation of 100 million pesos was announced for
this institute to be allotted over a period
of about a decade. The following year, Rojas
established a National Social Assistance
Secretariat (SENDAS) to offer help to these
affected by the violence. Lacking funds and
poorly administrated, SENDAS proved to have
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more form than substance in Rojas's program
of counterinsurgency.22
The failures of these efforts at a constructive solu
tion eventually ended all attempts related to this civic
action type program. Instead, a renewed emphasis was soon
placed on the option of military force as a means of sol
ving the guerrilla program. The initiation of the United
States civic action program as a part of Plan Lazo, indi
cated an attempt to combine the military force option with
new and more concrete constructive solutions similar to the
Rojas era.
As noted earlier, the United States civic action pro
gram was implemented in 1962. Initial planning, however,
had begun as early as 1960 when the United States military
mission in Colombia worked with local officials on the
2 ^
formulation of the program. At this point United States
officials were interested in developing a program that
would aid in the improvement of social conditions for the
civilian population with the belief that such actions would
serve to alleviate a general dissatisfaction that could lead
to violent oppositino to the local government. The program
was to concentrate on small types of projects that would
have an immediate impact and also be achieveable within the
current capabilities of not only the Colombian, but most
22
D..M. Condit and Bert Cooper, ed., Challenge and Re
sponse in Internal Conflict; The Experience in Africa and
Latin America Vol. Ill (Washington. D.C.: The American
University for Research in Social Systems, 1968), p. 422.
23Gannon, "Military Civic Action," p. 14.
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Latin American militaries. Examples of such project would
include schools, roads and small-scale medical services.
"It was to these projects," noted Ronning and Barber
and the military units selected to carry them
out, that the United States lent the major part
of its support under the Military Assistance
Program or through A.I.D.—Alliance for Progress
Fund Grants.24
On this same point they add:
The Counter-insurgency Planning Guide, published
by the United States Special Warfare School ad
vised that initial priority should be given to
select high-impact projects aimed at establishing
the credibility of the Civic Action Program.25
The United States position on the character of the
civic action program found a ready acceptance on the part of
Colombian military officials. Their analysis of internal
problems within their country tended to concur with the
belief that socio-economic dissatisfactions was a major,
if not root cause, of the guerrilla insurgency. The United
States Army Area Handbook for Colombia comments on this
view of the Colombian military:
This view of the guerrilla problem was expressed
in the Review of the Armed Forces, which was
published by the Armed Forces General Command
(Colombia) in 1960. In this journal the eradica
tion of the guerrillas was tied to an improvement
in living conditions in areas of guerrilla opera
tions in an effort both to undermine the image of
the armed forces in those areas. General Alberto
Raiz Nova, who served as Minister of War under
President Guillermo Leon Valencia from 1962 to 1965,
became closely identified with these views and was
24
Barber and Ronning, Internal Security, p. 184
25Ibid., p. 184.
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the architect of the military's civic action
programs, which since 1962 have been a major
component of the government's efforts against
the guerrillas.26
In assessing the views of the Colombian military, it
is also appropriate that the views of General Ruiz be
examined. An extensive comment by Ruiz reflects the simi
larity of views with the United States on the purpose and
function of civic action:
Military civic action has as its purpose to extend
to vast sectors of the populace the government's
help, especially in the field of social assistance,
through the military organization of the nation.
It is based on the premise that the use of mili
tary means to accomplish porgrams of economic and
social welfare will awaken in the beneficial pop
ulation trust and sympathy towards the government
and the military forces. The programs are developed
without affecting the military efficiency of the
armed institutions or compromising their princi
pal functions.
Besides accomplishing an effective program of
assistance to the people, military civic action
gains the support of the poulace for the legiti
mate and rightful regime and for its armed
forces. It also helps to prove the usefulness
of the army and to counter the attacks of those
who see military expenditures only as a useless
drain of public funds, and who deny the impor
tance of the mission of the armed forces within
the state.
Besides reading the objective of counteracting
the campaigns of the communists among the people
aginst the armed insitutions, civic action makes
known the concern of the government for the less
favored and stops those whose foster insurrection,
by proving that welfare and social improvement can
come to the people in a legal and orderly manner.27
2fi
U.S. Department of the Army, Area Handbook for Colom
bia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p.408.
27cited in Gannon, "Military Civic Action," pp. 15-16
and Colonel John T. Price, "The Indigeneous Military—Its
Role in Nation Building in Latin America," U.S. Army College,
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, March, 1969) , p. 28.
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This compatible view of the United States concept on
the part of the Colombian military allowed for the rapid
and comprehensive implementation of a civic action program
for that country. Beginning in April 1962, the Colombian
Armed Forces and the United States Army Mission developed
a plan of civic action that would be carried out by Colom
bian military personnel. The plan would involve such ac
tivities as "construction of penetration and farm market
roads, community development, health and sanitation pro-
28
grams, well-drilling and educational programs." The
United States would primarily be responsible for providing
technical advisors to work with Colombian military person
nel. The scheme also called on the Colombian government
to supply equipment and materials while the actual work
would be carried out jointly by civilian and military per
sonnel.
By September the original civic action policy had been
revised and was now set-up and entitled as "Impact" program.
Its basic thrust would be to emphasize those projects with
in areas where internal security problems were greatest.
This brought the Colombia program more in line with the
directives of the Counter-Insurgency Planning Guide calling
for high-impact projects with good chances of completion in
a relatively short period of time. As Ronning and Barber
note the revision "was an obvious attempt to stamp out the
28
Barber and Ronning, Internal Security, p. 192.
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causes of violence as well as an attempt to better the
image of the military in the eyes of the poeple of the area."
A final change was the earlier noted decision that the United
States would provide funding under A.I.D. and MAP.
In order for the policy to be successful, certain re
quirements within the Colombian military establishment were
also necessary. Hence, the Colombian Army Engineer Battal
ions were reorganized while new training methods were intro-
29
duced at the Engineering School. The goal was to make
these units better qualified in the completion of road-
building and constructive tasks in heretofore unaccessible
areas. Additionally, twelve of sixty-six units of the Colom
bian Armed Forces were reassigned to the primary mission of
military civic action. Finally, in the most significant
action, a formal United States sponsored civic action policy
was implemented in November 1962 by Presidential decree No.
1381, which established the National Committee on Military
Civic Action.
The mission of the committee was to coordinate civic
action activities throughout the country. It included such
prominent government officials as the Ministers of Govern
ment, War, Agriculture, Public Health, National Education
and Public Works. Other members included lesser officials
29Ibid., p. 194.
Gannon, "Military Civic Action," p. 24.
Ibid., p. 20 and Barber and Ronning, Internal Se
curity, p. 114.
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and private individuals interested in supporting the pro
gram. The Minister of War serves as the executive secre
tary for the Committee. General Ruiz, who handled this
position initially, commented on the organization and
effectiveness of the Committee saying:
Military civic action requires coordination
among the different government levels and is
carried out by committees composed of mili
tary and civilian authorities; ecclesiatic
authorities are also invited to participate,
as well as those individuals and groups who
desire to collaborate. The task of the
committees is to promote the cooperation of
the civilian population through campagns of
social, educationand communal action ....
The Colombian experience has shown the ex
cellent results that are obtained through the
establishment of the committees and which are
evident in the cooperation that all the citi
zens have offered in the actions accomplished.32
It is thus clear that the policy for Colombian was designed
to be a comprehensive and forceful policy with the full sup
port of the government. As Major Gannon notes, "it must be
realized that the military civic action program, as admin
istered in Colombia, is truly on a national scale."33
Turning to an examination of the details of the Colom
bian civic action program, a look at its objectives is nec
essary. Major Dominick Gannon, in his study of the Colom
bian program, identifies four objectives which the policy
aimed at accomplishing. He notes that while they specifi
cally apply to Colombia, they are also applicable to civic
32
Glick, Peaceful Conflict, p. 105.
Gannon, "Military Civic Action," p. 21.
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action programs in other countries. They are:
1. The civic action program should contribute
to the social, cultural and economic pro
gress of a country. For very remote and
inaccessible areas, the military forces of
a country are often the only governmental
agency equipped and prepared to initiate
needed programs and to perform services in
the socioeconomic field. Civic action often
brings government and civilization to remote
areas where there are no other actual or
symbolic representations of national authority.
2. Civic action promotes the desire of commun
ities to contribute to their own progress.
The people learn that they can help bring
abour their own social and economic improve
ment by working side-by-side with the mili
tary.
3. Civic action strengthens the ties of mutual
respect and friendship between the civilian
population and the national armed forces.
The armed forces of some developing coun
tries have been a major political force,
separate and apart from the people. Par
ticipation in civic action brings the sol
dier closer to the people and makes both
aware of the combined potential for nation
building. Civic action engages the mili
tary in peaceful and productive pursuits
and refutes the arguments of those who con
demn military expenditures as a useless
drain of public funds.
4. Lastly, the civic action program should as
sist in reducing discontent among the people,
thereby discouraging insurgency and the in
filtration of extremist ideologies. It elim
inates some of the grievances and helps to
dissuade civilians from cooperating with
guerrilla forces.
Towards achieving these objectives, the governments of
the United States and Colombia put into operation a series
of initial civic action projects for the years 1962 through
34
Gannon, "Military Civic Action," p. 21.
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1965. The projects are discussed in a document recently
declassified by this author. The document is Civic Action
Projects Report published by the United States Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM) in the Quarry Heights, Canal Zone.
The information contained in the document provides valuable
knowledge on both the role of United States as well as the
projects implemented during the initial phase of the civic
action program.
In examining the projects, one notices that despite
the program's development as an American creation, conscious
efforts were made to conceal the degree of the Unites States
involvement. On this point the document reads:
The policy has been to play down the U.S. role
in civic action on the premise that it was the
image of the host country which was important
in internal security operations . . . -^"
To the contrary, however, critical areas of the program such
as funding, coordination of programs, training of personnel,
and writing of loan grants were handled solely by American
officials. Central to this task was the work of the United
States Military Group (USMILGP) and Mobile Training Teams
(MTTS). The following quote from the Civic Action Projects
Report illustrates the critical and pervasive role of these
American units to the civic action program:
United States Southern Command, Civic Action Projects
Report, 1 January 1965 to 31 December 1965, Vol. I, n.p.
(Quarry Heights, Canal Zone, 1965), p. 244. This document
was declassified by the author on May 2, 1979.
Ibid., p. 245 (author's emphasis).
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USMILGP and U.S. Mobile Training Teams (MTTS)
will work with Colombian Civic Affairs and
Public Information personnel to assure con
tinuing publicity for projects which tend to be
taken for granted after a time . . . USMILGP
and MTT personnel so that the turn-over causes
the least amount of problems . . . USMILGP will
write the loan and project agreements in such
a manner as to make the turnover of peso funds
for civic action to the ministry of Defense
quicker and easier so projects will not be held
up for lack of supplies . . . Civic Action MTTS
currently in the country and the perspective
USMILGP civic action officer should continue to
work to improve coordination of the civic action
program both within Colombian military forces
between the forces and Colombian and U.S. agen
cies ... 37
As noted earlier the United States-Colombian civic ac
tion program had its beginning in 1962. A series of four
teen projects were implemented throughout Colombia (See
Appendix 4 for location of projects) involving each major
branch of the Colombian Armed Forces. This included the
Army, Navy and Air Force in addition to a number of joint
projects by the forces. Importantly, the discussion of
the detailed information of the projects which follows is
taken from the Civic Action Projects Report.38 Included
will be comments on the name, description and nature of the
projects, the branch of the armed forces responsible for it,
the character and extent of the United States role. Also,
where indicated, the specific connection between a particu





1. Project A-l (Army)
Name of Project. Tolima-Valle Highway .
Location of Project. 100 kilometers of road connecting
Ataco, in the Department of Tolima with Palmira, in the
Department of Valle. See Map, Appendix 4, for notation A-l.
Description of Project. This project involves the con
struction of two arterial, all-weather, two-lane gravel high
ways .... Those highways will cross each other roughly in
the center of the violence affected departments of Tolima
and Valle.
Presence of the Engineer Troops coupled with the im
proved reaction capability provided by the roads has had a
direct affect on the suppression of violence in the area
.... The road has contributed to the improvement of the
economy of the area and the standard of living of the peo
ple, and had thus improved some of the cause of violence
and dissatisfaction.39
Date Project Started. April 1963.
United States Support. The United States military pro
vided two part-time personnel to assist on this project,
while USAID and USMILGP wrote loan grants to provide opera
ting expenses. In addition, under MAP, the United States
furnished equipment for three Colombian battalions working
on this project. Funding under AID totalled $860,000 for
39
Ibid., p. 249 (author's emphasis).
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year 1963, $90,000 for 1964, and $100,000 for 1964.40 Fi
nally, USMILGP and MTTs provided continuing efforts in
maintaining publicity for the project.
2. Project A-2 (Army)
Name of Project. Road Improvement and Maintenance.
Location of Project. Department of Santender, Caldas,
Valle and Boyaca. See map, Appendix 4, for notation A-2.
Description of Project. This is a long-range project.
The initial survey indicated that over 1,000 kilometers of
roads in violence areas were in need of repair. Pacifi
cation of some of these areas has already made it practi
cal for Public Works to do a small part of this work, and
a study is currently underway to determine which of them
will be rehabilitated by them. This project makes easier
the entry of military and police units the area to re-
establish public order. Some of the causes of violence
are removed by helping renew the economic development of
the violence-affected areas by facilitating the movement
41
of goods to market.
Date Project Started. 1963.
United States Support. The United States military pro
vided two part-time personnel to assist on this project,
40
United States funding figures for this project and
all others are estimates according to the document since
"U.S. AID mission figures on expenditures are not maintained
by separate sub-activity" and the totals "will increase as
pipeline items are received." Ibid., p. 250.
41Ibid., p. 252 (author's emphasis).
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while USAID and USMILGP wrote loan grants to provide opera
ting expenses. Additionally, under MAP the United States
furnished equipment for the Colombian engineering battal
ion working on this project. Funding under AID totalled
$328,000 for the year 1963, $80,000 for 1964 and $80,000
for 1965. Finally, USMILGP and MTTs provided continuing
efforts in maintaining publicity for the project.
3. Project A-3 (Army)
Name of Project. Potable water supply.
Location of Project. Departments of Boyaco and Cundi-
marca. See map, Appendix 4, for notation A-3.
Description of Project. Drilling of wells, construc
tion for reservoirs, and the installation of chlorinators
to provide potable water at medical health center sites
and to small villages in actual or potential violence areas,
Date Project Started. August 1963.
United States Support. The United States military pro-
two part-time personnel to assist on this project. Addi
tionally, two rotary and one percussion well-drilling rigs
were provided under MAP as well as an MTT to instruct in
the use of the equipment. Funding under AID totalled
$185,000 for the year 1963, $60,000 for 1964 and $60,000
for 1965.
4. Project A-4 (Army)
Name of Project. Communications Nets .
Location of Project. Remote, rural areas of Colombia.
See map, Appendix 4, for notation A-4.
131
Description Of Project. Establishes a communication
radio network in remote violence areas that are not now
served by any modern means of communication. Farm owners
purchase civilian type citizens band transceivers which
are installed on farms. These are supplemented by net con
trol and relay stations, which permit communications with
military and police post as well as patch into telephone
circuits. Thus, isolated farms and settlements can com
municate with posts of public order forces in cases of
emergency. Sets are also used for commercial and social
communication thus helping remove causes of violence.
Date Project Started. 1963.
United States Support. The United States provided two
part-time personnel for this project. USMILGP and USAID
also helped in selecting and procuring control and repeater
stations. Additionally, a MTT spent two months assisting
this project in 1965, while a joint U.S. Army/AID team pro
vided three months of assistance in 1966. Funding from the
United States totalled $132,000 for the year 1963, $48,000
for 1965.
5« Project A-5 (Army)
Name of Project. Rural School Construction.
Location of Project. Remote and violence areas. See
map, Appendix 4, for notation A-5.
42
Ibid., p. 257 (author's emphasis).
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Description of Project. In coordination with the
Ministry of Education rural schools are constructed in re
mote and violence areas with the Colombian Military Forces
furnishing technical assistance, some work with MAP engi
neer equipment, and some construction materials, and, in
all but a few cases, the teachers . . . ,43
Date Project Started. 1963.
United States Support. The United States military pro
vided one part-time person for this project. MAP equipment
is also used. United States funding for this project was
$23,000 for the year 1963. USMILGP and USAID worked on ways
to increase the amount and speed funding. Finally, USMILGP
and MTTs worked to maintain continuous publicity on the
project, taking particular advantage of graduation and
anniversaries.
6. Project N-l (Navy)
Name of Project. Cartagena Ship Repair Facility and
Floating.
Location of Project. Cartagena, Bolivar. See map,
Appendix 4, for notation N-l.
Description of Project. Provides repairs for Naval,
commercial, private shipping, increased employment to im
prove the economy in a depressed area, and valuable techni





Date Project Started. 1962.
United States Support. The United States military pro
vides two part-time personnel on a continuing basis. Tools,
cranes, lathes and other equipment are provided under MAP.
A floating dry dock (ARD), was provided by the U.S. Navy
on a navy-to-navy lease basis. Additionally, the United
States provides follow-up spare parts which amount to
roughly $15,000 per year. The USMILGP provides continuing
publicity on the project.
7. Project N-2 (Navy)
Name of Project. Civic Action by River Patrols.
Location of Project. Amazon-Putumayo, 1,000 miles;
Caqueta, 1,000 miles; Magdalena, 600 miles; Meta, 400 miles.
Description of Project. A total of nine river gunboats,
transports and tugs provide medical service, supplies, engi
neering advice and service and transportation for inhabitants
along these jungle rivers. This is the only means of trans
portation, communication, and medical support for many of
45
these people.
Date Project Started. 1963.
United States Support. The United States military pro
vides one part-time personnel for this project. Additional
ly, the United States provided $12,000 in MAP support for
the procurement of gunboats. CARE packages are also pro
vided to the river patrols. USAID drugs and MAP supplied
45Ibid., p. 263.
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medical equipment are provided to local health post. USMILGP
and MTTs provide continuing local and national publicity on
this project.
8. Project AF-1 (Air Force)
Name of Project. SATENA Airlift Operation (Servico de
Aeronavegacion a Los Territories Nacionales).
Location of Project. Main office located in Bogota.
Description of Project. The single most important and
and productive civic action project undertaken by the Colom
bian Air Force is the SATENA Airlift operation to the under
developed, under populated Eastern half of the Republic of
Colombia, where other means of communications are almost
totally lacking . . . SATENA is accomplishing with the re
mote villages in the eastern half of the country . . . SATENA
is providing the essential airlift link with the central
government, thus contributing to political cohesion and
economic development of the republic. It is populating en
tire new towns and village ... It transports material
supplies, evacuates the sick and injured ... It moved crops
and other products at a rate the colonists can afford.
Date Project Started. 1962.
United States Support. This project has received only
nominal U.S. support, and is not projected to receive U.S.
support although it was originally scheduled for U.S. sup
port as an Air Force civic action project. Projected
46Ibid., p. 265.
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support was withdrawn in 1963, before MAP assistance was
given.
9. Project AF-2 (Air Force)
Name of Project. Medical civic action.
Location of Project. Main office is located in Bogota.
The operation, however, is scattered in some twenty-nine
communities.
Description of Project. Among the significant civic
action projects undertaken by the Colombian Air Force is
the medical civic action project. For the most part, this
operates under Colombian Air Force sponsorship.
The accomplishments of this project, financed almost
entirely by Colombian Air Force funds, have been outstanding.
As an example, the following communities were visited during
calendar year 1965:
Yaguara Arabia La Maearena
Rio Lozada Brisasdol Llano Solita
Monterrey Trinidad Jose Maria
Tauramena San Juanito Mandur
Mandalay La Pradena Tio Barbas
Pto Otero Yuruparia Arauguita
San Jose Tame Recreo
Chafurray San Carlos Secreto
legal Chimbi
Barrio Alfonsa Lopez Sicomorro
The following patients were treated by the Colombian













Yellow Fever Shots 3,584
Smallpox vaccinations 3,964
Other 316
Date Project Started. 1965.
United States Support. The United States provides one
person for this project. The U.S. Air Force also provided
a five man medical MTTs consisting of one officer and four
NCO's from the Canal Zone for a four-day period. The USAF
mission also works with the Colombian Air Force in its
efforts to increase funding for the project.
10. Project AF-3 (Air Force)
Name of Project. Road Building Project "Orion"
Location of Project. Adjacent Tres Esquinas Air Base.
See map, Appendix 4, for notation Af-3.
Description of Project. This a road project that bisects
the jungle from Tes Esquinas to Montanitas. The Colombian
Air Force was designated exclusive agent because Tres Esqui
nas is an Air Force Base, and the base is charged with the
development of this region. The road project is being con-
47
structed from both communities.
Date Project Started. 1963.
United States Support. The United States military pro
vided one part-time person. The USAF mission also supports
Colombian Air Force efforts to increase funding.
47Ibid., p. 269.
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11. Project J-l (Joint)
Name of Project. Health Posts—Field Dispensaries.
Location of Project. See map, Appendix 4, for notation
J-l.
The Army is operating health posts at the following
locations:
J-l, al Quebradanegra J-l, a9 Florian
J-l, a2 Buenvista J-l, alO Cumaribo
J-l, a3 San Antoniode Sevilla J-l, all Medellin de Ariari
J-l, a4 San Antonio de Balbo J-l, al2 Valpariso
J-l, a5 Mira Valles J-l, al3 Rio Blanco
J-l, a6 Santa Lucia J-l/ al4 Doncello
J-l, a7 Planadas j-l, al5 La belleza
J-l, a8 Jesus Maria J-l, al6 Venecia
The Navy operates two floating dispensaries and small
hospitals at:
J-l, nl Leticia J-l, a3 Leguizamo
J-l, n2 Orocue
The Air Force operates a health post at:
J-l, afl Tres Esquinas
Description of Project. The Colombian military forces
operate the above listed posts in areas of violence or for
mer violence. Most of the posts have limited dental and
medical equipment (MAP) supplies), potable water, generators
for operation of equipment and lighting, visiting doctors
and dentists, and permanent nurses and first aid men. Money
for drugs and expendable supplies is from USAID. The civic
action health centers treat about 27,000 patients each year.
They have been of great help in raising the health standards
of the people in areas where they operate and serve as a
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constant reminder of the government's interest in the peo-
Pie.48
Date Project Started. 1964.
United States Support. The United States military pro
vided one full time and one part-time personnel to this proj
ect. Supplies provided included twenty-three surgical, den
tal, and medical sets; 22 phase I and 19 phase II emergency
medical treatment units; 19 jeep ambulance; and generators
were furnished by MAP ... A Colombian hospital received
$15,000 and an x-ray machine. USAID funding totalled $160,000
for the year 1964 and $60,000 for 1965. Finally, USMILGP and
civic action MTTs assisting in the improvement of administra
tive tasks such as getting reports and drug and supply requi
sitions in regularly and on time.
12. Project J-2 (Joint)
Name of Project. This project is being carried out as
seven Army, one Navy and one Air Force induction and recruit
training centers. See map, Appendix 4, for notation J-2.
Description of Project. Electronic equipment, tapes
and booklets were purchased by USAID in 1963 for nine cen
ters. Literacy training is given to recuits with less than
a third grade reading and writing skill level to attempt to
bring them up to at least that level. In the Army the lit
eracy rate is raised from 40% to 85% upon completion of
basic training, in the Navy from 95% to almost 100%, and
in the Air Force from 50% to 90%. Training is continued in
48
Ibid., p. 271 (author's emphasis).
13 9
the new unit with military or civilian instructors depending
49
on the tactical situation.
Date Project Started. 1963.
United States Support. The United States military pro
vides one part-time person for this project. USAID funding
totalled $24,000 for the year 1963. USMILGP and MTTs work
to provide continuing publicity for the project.
13. Project J-3 (Joint)
Name of Project. Youth camps.
Location of Project. Various locations throughout
Colombia. See map, Appendix 4, for notation J-3.
Description of Project. Designed to strengthen the
ties between the military forces and youth from potential
or actual violence areas and to improve the lives of these
youths. Camps last for three weeks and each is attended
by thirty boys between twelve and sixteen years of age
selected from poor families in potential or actual violence
areas. The boys are given some clothing, toilet articles
and school supplies. Camps are held on or near military
posts. The boys receive instruction in civics, history,
geography, personal hygiene, first aid, sanitation, group
activities and sports. They take trips to nearby points
of interest.
Date Project Started. 1964.
id., p. 274.
Ibid., pp. 278-279 (author's emphasis).
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United States Support. The United States military pro
vides one part-time person for this porject. Funding to
talled $12,000 for the year 1964 and $15,000 for 1965. These
funds were provided by US SOUTHCOM Special Activities Fund.
The United States Information Service (USIS) provided films
while Peace Corps Volunteers gave instructions in a number
of classes.
14. Project J-4 (Joint)
Name of Project. Civic Action Days.
Location of Project. Civic Action Days are conducted by
all military units of battalion size, brigade headquarters,
school bases and training centers all over the country.
Description of the Project. A Civic Action Day con
sists of a military unit moving into a village after ad
vance publicity and performing services for the villagers
surrounding population . . . Examples of these services
are: a. medical counsultants, b. dental treatment extrac
tions) , c. immunication and first aid, d. distribution of
CARE packages, e. haircuts and shoe repair, f. veterinary
supplies, g. documentation . . . This is a continuing proj
ect which will be conducted until the violence problem is
solved.
Date Project Started. 1692.
United States Support. The United States military pro
vides three part-time personnel for this project and the
51Ibid., pp. 278-279 (author's emphasis).
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supply of CARE packages.
The above projects constituted the basis of the United
States sponsored civic action program for Colombia. As noted
these projects were initiated following a period of intense
counterinsurgency military operations in areas where the
guerrilla opposition was strongest. Following these opera
tions, the civic actions projects were undertaken as the
constuctive phase of the broad effort to eliminate the long-
lived guerrilla bases. As pointed out in the previous chap
ter, however, the initial military operations did not com
pletely destroy the guerrilla strongholds. Accordingly, it
became necessary to mount additional military expeditions
to contain the new guerrilla resurgence. This in turn ne
cessitated certain changes in the implementation of the civic
action program in Colombia. At a different level, these
changes were a reflection of a change in Washington.
With President Kennedy's assassination and the coming
into office of Lyndon Johnson, the vigorous support of the
civic action policy now under-went a change in emphasis.
This change was evident both within Colombia as well as
in Washignton. Within Colombia it has been noted that
"after 1965 civic action programs continued, but they were
de-emphasized in favor of military actions against the
52
guerrillas. This of course was due in part to the reor
ganized military posture of the guerrillas. In so far as
Washington was concerned, however, the change in emphasis
52
Area Handbook, p. 408.
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did not so much reflect changing conditions within Colom
bia, but rather a differing policy perspective in regards
to the perceived best effective means for dealing with
guerrilla movements not only within that country, but
throughout the world.
Accordingly, the new administration of President
Johnson in the 1964-65 period began to offer less admini
strative support for the kinds of policy concepts developed
by the Kennedy Administration that were being implemented
in Colombia, Latin America and the world. This was particu
larly evident with the new concept of civic action, which
from the Johnson administration's perspective had a number
of deficiencies as a means of solving military problems
such as guerrilla warfare. This is not to say or imply
that President Johnson totally abandoned and neglected the
civic action policy. To the contrary, he did offer what
amounts to lip service support of the concept. As early
as August 1964, President Johnson in a statement to the
Fifth Conference of American Armies (United States and
Latin American Army Chiefs of Staff), went on record in
support of civic action saying:
It is not sufficient that the military protect
our lands from outside interference or attack—
in addition, it is the responsibility of each
of us to contribute to the security and well-
being of our fellow citizens by working together
for military and civic progress. *-3
Glick, Peaceful Conflict, p. 22, and Hanning, A Time
To, p. 221.
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The supportive words, however, did not conceal the ad
ministrative disfavor with the new concept and there were
very evident indications that policy would be placed on a
backburner in respoect to its usage as a viable policy.
Within the context of these developments, Ronning and Barber
offer a number of very incisive comments on the changing
policy emphasis of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
In view of the significant substance of their remarks, some
detail and length is taken in quoting them. In respect to
the policy change itself, Ronning and Barber note:
Although there are no indications of an abandon
ment of civic action and non-military means of
preventing insurgency, there are indications that
the Johnson Administration is giving increasing
attention to the more purely military solutions
to the problem of counterinsurgency.*4
This changing posture was given full credence as Washing
ton signaled to Latin America its view that right-wing mili
tary coups such as those which took place in Brazil and
Bolivia in 1964 would not be looked upon with disfavor. La
ter President Johnson's decision to intervene militarily
in the Dominican Republic as well his urging of the creation
of a permanent Inter-American Defense force, quickly dis
pelled any remaining notions as to his support of the peace
ful use of military forces. Detailing the new Washington
posture, Ronning and Barber comment:
... In 1963-65 there has been much less public
urgency displayed regarding civic action. Mes
sages to Congress have been much less frequent or
54
Barber and Ronning, Internal Security, p. 208.
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strongly stated than was the case in 1961-63.
In reference to the Latin American area, in a
dozen policy speeches delivered by Mr. Mann
during his tenure as Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs and United
States Coordinator of the Alliance for Pro
gress, no mention is made of any aspect of
military civic action. President Johnson has
mentioned the subject, but not with emphasis
or priority.55
In a very fundamental sense, then, the changed posture
by Johnson in regards to Latin American affairs was not
unique. It was not so much his dislike of civic action that
led to his de-emphasis of the policy. Moreso, it was simply
his preference for the use of force as a more viable military
option. Civic action, like the larger counterinsurgency
doctrine were viewed as idealistic, pristine creations of a
young, romantic president. They had no place in Johnson's
worldview of power struggle and real politics. Thus the
change in Latin America was not an isolated phenomenon, on
a worldwide basis Johnson increasingly encouraged and sup
ported a hardline military posture. As a consequence of this
view, it led to a revision and abandonment of Kennedy's broad
counterinsurgency doctrine in Vietnam and now of civic action
in Latin America in general and Colombia in particular.
Again Ronning and Barber succinctly explained this develop
ment:
The retreat of United States policy in hard
pressed countries such as Vietnam, from a
policy which emphasized military civic action
55Ibid., p. 243.
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to overcome subversion and insurgency to greater
reliance on conventional military strength and
modern weapons such as jet bombers could be an
indication that strategic and security thinking
in Washington no longer relies on "winning the
hearts and minds of men" to contain guerrillas
or discourage potential insurgents.13"
This retreat or de-emphasis on civic action in Colombia
lasted throughout the period of renewed military operations
against the guerrillas. It wasn't until 1968 that civic ac
tion was once again being used as a necessary constructive
phase of the overall counterinsurgency effort. Even so,
this renewed emphasis took place within the context of less
administrative support from Washington. The Colombian gov
ernment thus found itself having to renew civic action
through the greater use of its own indigenous resources.
Colombia's new program went into effort in late 1968 being
hailed as a "ten year anticommunist plan." The purpose
of this new plan was to improve civic action projects pre
viously undertaken and to expand the area of operations by
colonizing new national territories. One of the major
projects in this view was cited by the newspaper, El Tiempo,
in the capital city of Bogota. It noted:
The Colombian government launched a vast and co
ordinated civic and military offense on the areas
affected by centers of guerrillas warfare in the
Alto Sinu-San Jorge region, in hopes of attaining
the economic and social development of this vast
region.58
56Ibid., p. 243 (author's emphasis).
Price, "The Indigenous Military," p. 31.
58Ibid., p. 33.
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In respect to the operation of the various civic ac
tion projects the plan called for the armed forces to con
tinue and expand on essentially the same types of activi
ties that were undertaken in the initial "Impact" program.
With the decreased commitment of the United States, how
ever, the success of this renewed effort would depend on
greater support from indigenous organizations of social
assistance as well as increased economic and technical
aid. Such organizations in Colombia included the Agarian
bank, the Institute of Development of Renewable National
Resources, the Magdalena and Sinu Valleys corporation and
the National Supply Institute.
Putting the plan into the effect first called upon
the armed forces to mount a military operation to clear
the selected national territories of guerrillas. The army
would then move in and set up the basic superstructure
necessities for the region including roads, communications
and electrical power facilities. Within this controlled
zone a massive publicity campaign would be mounted while
the government recruited local citizens support of the
project. Later a number of specific civic action projects
were implemented with assistance from various social organ
izations. Assessing the new policy, one Colombian Army
Colonel remarked,
Military action could not have worked out more
perfectly; this program will make military suc
cesses more lasting and secure and I hope that
with the complete and perfect execution of the
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of the reconstruction plan a still latent prob
lem of public order will be ended.59
Despite the Colombian Colonel's optimism, events did
not go exactly as planned. Changed internal security con
siderations once again forced a retreat on the civic action
program. One account notes this action saying:
In the first half of the 1970's the development
orientation of the armed forces remained, but it
was de-emphasized in favor of an expansion of their
coercive role in the face of continuing internal
security problems that were especially common in
urban areas.60
This last and somewhat desperate attempt at a resurgence by
the rural guerrillas, in addition to the expansion of new
groups in the urban setting, quickly spurred the Colombia
armed forces to return to the military offensive. Its all-
out campaign in 1973 virtually eliminated the guerrillas
rural apparatus and allowed the armed forces to devote in
creased attention to the growing urban threat. Importantly,
it was the critical success of the army in the rural areas
that opened the way for the eventual continuation of the
civic action projects initiated under the ten year anti-
communist plan.
Even though its role was of a relative low-key nature,
the United States did continue its assistance thus aiding
in the successes of the Colombian military. Although that
role had been greatly reduced since the mid-1960's it was
59
Cited in Ibid., p. 34.
Area Handbook, p. 427.
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not completely abolished. As a matter of fact, the guer
rilla resurgence in the late 1960's and early 1970's also
spurred the United States to resume a number of its counter-
insurgency oriented activities. Accordingly, in the civic
action area, the United States initiated ten new projects
toward the effort to complete the rural pacification pro
cess which was so successful.
Implemented in 1970 and 1971, these ten civic action
projects were part of the sixty-five counterinsurgency mis
sions spelled out in the recently declassified Military
Assistance Plan for Colombia. The listed title of the
projects are: (1) Third Engineer Battalion Construction,
(2) Fourth Engineer Battalion Construction, (3) Engineer
Well Drilling Unit, (4) Second Engineer Battalion Construc
tion, (5) Information Unit, (6) Engineer FOS and Secondary
Items (Army), (7)Floating Dry Dock, (8) Tankers, (9) Map
Training (Navy), and (10) Ship Support, FOS and Secondary
Items (Navy). Of these ten projects detailed information
is provided for only five. The other five are deleted
being that they remain classified. An account of the five
projects listed in the document (portions of which are also
deleted) are as follows:
United States Southern Command, Military Assistance
Plan: Colombia, Vol. II, n.p., n.d. There are no page
numbers listed in this document. Each project is identi
fied solely by its MAP Element Code. The document itself
was declassified by the author in December 1979.
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1. Title: One Engineer Battalion (Construction)
MAP Element Code: 3AQB
Units/Activities/Location; 3rd Engineer Battalion
a. Palmira, Department of Valle
b. Department of Valle (Tacaeyo-Toez Highway Project)
c. Bella Vista Camp, Department of Valle (Tolima
Highway Project)
Mission: The mission of this battalion is to accomplish
military construction and engineer civic action construc
tion projects . . . (remaining portions deleted).
Cost Summary: FY 1970 - $6,024.
2. Title: One Engineer Battalion (Construction)
MAP Element Code: 3AQC
Units/Activiteis/Location:
a. Bogota, Special District
b. Department of Tolima
c. Moniquica, Department of Santander
Mission: The mission of this battalion is to accomplish
construction and engineer civic action projects and sup
port training conducted at the engineer shcool
Cost Summary: FY 1970 - $48,734.
3. Title: Army Operating Support (Engineer FOS and Secondary
Items) J
MAP Element Code: 3BVB
Units/Activities, All MAP supported Colombian Army units
and activities.
Mission: The purpose of this element is to consolidate
the requirements of the Colombian Army for engineer fol
low-on spare parts (FOS) and secondary items . . . (re
maining portion deleted).
Cost Summary: FY 1970 - $217,800; FY 1971 - $228,300.
4. Title: Navy Operating Support (MAP Training)
MAP Element Code: 3HTO
Units/Activities/Location: All Map Supported Colombian
Navy Units and Activities.
Mission: The mission of the element is to relate opera
ting cost for MAP Supported Training to the MAP supported
portion of the Colombian Navy.
Quantity and Cost Summary:
FY-1970 STU SP COST
Student Training in the Continental U.S. 38 52 $109 000
Student Training in the Canal Zone _£ _6 3,'pop
^al4. _ 44 58 1O9,'oOO




FY - 1971 STU SP COST
Student Training in the Continental U.S. 40 56 $109,000
Student Training in the Canal Zone _2^ _2_ 1,000
Total 42 58 110,000
Orientation Tours in the Continental US 55 58 76,000
MISC (UNITAS) 11,000
TOTAL COST $197,000
5. Title: Navy Operating Support (FOS and Secondary Items)
MAP Element Code: #HVO
Units/Activities/Location: All Map Supported Colombian
Units and Activities.
Mission: The mission of the element is to relate opera
ting costs for follow-on spares and secondary items to
MAP supported portion of the Colombian Navy.
Equipment Support Cost Summary (Operating Costs):
Item
Ships Spare Parts Books, Maps, Publications
Communications Equipment Spares Primary Batteries
Other Auto Spares Other Hand and Measuring
Other Industrial Supplies Tools
Other Equipment and Construction Supplies
Naval Ordinance Spares
FY 1970 - $229,995
FY 1971 - $243,244
The above action projects culminated the United States as
sistance efforts toward the elimination of the guerrilla in
surgency in the rural areas of the country. Without ques
tion, it seems quite clear that the civic action programs
of the United States and Colombian government's proved to
be a real success. Praise from various sources have testi
fied on the Colombian example as being a textbook case of
counterinsurgency in which the civic action component was
both a critical and necessary one. These comments attesting
to the value of civic action are citied in some detail. First,
a number of United States military officials have remarked on
the success of the program. The Civic Action Projects Re
port comments:
15.1
The civic action program in Colombia has been
very effective in promotion economic and so
cial development and improving the internal
security capability . . . Official reports from
the field give a great deal of credit to civic
action for bringing the people in the areas of
violence to the government's side and influencing
them to give information and help the government.62
Next, Colonel John T. Price adds,
In this regard, it is interesting to note the inter
relationship of the military efforts to eliminate
the insurgents and of the simultaneous civic ac
tion activities designed to aid the peasants and
others in areas being pacified.63
Major Dominick Gannon concluded, "The military civic action
program in Colombia is one of the most successful programs
64
in Latin America."
Ronning and Barber in their study of civic acion through
out Latin America offer some cogent comments which attest to
the turnabout of affairs in Colombia following the imple
mentation of the United States program. They note:
Following nearly two decades of failure, Colombia
military units have recently been successful
against rural bandits after employing the tech
nique of civic action. By this means, the army
has apparently succeeded in gaining the confidence
of traditionally suspicious and often hostile
campesinos to the point where they no longer co
operate with the bandits and in some cases even
assist the army with valuable information . . .
the peasants did protect the bandits by their
silence in the face of military questioning
until the advent of a directed civic action
program.65
62
Civic Action, p. 244.
Cited in Prince, "The Indigenous Military," p. 29.
Gannon, "Military Civic Action," pp. 37-38.
Barber and Ronning, Internal Security, p. 204.
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Finally, in one of the strongest testaments to the value
of the civic action program, Hugh Hanning comments:
Colombia is a classical example of a country that
has successfully used PUMPF (Peaceful Use of Mili
tary Forces) as an integral part of a counterin-
surgency campaign ... It was General Ruiz Novoa,
a veteran of the Korean War, who in the two years
of his appointment as War Minister (1962-64) broke
the back of the sixteen year old guerrilla war,
which up to that point is estimated to have cost
no fewer than 200,000 lives. This he did by a
judicious combination of mailed fist and Accion
Civica-Militar.66
66Hanning, Peaceful Uses, p. 73, (author's) emphasis)
CHAPTER IV
THE UNITED STATES POLICE ASSISTANCE-PUBLIC
SAFETY PROGRAM IN COLOMBIA
This sixth chapter on the United States counterinsur-
gency effort in Colombia examines the third phase of Plan
Lazo, known as police assistance-public safety. This pro
gram represented the third tier of the three part approach
in the effort to resolve the internal security problems of
Colombia. Essentially, the basic thrust of the program was
that the United States, through the Agency for International
Development and its Office of Public Safety, would establish
a broad program of assistance to improve the quality and
overall operation of the police forces in Colombia. These
actions, along with the other programs of military assistance
and civic action to the Armed Forces, it was believed, would
lead to an elimination of the major internal security con
cerns and improve the ability of the Colombian government
to handle any future problems without outside assistance.
Before examining the detailed specifics of the policy
in Colombia, this chapter will first look at the police assis
tance-public safety program as it applied to the Latin Ameri
can continent as a whole. In doing so it will examine the
origins of the program, its goals and objectives, size and
153
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cost, and the basic mechanics of putting the program into
operation. This discussion in the first half of the chap
ter will thus provide the necessary background for a de
tailed examination of the program, objectives, methods
of operation as well as the total cost and impact of the
United States effort.
The initial American efforts at foreign police assis
tance had their beginnings during the United States mili
tary occupation of Germany and Japan. President Eisenhower,
in a meeting before the National Security Council, raised
questions pertaining to the lack of attention being paid to
police forces as opposed to more substantive efforts towards
building up their military troops. In that meeting he asked,
"We're building up military forces that we all know wouldn't
last a week or ten days in a hot war. But what are we doing
about constabulary forces?" Eisenhower's concern quickly
resulted in the establishment of an advisory policy assis
tance agency. The new agency was placed under the control
of the State Department, being administered as part of the
foreign aid program. Named to head the agency was a former
policeman from Kansas City named Byron Engle.
Almost immediately the new agency went into operation.
First by centralizing the small number of advisors under its
A. J. Languth, Hidden Terrors: The Truth About U.S.
Police Operations in Latin America (New York: Patheon
Books, 1978), p. 48.
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helm and by removing itself from the control of a variety of
differing agencies. Prior tio this, A. J. Langguth notes:
Police advisors in Okinawa and Japan were under
army control, along with those in Korea and the
Philippines, Berlin's police advisors reported to
the State Department; and the four man group in
Iran came under the Foreign Operation Administra
tion. 2
Acting under the pretext of the Cold War, its stated mis
sion was that of "combating communism and subversion."
The confusing ideological turmoil of world politics during
this era, particularly in the developing countries, led to
a change in the mission's purposes in 1959. As opposed to
simply being concerned with communism, the working of the
agency's mission were broadened to read "combating interest
inimical to the United States."
The new agency functioned on a relatively miniscule
scale until President Kennedy was elected to office in 1960.
It was at this point that a more formal concept and program
of police assistance began to emerge as a key component of
American foreign policy. It was President Kennedy, it can
be recalled, who provided the impetus for the development
of the new doctrine of counterinsurgency. Police Assistance-
Public Safety thus emerged as an integral component of that
doctrine. The organizational thrust for its inclusion as
a part of that doctrine took shape with the creation of the
Counter-Insurgency Group. Accordingly, the Group established
2Ibid, p. 48.
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a Committee on Police and Police Training. It was Presi
dent Kennedy as well as his brother, Robert (Attorney Gen
eral at the time), who insured the inclusion of the com
mittee and the program of police assistance as functional
parts of the overall counterinsurgency doctrine.
The Committee on Police and Police Training proceeded
to establish and expanded a more formal office to administer
this program. After some dispute with the Pentagon over
the jurisdiction of police powers, it was decided that the
police function was a civil one and the agency would go to
the State Department. This new agency became of the Office
of Public Safety (OPS) and was to operate under the Agency
for International Development. That administrative deci
sion thus tended to make police assistance look more like
a civilian effort while helping to conceal its explicit
ideological and jurisdictional military functions. In this
context, Douglas Blaufard correctly adds, "on the civilian
side of the effort the most specifically counterinsurgency
4
oriented program was the police training activity of USAID."
The person selected as Director of the Agency was the same




Douglas Blaufaub, The Counterinsurgency Era; U.S.
Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present (New YorK:
The Free Press, 1977), p. 282.
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The Office of Public Safety thus came into being not
merely through the process of routine administrative growth,
but moreso to serve a specific ideological function. It
clearly emerged out of the Kennedy's passion for a unique
doctrine in which the challenge of communists and other
anti-American elements could be met. Referring to the first
request of assistance to OPS from Venezuela, hearings before
the Foreign Assistance Committee in 1965 make this point
clear saying:
Thus was established what amounted to a new func
tion of foreign aid policy—the modernization of
civilian police forces in underdeveloped countries
as a tactic of the cold war.
The new director of OPS, Byron Engle espoused similar views
on this point. He commented:
When the Cold War began, we began to realize that
police forces are damned important. They have the
basic responsibility for maintaining peace and
order for controlling subversion. If you have a
good police it's a lot more difficult for communists
to subvert government.6
This concern for "law and order" invariably was essential
as perhaps the key rationale for the existence of the police
assistance program. Going even further however, United
States officials tied in the law and order concern as merely
being one of "technical assistance" despite the policy's
clearly avowed ideological and political origins. The law
U.S. Senate, Gommittee on Appropriations, Foreign As
sistance Appropriations, 1965, Hearings, 89th Cong., 1st
sess., 1965, p. 76.
6Ibid., p. 78.
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and order and technical assistance rationale were spelled
out in detail by former AID Director David Bell:
Maintenance of law and order including internal
security is one of the fundamental responsi
bilities of government. In most countries this
is a responsibility of the police—using the
term "police" in the broad sense to include
various agencies of government . . . Success
ful discharge of this responsibility is im
perative if a nation is to establish and main
tain the environment of stability and security
so essential to economic, social and political
progress and to attain the goal of free stable,
independent and self-reliant government. Clearly,
this progress and this goal will not be attain
able if law and order is replaced by disorder
and violence. Communist subversion, terrorism
and insurgency typically strive to breakdown
law and order and internal security.
Plainly, the United States has very great in
terests in the creation and maintenance of an
atmosphere of law and order under humane, civil
concepts and control, and in countering com
munist efforts in all forms. When there is a
need, technical assistance to the police of de-
loping nations to meet their responsibilities
promotes and protects these U.S. interests.
This is a function of the AID public safety
program""^ '. 77
Bell's arguments seem quite rational, yet the broad
scope of OPS activities tend to raise serious questions as
to whether or not law and order is its primary function.
The kind of police assistance that OPS provides, without
question, goes beyond the traditional conception of routine
police work. Its basic focus and emphasis is geared more
towards broad based internal security matters with definite
Ibid., p. 72, (author's emphasis). It should be pointed
out that a number of Senators expressed concern over AID'S
use of its technical assistance functions as a means of
training foreign police. Bell's remarks were in response
to those concerns.
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ideological and political overtones. Accordingly, Michael
Klare, in a study of OPS, offers a succinct view of its
scope saying, "thousands of officers are being trained not
in routine police functions of crime prevention, but in
o
counterinsurgency techniques and ideology."
This counterinsurgency role was also expressed by
Robert Kennedy, one of the main architects of the program,
who fashioned the catchword of the agency's function saying
that police were the "first line of defense" in the cold
war. He alluded that point in his remarks before the first
graduating class of the International Police Academy.9 when
he noted that ths was "the age of hit-run terrorists activi
ties coordinated on a global scale, and the police were a
very real first line of defense." Kennedy added that sabo
tage, banditry and terrorism were now the means of toppling
governments and taking control of free societies. Again
Klare augments this contention noting:
Local police are seen as the first line of de
fense against subersion, and with proper training
should be able to deal with internal disorder be
fore it grows into a full scale guerrilla movement
or mass insurrection.H
g
"A.I.D. Police Programs for Latin America, 1971-72,
"NACLA Newsletter Vol. 5, No. 3 (July-August 1971): 2.
9
The IPA is discussed below.
The New York Times, 29 February 1964 and Foreign
Assistance Appropriations, p. 81.
"A.I.D. Police Programs," p. 2.
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OPS police assistance thus takes on a unique character.
Its training functions being designed to train police in
counterinsurgency techniques that will enable them to handle
a variety of internal security problems where the use of
military forces might not prove feasible or appropriate.
In essence, then OPS trains police to carry out military
functions. This unique role of police forces as opposed
to military troops has been stressed by a number of persons.
Former AID Director Bell, in his testimony before the Senate
Committee, expressed his view saying:
. . . the police are a most sensitive point of
contact between government and people, close
to the focal point of unrest and more accep
table than the army as keepers of order over
long periods of time. The police are fre
quently better trained and equipped than the
military to deal with minor forms of violence,
conspiring and subversion.12
In an article entitled "The U.S. Public Safety Program (Po
lice Aid for Tyrants)," authors Nancy Stein and Michael
Klare quote Professor David Burks on this question, Burks
noted:
... I think we have to face a reality. The
reality is that when the insurgents appear, the
governments will call upon the army to eliminate
the insurgents. And, in most cases that I have
examined, this was not too difficult to do. But
there comes a point—and this came in Cuba in
1957 and 1958 when Castro was in the Sierra
Maestra—there can come a point where the army
cannot handle this kind of situation simply be
cause the military establishment tends to use
12
Foreign Assistance Appropriations, p. 73.
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too much force, tends to use the wrong tech
niques and tends, therefore, to polarize the
population and gradually force the majority
of those who are politically active to sup
port the revolutionary or insurgent force.1-3
In a RAND Corporation Study, In Search of Self-Reli-
ance: U.S. Security Assistance to the Third World Under
the Nixon Doctrine, Guy J. Paulker further expounds this
argument:
The activist mood of the early Kennedy years
led to use of MAP against the newly perceived
threat of "wars of national liberation." . . .
MAP's most serious deficiencies, however, re
sulted from continued belief in the efficacy
of convention military forces against insur
gencies and from the failure to recognize that
the military should have a supporting rather
than a primary role in counterinsurgency op
erations . . . The essential functions of gov-
erment forces in an insurgency are police and
police-intelligence activities. These functions
are low-cost. They are necessary for providing
continuous personal security to the population
and to the government's administrative appara
tus for counteracting the insurgency system.
The key target for governmental forces is the
insurgent movement's organization, not its
military forces. Identifying and penetrating
that organization is a police-intelligence
task. Eradicating it requires disrupting its
communications, isolating its components, and
targeting individual members—a combined task
for intelligence, police and supporting military
units. Thus, effective counterinsurgency calls
largely for police skills, while the special
military skills it does require are not char
acteristic of conventional armies.14
Michael Klare and Nancy Stein, "Police Aid for Ty
rants," The U.S. Military Apparatus (New York: North
American Congress on Latin America, 1972), p. 55.
14Guy Paulker, et al., In search of Self-Reliance;
U.S. Security Assistance to the Third World Under the
Nixon Doctrine (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1973),
p. 51, (emphasis in original).
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As the above statements make clear, the police can and
do enjoy a unique function in regards to internal security
matters that go far beyond rountine police investigation.
OPS officials are quite aware of that reality as it is
precisely that kind of police assistance training which the
agency provides. As has been pointed out earlier, its op
erational mandate emerged in the context of the cold war
as the Kennedy's sought to develop an appropriate counter
technique for the concept of wars of national liberation
in the third world.
It is in this context, then, that a more realistic
appraisal of AID'S "technical assistance" through public
safety programs can be assessed. Promoting and strengthen
ing the police as the "first line of defense" against in
cipient insurgency movements was thus a counterinsurgency
tactic whereby the United States and its trained allies
could eliminate these developments in their earliest stages,
Significantly, such a timely effective response by foreign
police would also forestall the need for a possible direct
intervention by the United States. In a very real sense,
it is this issue which lies at the heart of basic counter-
insurgency foctrine. General Maxwell Taylor, the Chairman
of Kennedy's Counter-Insurgency Group (and one of the chief
architects of the overall policy) in a speech at graduation
15
Klare and Stein, "Police Aid," p. 55.
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ceremonies of the International Police Academy expressed
this point most succinctly when he said:
The outstanding lesson of Vietnam is that we
should never let another Vietnam-type situa
tion arise again. We were too late in recog
nizing the extent of the subervise threat, we
appreciate now that every young, emerging
country must be constantly on the alert,
watching for symptoms which, if allowed to
develop unrestrained, may eventually grow in
to a disastrous situation such as that in
South Vietnam. We have learned the need for
a strong police intelligence organization to
assist in identifying early the symptoms of an
incipient subversive sitution.-Lb
Interpreting this argument, Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman
note, "this is call for counter-revolutionary policy states,
one that has widely headed in the United States1 sphere of
17
influence."
OPS, however, is rather cautious in stating the overt
political implications of its mission. The agency has thus
developed a broad, alternative set of sanitized explana
tions as to how it implements its program of "technical
assistance." Accordingly, OPS lists the objectives of its
program as being:
(1) strengthening the capability of civil police
and paramilitary forces to enforce the law and
maintain public order with the minimum use of
physical force, and to counter communist-inspired
or exploited subversion and insurgency; and (2) en
couraging the development of responsible and human
police administration and judical procedure to
improve the effectivess of civil police and para
military forces, and enable them to be more closely
Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Washington
Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston: South End
Press, 1979), p. 100.
Ibid., p. 100.
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integrated into the community.18
In order to successfully accomplish these objectives
the agency provides the following essential services:
(1) provides advanced training to senior police
officers at the International Police Academy in
Washington, D.C. and at other police schools in
the United States (See Appendix 5 and 6); (2) the
stationing of 'public safety advisors' in selected
third world countries to provide training for rank
and file police officers at the country's national
police headquarters (see Appendix 5); and (3) by
making direct grants of specialized police equip
ment, including riot gasses, pistols, shotguns,
gas masks, raios and walkie-talkies, patrol cars,
jeeps and computers (See Appendix 7) A9
Through such a program of instruction and assistance, OPS
officials were confident that foreign police would markedly
improve their performance and effectiveness. They assumed
major achievements would be in the following areas:
(1) a capability for regular police operations,
with (2) an investigative capability for de
tecting and identifying criminal and/or sub
versive individuals and organizations and neu
tralizing their activities, and with (3) a
capabality for controlling militant activities
ranging from demonstrations, disorders, or riots
through small-scale guerrilla operations.20
While the above lays the general format of OPS opera
tions, it is found that individual programs are initiated
only at the request of a foreign government. OPS officials
then dispatch an on-the scene investigation team of tech
nicians who determine the particular needs and requirements
18
Foreign Assistance Appropriations, p. 72.
and Stein, "Police Aid," p. 56.
Michael Klare, "U.S. Police Assistance Programs in
Latin America," U.S. Military and Police Operations in the
Third World (New York: North American Congress on Latin
America, 1970), p. 10 and Klare and Stein, "Police Aid," p.60.
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of a country in accordance with the above stated objec
tives. If approval is given OPS then selects any neces
sary personnel from an inter-agency pool composed of the
FBI, CIA, Immigration and Naturalization Services, Border
Patrol, Secret Service, Bureau of Narcotics and Customs
and the police and security services of the United States
21
military are utilized.
In regards to areas of instruction, OPS provides both
traditional and non-traditional training. The traditional
instruction includes: concepts and principles of police
organization, administration, management and investigation,
basic police operations, scientific and technical aids,
border control and internal security security subjects. It
is under the internal security heading that OPS expands into
the non-traditional police trainging which includes such
subjects as intelligence, communications, riot-control and
counterinsurgency. It is these non-traditional areas which
focus on the actual political objectives of OPS.
Insofar as finance is concerned, the OPS program of
training and instruction is a relatively low cost operation.
It does not involve a large financial, personnel or major
weapons and equipment expenses. Designed as a low cost or
no cost operation, it is the make-up of the training instru-
tion program that is perhaps crucial to OPS officials. In
21
Foreign Assistance Appropriations, p. 73.
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focusing its efforts on the above mentioned areas the pro
gram allows OPS to exert significant influence over foreign
police departments insofar as their orientation and long
term operation are concerned. Thus, one AID document
concludes that despite the small size of the training pro
gram, "for U.S. objectives it provides the necessary lever-
age.»22
The above is no accidental feature of OPS functions.
It was clearly designed to operate as both a unique and in
fluential agency. A State Department memorandum issued in
November 1962 attest to this point when it declared that
AID:
vest the office of Public Safety with primary
responsibility and authority for public safety
programs and gives that office a series of
powers and responsibilities which will enable
it to act rapidly, vigorously and effectively
. . . powers greater than any other technical
office or division in AID.^3
The most frequently referred to example of these powers con
cerns the speed of operations under which OPS can go into
action. This is important in view of the rapidly changing
dynamics of an internal security problem. To do so the
agency has devised means of delivering equipment, training
and advice in only a few days. OPS officials often point
with pride to the successful utilization of these methods
in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic where they quickly
22Klare and Stein, "Police Aid," p. 73.
23
Foreign Assistance Appropriations, p. 76, (author's
emphasis).
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came to the aid of these threatened governments.
As noted earlier, OPS's main training center was in the
International Police Academy (IPA) located in Washington,
D.C. It is there that police from around the world came
for instruction. Prior to this location, the IPA was
known as the Inter-American Policy Academy located at Fort
Davis in the Panama Canal Zone. At this time the Academy
was used primarily to train police from the western hemis
phere. With the move to Washington in 1964, the operation
was expanded to train police on a worldwide basis although
most students still came from Latin America.
The course curriculum of IPA ranged from routine,
conventional police techniques as well as advanced training
in any of ten specialties, included among these specialties
were Immigration and Customs Control, Protection of Digni
taries, and Criminal Violence Control (i.e., Airline Se
curity, Bomb Threats, Kidnapping, Extortion and Assassina
tion) . (See Appendix 8). Extensive use is also made of
training films with such titles as "The Police Baton," "The
24
Third Challenge," "The Use of Tear Gase to Preserve Order."
A main film consistent with the stated purpose of the Academy
is entitled "The First Line of Defense." Aside from this
traditional emphasis however, Michael Klare notes, "the
primary purpose is to provide training in paramilitary
24
Langguth, Hidden Terrors, p. 127.
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operation and urban counterinsurgency." Accordingly, it
is no surprise that a standard aspect of the IPA curricu
lum included spending time at the John F. Kennedy Special
Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. There stu
dents were given instruction in counterinsurgency and
guerrilla warfare techniques. Additionally, OPS also of
fered extended courses in counterinsurgency training at the
United States Army School of the Americas (USARSA) located
at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone (See Appendix 9).
While the above constitute the main aspects of OPS
training, it does not exhaust the area of instruction. Its
least publicized courses, which might be considered para
legal, include bomb and torture training. Both areas, when
revealed, caused a great deal of political embarrassment
and criticism for OPS. The course was taught not at the
26
IPA, but at a secret military base at Los Fresnos, Texas.
Here in a course called T.A.I. (Investigation of Terrorist
Activities), students were sworn to secrecy and taught to
handle a variety of explosives including C-3 and C-4 plastic
bombs as well as TNT. The issue which brought on some of
the political embarrassment was the revelation that the
25
Michael Klare, "U.S. Military Operations in Latin
Operations in Latin America," U.S. Military and Police
Operations in the Third World (New York: North American
Congress on Latin America, 1970), p. 8.
26
Langguth, Hidden Terrors, p. 242. These revelations
increased the criticism of the Office of Public Safety and
led to its closing as well as the International Policy
Academy in 1975.
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courses were taught by the CIA. Significantly, as A. J.
Langguth explains, political damage resulted from the fact
that the CIA taught students not how to destroy bombs, but
only how to build them.
Perhaps even more damaging was the publicizing of OPS
instruction in torture training. In what were publicly
called Survival Schools, training was conducted by the Navy
at two installations in California and Maine; and by the
Army at Fort Bragg and on an island off the coast of Brazil.27
It was these revelations that gave real substance to critics
in the United States and abroad who condemned OPS as an
agency of political repression. In Latin America, where
the police reputation for torture was most ominous, the
revlations were more damaging, since it was from there that
IPA received most of its students.
Turning to the specific OPS program of Colombia, the
policy was implemented in 1963 as an aspect of the Plan
Lazo operation designed to eliminate the guerrilla move
ments in the country. This basic premise is central to
the overall OPS effort in Colombia, the program clearly
having a political and military objective. OPS officials,
however, as noted earlier, in spelling out the objectives
of the program avoid reference to these political objectives,
instead they tend to stress their concerns for traditional
27Ibid., pp. 225-226.
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police matters as the purpose of their assistance. Thus, in
a letter to the head of the Plan Lazo operation, General Al
berto Ruiz Nova-Minister of War,28 OPS official spelled out
the rationale for the program saying:
If it is the desire of the Government of Colom
bia that a program of technical assistance and
cooperation be established, as has been previously
SeSi irneM°ff-r the followin9 suggestions. Y
/WD'S*AI M1SS1on, subject to the approval of
AID/Washmgton, could provide technical assis
tance, training and selected items of police
equipment. Technical assistance would be pro
vided by a group of experienced U.S. technicians
who would provide technical assistance in all
phases of police activity . . . Although the
general objectives would be that of over-all
improvement of the police, we suggest, subject
to your approval, the following specific objectives:
the improvement of riot control capability, im
provement and extension of the radio network, more
mobility and more patrol coverage, the use of
firearms reloading equipment so that firearms
training can be intensified, certain modifica
tions m training so as to provide more field
exercise and demonstrations, and a more in
tensive public relations program.29
As noted earlier, the OPS police program constituted a
phase of the Plan Lazo operation. Hence, the letter to
General Ruiz, head of the campaign is significant. OPS's
connection to Plan Lazo was based on Robert Kennedy's earlier
stated premise that the police constituted the "first line
of defense" against subversion. The internal security situa
tion at this time, 1963, was quite grave as the guerrillas
28, „. .
As Minister of War, under the original structure of
CommandOmbian Police' Ruiz also headed the Colombian Police
29
For the full text of this letter, see Appendix 10.
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constituted a real threat to the stability of the govern
ment. The OPS program, along with the other forms of
United States military assistance, was thus deemed essen
tial by both Colombian and American officials. It was
felt that the program would contribute greatly to the ef
fort of eliminating the insurgent threat. OPS, then,
had clear political motives, as national security was just
as important as the desire to upgrade the conventional
capabilities of the Colombian police. In this context it
is also significant that the original structure of the
Colombian National Police placed the department under the
direct control of the Minister of War, the person respon
sible for the national security of the country.
These national security concerns are revealed both
implicitly and explicitly in two documents recently de
classified by the author concerning the OPS police assis
tance program in Colombia. The documents are, Report on
the Police of the Republic of Colombia (The National Po
lice, The Administrative Department of Security) and Term
ination Phase-Out Study: Public Safety Project Colombia.
The concerns are spelled out in a set of objectives, recom
mendations and conclusions for the Colombian police. In
the first instance, OPS established a set of objectives for
Except where otherwise noted the material on OPS's
police assistance program in Colombia is taken from these
two documents. Both documents were declassified under the
Freedom of Information Act on June 5, 1979.
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the two divisions of the police structure, the National Po
lice and the Department of Administrative Security (DAS).
For the National Police the following objectives were
set out:
1. Improve vigilance and patrol so as to prevent
crimes and provide more protection to the public.
2. Reduce violence in the rural areas.
3. Extension of public relations programs so that it
will operate on a wider scope.
4. Increase the number of technical police materials
in the training schools.
5. Conduct a study of the present legal system with
recommendations for improvement.
6. Provide additional arms and transportation to the
police in the rural areas.
7. Conduct an intensive study of the present communi
cations network, so that plans can be made for improvement
in this area.
For the DAS, a division designed for intelligence in
vestigation under the direct authority of the Colombia pres
ident, a similar set of objectives were established. These
were:
1. Improve the quality of DAS personnel through better
recruitment, training and supervision.
2. To recommend an improved concept of the mission
and jurisdiction of DAS.
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3. To coordinate the functions of DAS with those of
the National Police and the Armed Forces.
4. To improve transportation services, technical ser
vices and communications system in DAS.
5. To recommend an improved program of public rela
tions in DAS.
6. To examine the security procedures within DAS
against penetration by alien and subversive groups and to
recommend improvements.
7. To develop an intelligence capability in DAS in
the areas of subversive activities and rural violence.
In addition to the above set of objectives, OPS of
ficials also laid out a program of action that included
recommendations for the police. A selected review of
those recommendations highlight OPS's concern and effort
to eliminate not only the traditional crime problems of
the country, but moreso the political trouble pertaining
to the insurgency and national security. Separate sets of
recommendations were established for both of the police,
the National Police and the DAS.
For the National Police, OPS first brought attention
to the attending economic and sociological problems that
accompanied in insurgency problem. Particular concern was
expressed about the urban population problem due to large
internal migrations from the rural areas of the country.
Recognizing the long term problem of such a trend, it was
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recommended that intensive preparations begin to contain
possible future civil disturbances. This was to include
training in modern nonlethal riot control techniques as
well as updating of riot control equipment (i.e., fresh
tear gas, and longer twenty-inch police batons).
In regards to the actual insurgency problem, the Na
tional Police were advised to develop a greater degree of
coordination between themselves and the military in pur
suing the guerrillas. Since the insurgent threat at this
time was primarily located in the rural areas, it was con
sequently recommended that the joint police military effort
concentrate on reducing the violence in those areas. Working
together it was suggested that improved police efforts in
towns and cities would release free military units for
operations aginst the insurgents in the rural areas. Simul
taneously, OPS advocated a much more vigorous and intensive
pursuit of the insurgents. Speaking on the insurgent tac
tics and the necessity to counter those methods, the Report
on the Police of the Republic of Colombia commented:
when not engaged in actual operations, the banits
separate and conceal themselves as law-abiding
members of the community. Thus they must be
identified and hunted down through police inves
tigative methods which are also necessary to
secure evidence on which to base prosecutions.31
U.S. Department of State, Agency for International
Development, Office of Public Safety, Report on the Police
of the Republic of Colombia, n.p., (1962), p. 3.
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Going even further, in an astonishing statement that might
easily be interpreted as an implicit catchword or endorse
ment for offically sanctioned terror, OPS officials remarked:
"It is apparent that most members of that bandit gangs are
beyond any hope of rehabilitation and, there, should be han-
32
died with relentless determination."
Finally, in a more technical vein, it was recommended
that the National Police improve various types of equipment
and facilities. Most important would be a new communications
system capable of providing nationwide twenty-four hour con
tact. In addition, the acquisition of equipment to develop
an identification records system as well as more appropriate
firearms (shoutguns and carbines) was suggested.
Turning to the DAS division of the police, OPS also de
veloped a set of recommendations indicating a similar concern
for matters pertaining to national security. Importantly,
DAS was originally conceived as an intelligence organization
under whose jurisdiction the matters of subversion and na
tional security would fall. In this context two recommen
dations deserve particular attention. The first was the
suggestion that the DAS increase its identification files
on suspected subversives. Criticizing the DAS's lack of
attention to the violence at the time, OPS suggested greater
concern for various forms of subversion which in its words
"may constitute as great a danger to internal security." A
32
Ibid., p. 3., (author's emphasis).
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second recommendation, somewhat similar to the earlier men
tioned OPS suggestion, calling for the forceful repression
of insurgents, reinforces the call to pursue subversives
with greater intensity. The recommendation reads:
DAS should intensify its countersubversive ac
tivities. It should concern itself with any
groups, whether of the left or the right, which
is dedicated to the overthrow of the Constitu
tional Government. It should increase its
efforts to penetrate such groups, to develop
informants, in labor and student circles, and
should employ all legal [sic] means to obtain
accurate and timely information on all plans
and activities potentially detrimental to the
security of the country.33
In implementing these OPS recommendations as a part of
Plan Lazo, it is clear that at this time the main national
security consideration steemed from guerrilla activity in
the rural areas of the country. With the successful mili
tary campaigns of 1964 and the consequent destruction of
the independent communist republics, there was a gradual
shift in the focus of the national security threat. The old
guerrilla forces as well as new groups now began to concen
trate their activities in the urban areas. Moreover, an in
creasing pattern of rapid urbanization compounded this new
concern.
By 1965 the combination of these developments created
a major urban crisis that threatened the stability of the
government itself. Guerrilla forces, particularly the Army
33Ibid., p. 9.
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of National Liberation, had initiated a major urban cam
paign of kidnapping and terror. Over a one year period
34
there were more than 150 kidnappings. Wealthy business
men and foreign businesses were the main victims of these
kidnappings and physical assaults. The implications of
this campaign were quite threatening. A New York Times
article entitled, "A Wave of Terror Sweeps Colombia," ex
pressed the gravity of the crisis when it commented:
In recent weeks a nationwide wave of kidnapping,
assaults and threats has become the gravest threat
to the country's stability . . . there is a gen
eral agreement that the incidents are highly fav
orable to any group seeking the overthrow of gov
ernment or the collapse of the social system.35
OPS took note of these developments and began to re-
focus the direction of its police assistance in Colombia.
Interestingly, the urban violence issue proved not to be
an isolated problem affecting only Colombia. Instead, the
phenomenon was fast becoming a most pervasive threat through
out the Latin American continent. Thus by the early 1970's
the primary focus of OPS concerns in Latin America centered
on urban guerrilla activities. In OPS's 1971-72 AID Police
Plan, an indication of this concern for the trend is spelled
out saying:
The problem of terrorism has continued to be
troublesome. It is becoming increasingly
serious and is likely to remain an unstabi-
lizing factor in many Latin American countries.
This situation is characteristically manifested
by the acute, intense urban terrorist activities,
34The New York Times, 21 March 1965.
35The New York Times, 29 March 1965.
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including assassinations of police officers,
bombings and kidnappings of indigenous and
foreign government officials ... .36
Reporting for the New York Times, Tad Szulc noted that be
ginning with fiscal years 1972 funding, OPS implemented the
new strategy to combat the urban violence problem. He
writes:
The new strategy, however, centers on the moderni
zation of the police forces and their instruction
in antisubversion techniques. The emergence of
urban guerrillas, notably in Latin America, was a
factor in the changing strategy.37
In regards to Colombia, Szulc notes that it was one of
the countries in Latin America where urban guerrillas were
a problem and thus was one of the places where OPS's new
strategy was introduced. As a result, Colombia was se
lected to receive an increase in AID appropriations. Such
a strategy for the urban centers in Colombia had become
quite appropriate. This was particularly true after the
Colombian military's campaign in 1973 that eliminated the
guerrilla's rural apparatus. With that defeat an urban
guerrilla warfare strategy had become a necessary although
perhaps desperate option.
The above information thus lays the general background
concern of OPS in Colombia. As an integral aspect of Plan
36
"A.I.D. Police Plan for 1971-72," NACLA Newsletter
Vol. 5, No. 3 (July-August 1971): 13.
37
The New York Times, 13 June 1971.
179
Lazo, OPS sought to improve the overall operation of the
police consistent with the belief that they were the first
line of defense against subversion. Towards that end a
wide-ranging program of assistance was implemented. At
this point then, the chapter will look at the specific de
tails of the OPS public safety police assistance program
in Colombia.
While the OPS program was not of staggering financial
expense, it must be borne in mind that the policy was de
veloped as a low-cost operation. It must also be recalled
that according to OPS's own analysis, the concentration of
its efforts in key areas of police work, gives it the "neces
sary leverage" it needs in spite of minimal expenditures.
Even so, however, the overall operation and expenditures
were of considerable significance. Expanding an operational
period of eleven years, from 196 3 to 1974, the program re
quired expenditures totalling over six million dollars.
Appropriation levels fluctuated reaching their highest point
in 1966 when expenditures surpassed the 1.7 million dollar
mark. In part, the peak expenditures can be attributed to
the crisis in the urban violence which began at that time.
The expenditures then declined until the implementation
of OPS's new urban counter-terriorist strategy in the 1971-
72 period wherein Colombia was selected as one of the special
cases. A chart of yearly expenditures from 1962 to 1973 is
presented in Appendix 11. To the total United States
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expenditures it is also necessary to consider the Colom
bian government's contribution, which totalled almost two
million dollars. A similar chart of the Colombian govern
ment expenditures is presented in Appendix 12. As a re
sult of these expenditures the police assistance program
was the second largest in Latin America. It should also
be added that this funding contributed to the massive growth
and expansion of the Colombian National Police. Since the
OPS program was instituted in 1963 the size of the police
grew from 35,000 to 50,000 by 1970. The urban strategy of
the 1971-72 period led to a further increase of 13,000 by
1974. Today the National Police number more than 75,000
making it the largest of Colombia security organization,
surpassing the combined strengths of the Army, Navy and
Air Force.
A central aspect of the total United States expendi
tures was the portion spent on commodity items. These
commodity expenditures accounted for over 3.2 million of
the total. A detailed list of the expenditures and the
specific commodities is found in Appendix 13. Examining
these items it is clear that the most important acquisition
pertains to communications equipment acquired over the eleven
year period. As pointed out earlier, OPS officials con
sidered this to be one of the areas in which the Colombian
police were most deficient. Hence it was one of the key
areas it recommended for major improvements. The fulfillment
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of the recommendations must be considered one of the major
successes of the program. This success is suggested in the
Termination Phase-Out Study where it notes:
The Communication Section has been reorganized
to provide all essential functions . . . the
section is completely self-sustaining in that it
has a modern well-equipped training center to pro
vide both basic technician training and advanced
re-training . . . The Communications operational
facilities of the National Police include modern,
high-speed data circuits and voice communications
between the Directorate General in Bogota and de
partmental commands throughout the country . . .
The major cities of Colombia have standard NP
mobile and portable communications capabilities.
Other cities have a limited urban tactical com
munications capability.38
Aside from these developments, the police in 1974 ordered an
additional $800,000 procurement of modern communication
equipment.
In regards to OPS personnel, who administered the pro
gram, the number of advisors assigned to Colombia has ranged
from one in 1963 to as many as seven in 1966. All total
there have been seventeen public safety advisors in Colombia.
A list of their names and assignments from 1963 to 1974 is
provided in Appendix 14. In addition to the above, there
were also twenty-one other public safety advisors who were
assigned for specialized assistance serving various lengths
of time on a temporary basis. This temporary specialized
assistance covered a range of assignments including crim
inalities, firearms, telecommunications and indus-
OQ
Termination Phase Out Study, Public Safety Project,
Colombia n.p., (April 1974), p. 23.
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trial security. Included among this group was none other
than the first director of OPS, Byron Engle, who visited
Colombia for consultation during the infant stages of the
the program in 1964. Complete details on the temporary
advisors, the time and length of service and the respective
assignments is listed in Appendix 15.
The final major aspect of the OPS program centered on
the United States sponsored training of Colombian personnel.
In the eleven years of operation, a total of 545 persons
received instruction including 46 0 National Police and DAS
agents at either the Inter-American Police Academy or the
International Police Academy. A list of the institutions
where Colombian personnel received instruction and the re
spective number trained at each location is provided in
Appendix 16.
The instruction received at the IPA was considered to
be of major importance in contributing to the overall im
provement and quality of the Colombia police. The courses
offered were both wide-ranging and varied. The curriculum
included two sets of instructions. One area was labelled
"General Course Specialization" and secondly, a separate
category entitled "Technical Specialist Training." Under
these two headings a variety of subjects were covered in
cluding Criminal Investigation, Riot Control, Immigration-
Customs Control, Communications, Rural Policing and Police
Operations. One course of particular interest under the
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Technical Specialist Training category was listed as Bomb
Investigation. As noted earlier, this was the course where
students were taught how to manufacture explosives and con
sequently created a mild outrage when revealed to members
of Congress. a complete list of the courses of instruc
tion and the number of students taking the respective sub
jects is provided in Appendix 16.
The training and instruction offered at the IPA has
proved to be most beneficial not only to the Colombian po
lice, but also to OPS in a political context. The long
term ties and contacts developed between Colombian police
and OPS officials has been greatly enhanced. Accordingly,
it should be noted the most high-ranking members of the
Colombia police, including various Directors as well as 85
percent of the senior Colonels of the National Police have
graduated from the IPA.40 Colombian police officials have
often praised the Academy where they take the instruction
very seriously and consistently finish with very high aca
demic ranking. In this context, the political value to
OPS and the United States in general, is best expressed by
the somewhat astonishing, yet most revealing observation,
that "Colombian police officers look toward the IPA as their
•Alma Mater1 and are seriously interested in its future."41
39
See Michael Klare, "The Reality Behind the State of
Siege," The Nation (December 1973), p. 622.
40
Termination Phase Out, pp. 30-31.
41Ibid., p. 31.
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In assessing the overall impact and effectiveness of
the OPS program in Colombia, it is clear that the National
Police and DAS have made major improvements in the quality
of their operation. In the areas of professionalism, or
ganization and administrative competence, tremendous strides
have been made. Moreover, in the two key areas of police
work, routine crime control and internal safety, the Colom
bian police developed its operation to the point where these
problems no longer loom as threatening crises. Signifi
cantly, in the latter area of internal security—which was
OPS's main concern, the Colombian police have been most
effective in challenging the efforts of urban guerrillas.
To date they have prevented the guerrillas from becoming
a major force capable of toppling or seriously weakening
the government. Two key statements in the Termination
Phase-Out Study shed pertinent light on this point. The
first, optimistic view of the internal security problem in
1974 argues:
National Police officials contacted by the team
(OPS) foresee no serious threat of internal se
curity in Colombia in the near future. While
the activities of guerrilla groups will require
the continued attention of the security forces,
current indications are that they are not likely
to again become a matter of real concern.42




Urban violence in the form of civil distur
bances is an always present possibility in
Colombia. This potential is especailly
notable in the young, particularly in the
universities. Many of Colombia's young peo
ple are deeply concerned with the economic
and social conditions which afflict the na
tion. Unemployment can also affect the in
ternal security because of the dissatisfac
tion and unrest this always brings. Such a
situation is ripe for agitation for political
purposes, and even without this artificial
stimulation, could lead to outbreaks of
urban violence.43
As the second statement suggested, the possibility for
continued internal security porblems in the urban areas was
eventually borne out. A number of urban guerrilla movements,
the May 19th movement (M-19) in particular, re-emerged in
the 1970's. Accordingly, a World Press Review article de
scribes Colombia as "the last South American nation where
the wave of such movements in the 1960's has not died down."44
While M-19's activities do not constitute a major threat to
the stability of government, they have become an increasingly
troublesome and embarrassing problem. The group's heist of
5,000 weapons in the capital city of Bogota on January 2,
1979 forced the government to initiate what has been termed
a massive campaign of repression by the police which resulted
in the arrests of thousands of people.45 Furthermore, M-19's
Ibid., p. 5.
44
Gwynne Dyer, "Day of Terrorists," World Press Review
(June 1980), p. 49. ■
45
The Guardian, 28 March 1979. Campaigns such as this
and the need for constant vigilance, despite the police for
ces increased professionalism, have led to charges of torture
and brutality by the police. Charges like these which are
levelled against many Latin American police are invariably
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taking of fourteen foreign diplomats as hostages at the
Dominican Republic's embassy in February 1980, proved to
be both a domestic and international embarrassment. Thus,
the problems of urban terrorists by organized guerrilla
groups has the potential to become a serious problem. One
factor which further aggraveted the potential seriousness
of the urban violence has been the rapid pattern of urban
migration. From 1970 to 1980 the population of the capi
tal city, Bogota, more than doubled. Moreover, other major
cities in Colombia face the same problem to the extent that
the country is now more than sixty-five percent urban.
Overall, however, the Colombian police at this point
have proved to be quite capable of containing most problems
before they reach crisis propotions. The police's consis
tent expansion in terms of manpower and resources give every
indication that it will be able to continue to operate in
this manner. Hence, a final assessment of the Colombian
police and the effectiveness of the OPS program reads:
There are few countries in Latin America that can
show as much progress with their National Police
as Colombia. The dedication and professional at
titude of the Officer Corps is most commendable.
This is not to say that all problems with the
Colombia National Police are,solved, . . . However,
the National Police of Colombia are now much better
prepared to solve these problems after being ex
posed for eleven years to Public Safety advice and
assistance.46
attributed to the police forces connections with OPS which
has been widely criticized for contributing to such terror
tactics by these government agencies.




In concluding this study on Colombia, the paper at
tempted to show how the United States concern for internal
security led to the implementation of a program of counter-
insurgency. The program was one which provided assistance
to the government of Colombia in order to help eliminate
an internal insurgency threat from groups seeking the over
throw and political reorganization of that society. While
the concerns of this study specifically focused on the bi
lateral program with Colombia, it also attempted to illu
strate the point that counterinsurgency as a policy ex
tended itself throughout the region.
To be sure, however, the Colombian case stands out as
perhaps the one classic case of successful counterinsur
gency program. It was a groundbreaker in regards to its
scope, longevity and success. As it was implemented the
program incorporated what came to be the basic phases of
a counterinsurgency policy (i.e., military action, civic
action, police assistance) and illustrated the ability of
such a program to grow gradually and function continually
over a period of years. In addition it was able to main-
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tain the critical feature of a counterinsurgency program
in limiting the United States role to that of a low-key,
but major supporting partner. Thus, while the United States
played a major role in planning, fiscal and material sup
port, the manpower requirements were handled primarily by
Colombian military personnel. Finally, in view of United
States officials characterization of the Colombian military
as the "world's premier counterinsurgency force," the pro
gram obviously illustrated its ability to have major im
pact in transforming the structure and character of a
country's armed forces.
To that extent, the counterinsurgency program repre
sented no simple project accomplishment, but rather the
growth and development of a process, whereby the concerns
of internal security and counterinsurgency became insti
tutionalized into the bilateral military relationship be
tween Colombia and the United States. In this way the
counterinsurgency operation and its related programs came
to be viewed and carried out not so much as a specialized,
highly publicized program, but moreso within the context
of a routine military mission.
On a continental level, this was true not only for
Colombia, but probably for many other countries as well.
The program in Colombia was significant in regards to its
timing as well as the level and consequences of its insur
gency threat. That particular threat deemed to be of a
greater consequence and requiring a more significant and
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on-going response from the United States. On the other hand,
the counterinsurgency concerns of the United States were
clearly expressed in other Latin American countries. Hence,
it can be argued that with the institutional bureauracies of
many governments any operation would probably be handled in
the context of a routine military mission. So just as there
was no public fanfare regarding the counterinsurgency program
in Colombia, the same might be true for these other countries.
Of course it would take a case by case analysis of many coun
tries to conclusively say that similar programs existed like
the one in Colombia.
This point concerning public attention brings to mind
another counterinsurgency case which eventually captured the
interest of the United States and the world. The case being
that of Vietnam. Its main significance, however, lies in
the fact that it was that conflict which led to the develop
ment of the counterinsurgency doctrine that was eventually
implemented as a specific program in Colombia. Oddly enough
while both operations had similar features, they differed
radically in public awareness and outcome.
At this point, then, it may be fruitful to offer some
brief comments on the development of the counterinsurgency
doctrine as it emerged in regards to the Vietnam conflict.
1
This section on counterinsurgency in Vietnam is drawn
from the author's Masters Thesis "World Revolution and Ameri
can Response: Counterinsurgency in Vietnam" (Masters Thesis,
Atlanta University, 1976.
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This will help to place the program in Colombia in a broader
prospective.
The actual development of the doctrine of counterinsur-
gency has its beginnings in the post world war two era. As
the colonial empires in the world began to break down, Ameri
can officials became increasingly concerned about the levels
of instability and social upheavals present there. The
feeling was that if such developments were not the actual
work of communist elements, they at least opened the doors
of opportunity for these interests. In the context of the
cold war, such events were viewed with grave concern. Ameri
can officials were strongly committed to keeping these na
tions either in the western alliance or neutral and most
definitely out of the Soviet bloc orientation.
A related and just as critical concern which emerged at
this time was the view of American officials that much of
the social unrest and political upheavals were of a revolu
tionary nature. Their view was that the pattern of the
violence itself was also of a special character. The spe
cial character was labelled guerrilla warfare or wars of
national liberation. The conflicts usually involved or
ganized political groups of leftist nature waging unortho
dox military campaigns against established governments. It
was the view of the United States that many of the guerrilla
conflicts were inspired or encouraged by external communist
influences. In particular, American officials believed the
Soviet Union was the major party behind these developments.
191
This view was confirmed in their minds after a speech by
Soviet Nikita Khruschev in January 1961 wherein he voiced
support for these wars of national liberation. In the
speech Kruschev commented :
Now a word about national liberation wars . . .
can such wars occur in the future? They can . . .
but these wars are popular uprisings. In other
words, can conditions be created in which people
lose their patience and rise in arms? They can.
What is the attitude of the Marxists toward such
uprising? A most positive one . . . The com
munist fully support such just wars and march
in the front ranks with the people waging libera-
struggles.2
With this view becoming the official government position,
American officials now say a need to develop an appropriate
response to what they saw as a new tactic of Soviet foreign
policy.
Prior to this development, the United States response
to hostile Soviet actions was assumed to be based on the
premise of a nuclear conflict. Labelled the doctrine of
massive retaliation, it assumed that any conflict with the
Soviet Union would be resolved in a nuclear war. Thus the
assumed new tactic of the Soviets, war of National Libera
tion, being of a sub-nuclear, limited war nature, left the
United States without an appropriate counter response.
The new American response was soon developed by Gen
eral Maxwell Taylor under what he called the policy of
"flexible response." In his book, The Uncertain Trumphet
2
Andrew Kauffman, "On Wars of National Liberation,"
Military Review (October, 1968), p. 32.
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he spelled out this new strategy saying:
It is my belief that Massive Retaliation as a
guiding strategic concept has reached a dead
end and that there is an urgent need for a re
appraisal of our strategic needs. In its hey
day, Massive Retaliation could offer our leaders
only two choices, the initiation of general nu
clear war or compromise and retreat. From its
earliest days, many world events have occurred
which cast doubt on its validity and exposed
its fallacious character. Korea, a limited
conventional war, fought by the United States,
when we had an atomic monopoly, was clear proof
of its universal efficacy. The many other lim
ited wars which have occurred since 1945 —
the Chinese civil war, the guerrilla warfare in
Greece and Malaya, Vietnam, Taiwan, Hungary,
the Middle East, Laos, to mention only a few —
are clear evidence that, while our massive retal
iatory strategiv may have prevented the Great
War — a World War III — it has not maintained
the Little Peace; that is, peace from distur
bances which are little only with the disaster
of general war . . .
. . . The Strategic doctrine which I would pro
pose to replace Massive Retaliation is called
herein the Strategy of Flexible Response. The
name suggest the need for a capability to react
across the entire spectrum of possible challenge,
for coping with anything from general atomic war
to infiltration and aggression such as threatened
Laos and Berlin in 1959. The new strategy would
recognize that it is just as necessary to deter or
win quickly a limited war as to deter general war . . .
With the election of President John Kennedy the ideas
of General Taylor found a receptive and responsive ear.
Much of what Taylor argued had been similarly expressed by
Kennedy. Thus he supported and pushed for the incorpora
tion of the flexible response strategy into United States
military policy. Commenting on these issues Kennedy noted
3General Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumphet, (New
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1960), pp. 5-6.
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Non-nuclear wars, and sub-limited or guer
rilla warfare, have since 1945 constituted the
most active and constant threat to free world
security . . . But both before and after 1953
events have demonstrated that our nuclear re
taliatory power is not enough. It is too
limited to justify atomic war. It cannot pro
tect uncommitted nations against a takeover
using local or guerrilla forces ... We must
regain the ability to intervene effectively
and swiftly in any limited war anywhere in the
world — augmenting, modernizing and providing
increased mobility and versatility for the con
ventional forces of the Army and Marine Corps
. . . It requires ... a whole new kind of
strategy, a wholly different kind of force and
therefore, a wholly different kind of military
training.4
The new strategy was counterinsurgency which would be
come the American response to challenge the wars of national
liberation. Towards the end Kennedy proceeded to establish
the organizational structure for the development of the
doctrine. That effort was centered in a high level inter
departmental committee called the Special Group for Coun
terinsurgency. In addition, all United States military
forces, especially the Army, were ordered to establish pro
grams and units to specialize in counterinsurgency training.
U.S., Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations,
1945-1967 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1971), Book 7, p. c-7 and Public Papers of the President.
John Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
5See Lt. Col. William Buchanana and Lt. Col. Robert
Hyatt, "Counter-Insurgency Political Structure," Military
Review, (Vol. XLVIII, September 1968, No. 9); also see
Lt. Col Bustav Gillert, "Composition and Organization of
the Special Group for Counter-Insurgency," Military Re
view (Vol. XLV, No. 4, April 1965).
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Significantly, the event which prompted the doctrine's
emergence was in Vietnam. A problem inherited as Kennedy
took office, it increasingly became a major concern and in
particular, the specific arena for the development and ap
plication of the new counterinsurgency strategy. It was
there that a pivotal challenge would take place between
the American concept for counterinsurgency and the guer
rilla war of national liberation being employed in Vietnam.
Vietnam would thus become a testing or battleground
between two superpower doctrines. On this point Noam
Chomsky has remarked:
Vietnam then provided an opportunity to prove to
Peking and Moscow that their policy of "wars of
national liberation: was dangerous and uncompro
mising and also provided both a challenge and op
portunity to test the new doctines of counterin
surgency. 6
This notion of testing ground was also expressed in
National Security Memorandum 288 (March 1964) which noted
that "the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a 'test
case1 of U.S. capacity to help a nation meet the communist
7
war of liberation . . ."
In an effort to develop a new strategy, Kennedy sent
a special mission to Vietnam. In doing so he said:
... We dare not fail to see the insidious na
ture of this new and deeper struggle. We dare
not fail to grasp the new concept, the new tools,
Noam Chomsky, For Reasons of State (New York: Pan
theon Books, 1971), p. 43.
7
Cited in Chomsky, p. 44.
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the new sense of urgency we will need to combat
it—whether in Cuba or South Vietnam.8
The mission was headed by General Maxwell Taylor and estab
lished what was known as the strategic concept of counter-
insurgency. It set out the basic tenets around which the
new strategy would be developed.
There were four tenets to the strategic concept. They
were: (1) separating, protecting and winning the support
of the local population; (2) developing military, para
military, and counter-guerrilla capabilities; (3) applying
political, economic and social measures to convert mili
tary victories into political gains; and (4) upgrading the
military capabilities of the South Vietnamese army and
limiting the American role to that of a supportive ally.
Kennedy was satisfied that a counterinsurgency program
based on these tenets offered the opportunity for a suc
cessful but limited American involvement.
Yet before the counterinsurgency strategy could be
fully developed, let alone implemented, President Kennedy
was assassinated. With his assassination the attempt to
implement the strategic concept also died. Lyndon John
son's step up to the Presidency provided him with an op
portunity to handle the Vietnam conflict in a more con
ventional military manner. Johnson himself was never im
pressed, nor did he favor the strategy of counterinsur
gency. His response then was to authorize the use of
8U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 4, p. b-22.
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more American manpower and military equipment. In sum,
there would now be a major role for the United Sates in
this conflict. Troop levels eventually surpassed the
500,000 mark. The strategy of counterinsurgency envision
ing a limited American role, as set out by Kennedy was
thus totally abandoned by Johnson who rapidly transformed
the conflict into an American war.
Interestingly, then, while the Vietnam conflict pro
duced the strategy of counterinsurgency, it was abandoned
there and it was subsequently in Colombia that the first
detailed specific program was implemented. Hence, the
earlier assertion that Colombia represents the one clas
sic case of a successful counterinsurgency program. Yet
in both cases, the original concern for the suppression of
revolutionary insurgencies was the same. As soon as the
counterinsurgency apporoach was dropped in favor or a more
conventional war effort, the two programs part their ways.
Both cases do however have roughly the same ten to fifteen
year time span. Yet the conventional approach of the John
son administration led to massive national and interna
tional protest, while the counterinsurgency program in
Colombia went on with no public attention and protest de
spite their initial similar objectives. It should be kept
in mind though that there was likewise no serious public
protest regarding the initial counterinsurgency effort in
Vietnam.
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This brings up the latest controversial counterinsur-
gency oriented effort, namely El Salvador. The recent de
cision of the Reagan administration to provide counterinsur-
gency type military assistance to the government of El
Salvador has sparked outcries of protest, many of which
have suggested that this action represents a parallel to
the Vietnam fiasco and will lead to a similar one there.
These arguments however tend to exhibit a misunderstanding
of both the policy of counterinsurgency as well as the
Vietnam conflict itself.
The arguments suggesting parallels to Vietnam do not
take into account one crucial, and perhaps more, difference
between the revolutionary movements in Vietnam and El Sal
vador. The critical difference being the considerable
political and military skills, resources and experience of
the Vietnamese revolutionaries which in no way can be com
pared to the guerrilla movement in El Salvador. It was the
tremendous military prowess of the Vietnamese guerrillas
which eventually led Johnson to abandon the counterinsur
gency effort of Kennedy. To argue that the guerrillas in
El Salvador have a similar level of military and political
capabilities is most questionable. The more appropriate
parallel would seem to be Colombia instead of Vietnam. In
these two cases, Colombia and El Salvador, the strengths
and weaknesses of the guerrillas seem more similar. In
both cases the ability of the guerrillas to defeat their
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their own governments, not withstanding any considerable
assistance from the United States, remains a question mark.
The real significance of the Reagan administration's
actions would seem to lie in the larger implications of
that decision. It suggests a return to a hardline posture
as well as a reversal of the so-called post-Vietnam syn
drome whereby the United States was reluctant to undertake
military actions abroad. The decision of Reagan draws a
sharp contrast between his administration's views on this
issue and those of President Carter. At the same time the
action gives initial indications that the United States
will also attempt to reinstitutionalize the counterinsur-
gency process for Central and Latin America.
In this context the administration is attempting to han
dle the El Salvador program as a routine bilateral military
mission. This is true in spite of initial administration
statements which indicated that the action had the elements
of a major foreign policy position in drawing a line against
subversive Soviet and Cuban activity in the region. Since
that time, however, the administration has tended to down
play the operation and also seems determined to limit the
United States role to a supportive one only. In doing this,
the Reagan administration will be able to routinely authorize
such actions as a part of the normal bilateral military mis
sion process. If so, counterinsurgency will have once again







































































VI Army Brigade, Tolima $ 9,820
VIII Army Brigade NA
III Army Brigade, Calle 969
I Army Brigade, Boyaca 38,126
IV Army Brigade NA
II Army Brigade 330
V Army Brigade NA
Reconnaissance Battalion NA
Airborne Battalion, META 1,999
1st Engineer Battalion Combat, 244
Tolima
1st Signal Company, Bogota 9,370
2nd Signal Company NA
1st Light Truck Company NA
1st Field Maintenance Company NA
2nd Field Maintenance Company, 870
Santander
Military Intelligence Unite 2,989
Information Unit NA
3rd Field Maintenance Company 7,217
Armament Maintenance & Supply NA
Depot
Signal Maintenance & Supply 11,693
Depot, Bogota
Automotive Maintenance & Supply NA
Depot
Engineer Maintenance & Supply NA
Depot
Military Institutes Brigade 6,849
MAP Training, Army 342,400
323,100
Armament FOS & Secondary 110,137
Items, Army 114,637
Signal FOS & Secondary 178,661
Items, Army 187,165
Automotive FOS & Secondary 256,165
Items, Army 268,967






































































































Special Air Warfare Squadron
(Fixed Wing)
Special Air Warfare Squadron
(Rotary Wing)
Air Force Training Squadron
(Fixed Wing
Air Force General Depot
Air Force Training Squadron
(Fixed Wing)
Air Force Operating Support
(MAP Training)
Air Force Operating Support





C - Internal Security

















































Source: Condensed from U.S. SOUTHCOM, Military Assistance Plan,
Colombia, Vol. II, n.p., n.d.
APPENDIX 2








ACTION PROGRAMS, FISCAL YEAR































































































































































































































Fiscal year 1962 was the first year civic action
assistance was so identified in MAP. Fiscal year 1967 is
estimated to have a worldwide total of $11,810.00.
2Less than 500.
Source: Edward B. Glick, Peaceful Conflict: The Non-Military
Use of the Military (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stack-
fole Books, 1967), p. 89.
APPENDIX 3
USAID EXPENDITURES FOR CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS




































































Source: Edward B. Click, Peaceful Conflict: The Non-Military
Use of the Military (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stack-
fole Books, 1967), p. 90.
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APPENDIX 4
LOCATION OF CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS
COLOMBIA
Barranquill
. . A-4 J-3
A-2 ft-3

















U.S., Southern Command, Civic Action Projects Report,
«-|J-uary 1965 tQ 31 December 1965, Vol. L, n.p.
Quarry Heights, Canal Zone, 1965), p. 247.
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APPENDIX 5
PUBLIC SAFETY TRAINING AND ADVISORY PROGRAMS
Foreign Police Personnel Resident Public Safety
Trained in the U. S., Advisors, as of June
Region & Country 1961-71 30, 1968
TOTAL, All Countries 6,812 407






Vietnam (South 382 200
Other Countries 33









CENTO/other countries 61 3
AFRICA, Total 843 27
Central Africa Rep. 7
Chad 8 2











Sierra Leone 3 4




Foreign Police Personnel Resident Public Safety
Region , Country ^^Si^ "" S"' "^Ig **»











Other countries 57 ~
90
Costa Rica 136
















Source: Michael Klare and Nancy Stein, "Police Aid for Tyrants."
.The U.S. Military Apparatus (New York: North American
Congress on Latin America, 1972), p. 59.
APPENDIX 6
POLICE TRAINING CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES
Institution Course and Description
Internal Police Academy,
Washington, D. C.
Senior Course (for high-level commanders) - instruction in
police organization, management, operation, planning and
research; communications; investigation; counterinsurgency
General Course (for middle-level police commanders) - train-
in police administration, organization and operations; in
ternal security, counterinsurgency and counter subversion;
riot control; scientific and technical aids; firearms, nar
cotics law enforcement; border patrol and customs. (In
English and French.)
Inter-American General Course - same as above, in Spanish.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
National Academy, Quantico, Va,
National Academy course of instruction - scientific and
technical topics involving police records, firearms and
ballistics, investigation procedures, police tactics.
o
00U. S. Post Office Department
Scientific Investigation Lab,
Washington, D. C.
Questioned Cocument Examination - scientific examination of
of documents.
International Police Services
School, Washington, D. C.
Police Records Management.
International Police Academy
and other Government Agencies
Special Actions & Riot Control (in French) - training for
civil disturbances and control of peaceful assemblages, in-
cluding handling of weapons and equipment.
Police Telecommunications Management -
Police Radio Communications
U. S. Coast Guard Training Center,
Yorktown, Va. and Coast Guard





Institution Course and Description
Southern Illinois University Penology and Corrections - (four courses) - Management of
of Correctional Institutions; Correctional Institution
Design and Construction; Correctional Relationships with
Juvenile and Criminal Courts; Probation and Parole Sys
tems.
Source: Condensed from U. S. Agency for International Development, Office of Public Safety,
Program Guide; Public Safety Training (Washington, D. C., 1968). Found in Michal
Klare and Nancy Stein, "Police Aid for Tyrants," The U. S. Military Apparatus (New-


























































































































































































































































































































aIncludes commodities delivered training in the Unted States, and in-
country training and advice provided by U. S. Safety Advisors.
Source: Michael Klare and Nancy Stein, "Police Aid for Tyrants,"
The U.S. Military Apparatus (New York: North American
Congress on Latin America, 1972), pp. 57-58.
APPENDIX 8
POLICE STUDIES OFFERED AT THE ACADEMY
Police Management Police Operations
The Changing Society Police Patrol
Police and National Security Police Communications System








Workshop in Police Organi
zation
Police Public Relations






























Introduction to Internal Security
Nature of Insurgency
Basic Framework for Counterinsur-
gency Policy
Operational Views of Insurgency
Introduction to Civil Disturbances
Records and Internal Security
Planning for Riot Control
Rio Control Formations
Photography in Civil Disturbances
Special Equipment for Control of
Civil Disturbances




* Environmental Factors of Insur
gency
* Economic Views of Insurgency
* Legal Considerations in Crowd
and Riot Control
Targets of Insurgency
** The Internal Security Services
** The Threat to Latin America
**Tactical Communications in
Control of Civil Disturbances
* Crowd and Mob Psychology
Counterinsurgency Intelligence
Source:
The Police and Resources Control
♦Offered in Senior Course Only Cause and Characteristics of Riots
**Offered in General Course Field Instructional Tour
Only
International Police Academy Review, January 1967. Found in A.I.D. Police Programs
for Latin America, 1971-72, NACLA Newsletter, Vol. 5, No. 3 (July-August, 1971), p. 9
APPENDIX 9
USARSA CATALOG
Course: 0-7, Urban Counterinsurgency. 34 students. 5 weeks.
Purpose: To provide students with an understanding of the
roles of local, regional, and national agencies in preventing
or combating urban disturbances. To develop an awareness of
the differences between rural and urban insurgency.
Scope: Theory, Tactics, and Equipment for Counterinsurgency
in Urban Areas; Police Activities; Management; Student Pre
sentations and Guest Speakers.
Prereguisities: Officers in grades from Major to Colonel or
equivalent representatives of police and other government
agencies with responsibilities in maintaining civil order
and public safety. Participants should come prepared to
(a) present a 30-minute conference on problem areas and solu
tions used to prevent or combat urban insurgency or civil
disturbances in their home countreis, and (b) discuss new or
unique equipment unsed in their countries to control urban
insurgency. Preparations for (a) and (b) should include
appropriate training aids.
Source: Condensed from USARSA Catalog, U.S. SOUTHCOM, Quarry
Heights, Canal Zone. Found in Latin America and
Empire Report, Vol. 8, No. 3 (March 1974), pp. 26-27,
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APPENDIX 10






Three technicians of A.I.D., at the request of your
government, recently made a study of the National Police,
copy of which is attached. It is our conclusion, as a re
sult of the study, that the police of Colombia have estab
lished a good organizational structure and good administra
tive procedures, but have certain shortcomings at the opera
tional level that limit their effectiveness. It is believed
that improvement at this level would enable the police to
maintain law and order more effectively.
If it is the desire of the Government of Colombia that
a program of technical assistance and cooperation be es
tablished, as have been previously indicated, we offer the
following suggestions. The U.S.A.I.D. Mission, subject to
the approval of A.I.D./Washington, could provide technical
assistance, training, and selected items of police equip
ment. Technical assistance would be provided by a group
of experienced U.S. technicians who would be assigned here
for a period of several years and who would provide techni
cal assistance in all general phases of police activity.
Training assistance would be provided locally through ar
rangements for selected police officials to attend training
courses in the United States and other areas. Some material
assistance, within financial limitations, could be provided
and would consist of that equipment necessary for implemen
tation of these programs and attainment of objectives mutual
ly agreed upon.
Although the general objective would be that of overall
improvement of the police, we suggest, subject to your ap
proval, the following specific objectives: the improvement
of riot control capability, improvement and extension of the
radio network, more mobility and more patrol coverage, the
use of firearms reloading equipment so that firearms training
can be intensified, certain modifications in training so as
to provide more field exercise and demonstration, and a more
intensive public relations program.
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If a program is mutually agreed upon, it will be neces
sary that the police provide the following: a liaison of
ficer to coordinate with the A.I.D. group, automotive trans
portation for U.S. technicians in their daily work and in
trips to the departamentos when made by motor vehicles;
sufficient office space and supplies for the technicians
and secretarial assistance. In the event that any equipment
is provided by A.I.A., the police also must provide ade
quate maintenance.
Please let us know whether you wish to continue with
plans for a program of technical cooperation and assistance
and whether you concur with plans and objectives described
herein. In the event that you concur, we will submit the
plan to A.I.D./Washington for final approval.
A final step will be implementation of a project agree
ment between this Mission and your Ministry.
Sincerely,
s/ Charles P. Fossum,
Mission Director
Source: U.S., Department of State, Agency for International
Development, Office of Public Safety, Report on the















































































Source: Termination Phase Out, Public Safety Project,
n.p., 1974, p. 58.
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APPENDIX 12
HOST COUNTRY CONTRIBUTIONS (US $)
CATEGORY 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 TOTALS
Technical &
Other Services 20.0 -0- 105.0 105.7 25.0 45.0 45.0 150.0 15.0 15.0 527.5
Commodities 3.0 224.0 100.0 173.0 25.0 35.0 35.0 -0- 32.0 32.0 658.0
Other Costs 68.5 106.0 200.0 42.5 75.0 50.0 50.0 4.0 38.0 38.0 672.0
TOTALS 90.5 330.0 405.0 323.0 125.0 130.0 130.0 154.0 85.0 85.0 1,857.5
Source: Termination Phase Out, Public Safety Project, Colombia, n.p., 1974, p. 57.
APPENDIX 13
COMMODITY PROFILE
FY 63 $706,000 800 .38 revolvers
500 .12 ga. riot guns
1,000 .30 Cal. carbines
22 rifles (unspecified)
40,000 .12 ga. shells (00)
50,000 .38 ammo





Ammo reloading tools and supplies
Misc. electrical eqt.
Lab, photo and tng eqt.
44 SSB transceivers
FY 64 $165,000 94 SSB back pack Transceivers
5 sedans
3 trucks
3 SSB base stations
21 multiplex speech-plus-tone units
1 elect, generator
20 outboard motors
17 auto TT machines
Crime lab eqt.
FY 65 $491,000 30 VHP-AM portable transceivers
100 VHF-AM hand carry transceivers
10 SSB transceivers
26 sedans
26 VHF-AM mobile station
4 VHF-AM desk top base stn.
10 SSB suppressed carrier rec.
4 SSB suppressed transmitter
31 VHF-AM portable transceivers
10 SSB transceivers






1,000 .30 cal. carbines
500 .38 cal. revolvers
150,000 rds, ammo (unspecified)
Chemical apparatus and supplies (unspecified)
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FY 66 $1,492,000 11,600 grenades, tear gas, CN
3,000 Projectiles, tear gas, CN
11,950 carbines, .30 cal. M-l
160,000 shotshells








Lot general camera and investigative eqt,
1,900 shotguns, riot, 12 gauge
Lot tools
2,390,000 cartridges, .30 cal., M-l





3 FM base stations




10 Transceivers (model SBT-204)
60 .38 revolvers
10,000 rds., .38 ammo
FY 67 $ 192,000 25 FM-1A, portable
44 FM-5A, mobile
7 HF Radio transmitters, SSB base
1 truck
8 sedans
Spare parts and equipment - commo
Misc. office equipment
Misc. spare auto parts
FY 68 $ 48,653 Misc. spare auto parts (excess)
1 Communications Control Center Console
w/accessories and spare parts
1 UHF Communications link
FY69 24,820 1 Lot, Communications Repair equipment
7 H.F. Receivers
2 H.F. SSB Transceivers
10 Transformers Avr
FY 70 -Vehicles $ 0 4 HF-SSB Transceivers
Telecom 35,36 9 4 Teletype equipment
Weapons 0 6 line amplifiers
General 4,500 3 Cameras
4 Chemical Analysis Kits
Total $39,868 3 Projector, Movie
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1 automatic document unit
1 lot Electronic hand tools
I lot radio spare parts
6 Bomb disposal units
II cameras
1 lot Photo develop equipment
1 Photo printer
2 safe lights
1 lot lab equipment
1 lot books
2 lot Lab equipment and supplies
1 lot commo repair parts
36 FP file cabinets
51 Narcotost Disposakits
17 cameras, 35mm
1 lot fingerprinting supplies
4 bomb disposal equipment
20 FM-5B




1 lot fingerprint supplies
20 dryers, flat pring
20 enlargers
20 Contact printers
1 dryer, drum print
1 lot Photographic equipment and
supplies
I video tape recording systems
w/accessories
18 35mm cameras w/accessories
23 TWX dialing units (TT)
II Teleprinters
1 lot spare parts for teletype
machines
10 pair binoculars
1 lot 35mm camera lenses
Source: Termination Phase Out, Public Safety Project, Colom
bia, n.p., 1974, pp. 52-53.
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Source: Termination Phase Out, Public Safety Project/ Colom
bia, n.p., 1974, p. 47.
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Louis LaBruzza 9/6 8
L. J. Goin
P. Ellena
Joseph Yager 6/6 9






































Telecom - this Advisor
was also in Colombia
in December 1963; how
ever, this is not re




















Source: Termination Phase Out, Public Safety Project, Colom-
bia, n.p., 1974, pp. 48-49.
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APPENDIX 16
UNITED STATES SPONSORED TRAINING
International Police Academy
— Senior Course 23
— General Course (See Table I) 341
— Narcotics Management 10
Police Executive 6
Technical Specialist Training (See Table II) 83
FBI National Academy 3
Inter-American Police Academy (Panama CZ) 79
TOTAL 545
TABLE I





















Penology & Corrections 4







NOTE: All figures are as of 4/40/74, and reflect completed
training only.
Source: Termination Phase Out, Public Safety Project, Colom
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